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Abstract
This thesis, presented as a theoretical contribution to the discipline of International 
Relations, describes the intellectual origins of the idea of the territorial state. The idea of 
the territorial state has a privileged place in International Relations for it is an integral 
element of Realism, the discipline’s dominant intellectual tradition. Realism assumes that 
the primary actors in the modem international system are states, as identified by their 
exercise of sovereignty over a delimited space or territory. In Realist history, the 
territorial state and the modem territorial international order emerged together, twin 
products of seventeenth century political theory and practice, as signified by political 
settlement of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
This thesis challenges the Realist narrative of the idea of the territorial state on 
two counts: methodologically and historically. First, it rejects the view that it is possible 
to account for the idea of the territorial state exclusively in terms of political practice and 
knowledge. It argues that the Realist idea of the territorial state needs to be understood 
as one expression of a much broader and more complex matrix of narratives -  social, 
political, philosophical and cultural -  about man’s capacity to know, represent and order 
the spaces of modernity.
Second, the thesis rejects the Realist history that dates the emergence of the 
territorial state to the seventeenth century. An alternative chronology is put forward that 
dates the origins of the idea of the territorial state to fifteenth and sixteenth century 
Renaissance Italy. The thesis argues that the first signs of the idea of the territorial state 
can be identified in various Renaissance spatial discourses: political, cosmological, 
artistic and cartographic. These spatial discourses and the practices they led to established 
the templates for thinking about and representing space in modernity, including those 
underlying the articulation of the idea of the modem territorial state.
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‘ In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map 
of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, 
the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer 
satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size 
was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The 
following Generations, who were not so fond of the study of Cartography as their 
Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some 
Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and 
Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that 
Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all of the Land there is no other Relic 
of the Disciplines of Geography.’1
the author must know that to classify is to embalm. Real identity is incompatible 
with schools and categories, except by mutilation.2
But I return to the subject of walls.3
1 Jorge Luis Borges, ‘On Exactitude in Science’ in Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley, 
(London, Allen Lane, 1999), p. 325.
2Mark Rothko, letter to the editor, Art News, 56:6 (December 1957), quoted in, Mark Rothko 1903-1970, 
Revised Edition, (London, Tate Gallery Publishing, 1999), p. 86.
3Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, (Cambridge MA, The 
MIT Press, 1994),
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The Renaissance Origins of the Idea of the Territorial State
This thesis is a work of intellectual or cultural history, presented as a theoretical 
contribution to the discipline of International Relations. It identifies the intellectual or 
discursive origins of the idea of the territorial state. The idea of the territorial state has 
long had a privileged place in the discipline of International Relations because it is an 
integral element of Realist theory, which since 1945 has been the main tradition of 
thinking about international politics. Realism assumes that the primary actors in the 
modem international system are states defined as political units exercising sovereignty 
over a defined territory. In Realist history, both the territorial state and the modem 
territorial international system emerged together in the seventeenth century.
This thesis challenges the Realist narrative of the idea of the territorial state by 
means of a double-edged critique. First, the thesis, which uses the approach of discourse 
analysis, rejects the view that it is possible to account for the idea of the territorial state 
exclusively in terms of political practice and knowledge. It argues that the Realist idea 
of the territorial state needs to be understood as one expression of a much broader and 
complex matrix of narratives -  social, political, philosophical and cultural -  about man’s 
capacity to know, represent and order the spaces of modernity.
Second, the thesis rejects the traditional Realist history of the territorial state, 
which claims that it emerged in the seventeenth century. My counter hypothesis is that 
the origins of the idea of the territorial state lie in fifteenth and sixteenth century 
Renaissance Italy. I shall show that the Italian Renaissance not only produced the idea of 
the territorial state in political discourse but also provided in discourses and practices as 
varied as cosmology, perspective and mapping, the underlying structures for thinking 
about and representing space that were to produce the modem idea of the territorial state.
Realism and the Westphalian Origins of the Territorial State
In the discipline of International Relations the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 have a 
privileged place. In the disciplines’ standard history, that of the dominant intellectual 
tradition of Realism, these settlements signified the moment when the modem
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international state system was bom. Westphalia signalled the end of the medieval 
European cartography of political order based in overlapping spheres of authority and 
centrifugal hierarchies centered on Pope and Emperor. The medieval order was replaced 
by a modem international order, a state system in which authority was layered 
horizontally, invested in individual states with equal claims to sovereign independence. 
So important is Westphalia to the Realist history of international relations that the 
modem states system is often referred to as the ‘European Westphalian system’. The 
exclusive signature of the Westphalian international system is that only states are 
recognised as legitimate political actors. This legitimacy is conferred by the status of 
sovereignty, which gives to state authorities the exclusive right of internal rule and 
guarantees that other states recognise this right and do not intervene in another sovereign 
state’s domestic affairs.
This work focuses on one element ofWestphalian sovereignty: the relationship 
between sovereignty and territory. If the Realist state is first and foremost sovereign, it 
is also most definitely territorial. As with sovereignty there is an internal and external 
consequence of territoriality. Raymond Aron derived from the fact that states were 
‘masters within their own frontiers’, each possessing ‘affagment ofthe earth’s crust, with 
the men and objects thereon’, that ‘[ejvery international order, down to our own day, has 
been essentially territorial. It represents an agreement among sovereignties, the 
compartmentalization of space.’1 The modem Westphalian international system is thus 
one of bounded, compartmentalised sovereign-spaces: a territorial order.2 This 
proposition is almost a truism for Realism. More recently, Stephen Krasner agrees that 
‘[t]he assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core element in any
1Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory oflntemationalRelations (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1966), p. 181.
2It should be noted that I am interested in the intellectual origins of a Realist concept, the idea
of the territorial state, rather than about the territorial state per se. Often it seems that the use of the term 
territorial state in Realist theory serves less as an accurate description of the modem state, than an ideal 
to be aspired to. If we take just one element of the idea of territorial sovereignty: the claim that between 
states there exist sharply defined boundaries, it is evident that even in the twentieth century the entire 
surface of the globe has not been neatly compartmentalised into sharply differentiated sovereign territorial 
units, but also includes many spaces where the boundaries are more porous, such as UN Protectorates, 
Imperial spheres of interest, mandates, trusteeships and neutral zones. Furthermore, many claim that state 
boundaries are being eroded by the interdependencies of modem economic life, markets and cultures. See, 
on the changing nature of boundaries, Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: 
An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System’, World Politics, 39:1 (Oct. 1986), pp. 27-52.
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definition of sovereignty’, the only alternatives being ‘either a world in which there are 
no clear boundaries or a world in which there is no final authority within a given 
territory.’3 This final authority is derived not only from the internal achievement of the 
monopoly of violence but also from positive belief in a state system organised around the 
principle ‘that political life must be territorially organized with one final authority within 
a given territory.’4
Krasner highlights an important element of the sovereignty-territory relationship: 
the catalytic role of violence. The ‘Realist-state’ of the Westphalian system is, notes 
Daniel Deudney, imagined as ‘a hierarchically organized protection-providing entity, 
monopolizing violence in a particular territory and possessing sovereignty and autonomy. 
States were built by concentrating armed force at the centre ... by disarming autonomous 
feudal lords, communal militias, mercenaries, and duelling aristocracies.’5 This 
understanding of the state is based in a paradigm established by Max Weber, and 
currently favoured by historical sociologists, that defines the state as an organisation that 
successfully upholds the exclusive legitimate right to exercise the means of violence for 
the maintenance of order over a defined territory.6 The presence of the Weberian idea of 
the territorial state in Realism ties in discourses on international politics to a broad and 
well-established tradition of thinking about the spatial allocation of politics in modernity.
Discourse and Space: The Idea of the Territorial State
The thesis adopts a particular attitude to the idea of the territorial state. This attitude
Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective’ in James A. Caporoso (ed.), The 
Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives (Newbury Park CA, Sage, 1989), pp. 69-96, 
at p. 92.
^asner, ‘Sovereignty’, p. 92.
5Daniel H. Deudney, ‘The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of 
Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861’, International Organization, 49:2 (Spring 1995), 
pp. 191-228, at p. 192. For Deudney, the consequence of the prevalence of the image of the Westphalian 
system in International Relations has been to occlude other modem ‘non-dyadic’ sovereign international 
orders. The most significant of these was the American Union or Philadelphian system, which, during the 
eighteenth century, was held up as an alternative model to the European state system. The Philadelphia 
system was the product of a structural republican theory of security institutions that emphasised popular 
sovereignty, formal state equality, the balance of power, and the division of power.
6I shall discuss Weber’s definition of the state and its relationship to Realism in the following
chapter.
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requires that we do not assume that the territorial state is somehow present in the ‘real 
world’ of international relations ‘out there’, and that Realism simply provides an 
objective, disinterested account of how it engages with other territorial states in the 
international system. We are interested in how this idea functions in the production of 
knowledge about international politics. This research is guided by the epistemological 
and theoretical orientations of discourse analysis -  or what in International Relations has, 
unsatisfactorily, become known as postmodernism.7 Mainstream scholars have dismissed 
discourse analysis as ephemeral, accusing ‘reflectivism’ of failing to contribute to 
empirical policy research.8 However, a small contingent of critical scholars have shown 
that discourse analysis has a place in the discipline. For Michael Shapiro discourse 
analysis alerts us to the fact that language is not simply a ‘transparent conduit’ between 
thought and objects, but is an opaque realm full of ‘meaning- and value-producing 
practices.’9 Likewise, David Campbell questions the epistemic realism of Realism and 
Marxism, which assumes that the world comprises objects whose existence is 
independent of the theories and epistemologies used in order to know it. Campbell wants 
to replace epistemic realism with an ‘interpretative logic’ which ‘asks how certain terms 
and concepts have historically functioned within discourse.’ He abandons the traditional 
epistemological distinction between discourse and an external realm that is apprehended 
through it. Discourse not only represents, but more significantly, constitutes the real: ‘ [it] 
is a managed space in which some statements and depictions have come to have greater 
value than others.’10
7For a useful discussion of the impact of postmodernism in International Relations, see Jim 
George, Discourses o f Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder 
CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), esp. pp. 191-219. Prominent postmodernists in International 
Relations are, according to George, Rob Walker, James Der Derian, Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro and 
David Campbell. He notes that their work is varied, encompassing the deconstruction of disciplinary 
canons, genealogies of diplomacy, critiques of the discourse of sovereignty, and analyses of the politics 
of representation. I prefer to use the term ‘discourse theory’ as it avoids confusing it with recent historical 
materialist critiques of ‘postmodemity’. I shall refer to these distinctions again in chapter two.
8Robert Keohane,‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 
32:4 (1989), pp. 379-96.
9Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Textualising Global Politics’ in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro 
(eds), Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington MA, 
Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 11-22, at p. 14.
10David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 5-6.
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Campbell claims that French thinker Michel Foucault has been a major influence 
on his work. Foucault rejected the view that discourse is ‘groups of signs (signifying 
elements referring to contents or representations)’, and urged us to think of them as 
‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.’11 This productive 
element of discourse is central to our analysis. I shall argue that the idea of the territorial 
state is produced by several modem discourses of space. These discourses are not, 
however, just political. Foucault observed that beneath discourse there he networks 
which determine the type of knowledge produced. These networks or epistemes are not 
restricted to disciplinary boundaries, but determine the production of knowledge in areas 
that seem to have little in common. Foucault encourages us to look for the production of 
the idea of the territorial state, not just in the discourses of politics and international 
relations, but also in discourses on geography, cosmology, cartography and perspective, 
which represent and produce the spaces of modernity.
Within International Relations, two thinkers who have done much to open up 
spaces for this kind of enquiry are Rob Walker and Richard Ashley. I shall discuss their 
work in some depth presently, but one of their central arguments usefully illustrates the 
potential of discourse analysis for this enquiry. Ashley and Walker are interested in the 
dominance of the all-pervasive ‘sign of sovereignty’ in international theory. They point 
out that all theories of the state in International Relations -  usually identified as a unitary 
body having a defined set of interests and the means to achieve them -  represent the state 
as a sovereign presence. The state is ‘represented as an entity having absolute boundaries 
unambiguously demarcating a domestic “inside” and setting it off from an international 
“outside”.’12 The inside is presented as the realm of identity, rationality and order, and 
the outside is figured, from the inside, as the realm of anarchy, war and difference. 
Ashley and Walker suggest, furthermore, that the sovereignty-as-presence code not only 
produces the inside/outside spaces of international relations -  state vs system, order vs 
anarchy, the good life vs chaos -  but also underpins much of modem Western thought. 
The effects of the ‘sign of sovereignty’ extend beyond International Relations or even
nMichel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, (London, 
Routledge, 1972), p. 49.
12Richard K. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique’, Millennium, 17:2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-62, at p. 248.
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beyond the distinction between political theory and international theory. The sign of 
sovereignty underpins not only knowledge of international relations but a whole matrix 
of modem epistemologies and ontologies.13 The idea of the sovereign territorial state is 
not an isolated concept of political theory, but is produced in a network of interrelated 
spatial vocabularies and figures which extend beyond the boundaries of political thought. 
In this work I shall explore, in the context of Renaissance Italy, the interdiscursive 
relations between the idea of the territorial state and the spatial discourse of cosmology, 
perspective and cartography.
The Renaissance Origins of the Modern State
Ashley and Walker claim that the intellectual structures that produced the idea of the 
territorial state came together in the seventeenth century; Ashley for example, talks of the 
‘Cartesian practice’ that separated the space of the state from other spaces outside. In this 
respect, discourse analysis does not offer an alternative to the Realist Westphalian dating 
of the origins of the territorial state: Descartes was obviously a paradigmatic figure of 
seventeenth century philosophy.14 For Realism and its critics the territorial state is a 
product of the seventeenth century.
In terms of artistic and cultural production, the seventeenth century is viewed as 
the age of the Baroque. For Lewis Mumford Baroque culture is riven by contradiction. 
There is
the abstract mathematical and methodical side, expressed to perfection in 
its rigorous street plans, its formal city layouts, and in its geometrically 
ordered gardens and landscape designs. And at the same time, in the 
painting and sculpture of the period, it embraces the sensuous, rebellious, 
extravagant, anti-classical, anti-mechanical side, expressed in its clothes 
and its sexual life and its religious fanaticism and its crazy statecraft.15
There seem to be two modernities co-existing simultaneously in the seventeenth century.
13RB.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
14Richard K. Ashley, ‘Living On Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War’ in Der Derian 
and Shapiro, International/Intertextual Relations, pp. 259-321.
15Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects 
(London, Penguin Books, 1961), p. 402.
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It will be apparent that the idea of the territorial state refers to the former modernity: the 
abstract, rigorous and ordered spaces of baroque cities and gardens. A similar term which 
has been used to describe not only the culture of the seventeenth but also that of the 
eighteenth centuries is the ‘Classical age’. For Foucault the Classical age lasted from the 
middle of the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth, when it was replaced by 
the modern age.16 I shall call the historical narrative that claims that the idea of the 
territorial state originated in the political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the Classical state hypothesis.
Although Mumford differentiates Baroque culture from the Renaissance culture 
that preceded it, he acknowledges that the Baroque city was anticipated by the 
Renaissance city. Taking a broad historical view, he suggests that between 1400 and 1800 
there was a widespread transformation in European life, from ‘medieval universality to 
baroque uniformity: from medieval localism to baroque centralism: from the absolutism 
of the God and the Holy Catholic Church to the absolutism of the temporal sovereign and 
the national state’.17 Now, and this is very significant, Mumford argues that the 
‘underlying tendency of this new order’ became visible in the seventeenth century, but 
that its foundations, were established in the Renaissance culture of the fifteenth century. 
It was during the Renaissance that the medieval city was first imagined in terms of a 
modem order and when patches of the medieval city were modified by ‘Renaissance 
order, openings and clarifications’.18 Renaissance city planners introduced clarity, 
openness and simplicity into the forms and structure of the city, symbolised by ‘the 
straight street, the unbroken horizontal roof line, the round arch, and the repetition of 
uniform elements, cornice, lintel, window, and column, on the facade.’19 The medieval 
cities were not, however, totally swept away to accommodate these new values; new 
plans attempted to harmonize the new design with the existing buildings and 
infrastructure. However, by the seventeenth century these principles had become
16See, for this periodisation, Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences (London, Routledge, 1970). For a history of sovereignty that adopts the same 
periodisation, see Jens Bartleson,yl Genealogy ofSovereignty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
17Mumford, City in History, p. 398.
18Mumford, City in History, p. 399.
19Mumford, City in History, p. 400.
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completely dominant, sweeping away all vestiges of the medieval order and producing 
the regimented, uniform and grandiose avenues and architecture characteristic of the 
Baroque city.
I shall argue that in the same way that Baroque or Classical city was preceded by
and anticipated by the Renaissance city, so the Classical idea of the territorial state was
preceded by and arose out of a Renaissance idea of the territorial state. The terms
Classical and Renaissance allow us to identify different moments in the development of
the city and the development of the idea of the territorial state, but they are not absolutely
distinct or discontinuous: the Baroque/Classical order had its roots in the Renaissance.
Cartesian practice had its roots in the spatial discourse of Machiavelli and Alberti. In the
seventeenth century
every aspect of life departed from the medieval pole and re-united under 
a new sign, the sign of the Prince. Machiavelli’s work on The Prince 
provides more than one clue to both the politics and the plan of the new 
city, and Descartes, coming later, will re-interpret the world of science in 
terms of the unified order of the baroque city. In the seventeenth century 
the intuitions of precursors like Alberti were finally realized in the 
baroque style of life, the baroque plan, the baroque garden, and the 
baroque city.20
Following Mumford we can hypothesise that the foundations of the idea of the territorial 
state were established during the Renaissance -  even if, it only became clearly visible as 
the Classical state of the seventeenth century.
My claim, that the idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy, is 
allied to a tradition of intellectual and cultural history that traces the origins of modernity 
to Renaissance Italy. The paradigm for this tradition is Jacob Burckhardt’s The 
Civilization o f the Renaissance in Italy, first published in 1860, which framed the Italian 
Renaissance as the simultaneous ‘discovery of the world and man’.21 Burkhardt believed 
that the Renaissance Italian states were unique among the polities of Europe because they 
were not based in a feudal order and did not, as in the rest of Europe, naturally evolve 
into unified monarchies. Because the rulers of Italian states, whether princely despots or 
republican leaders, had, more often than not, acquired power through ‘recent
20Mumford, City in History, p. 398.
21 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (London, Phaidon Press Limited,
1995).
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usurpations’, both the internal constitutions and the foreign policies of the Italian states, 
were required to be ‘works of art’, the ‘fruit of reflection and adaptation’.22 These traits 
of reflection and adaptation precipitated in Italians, both rulers and ruled, a sense of 
singularity or individuality. For Burkhardt the political circumstance of Italy produced 
the modem individual; Renaissance Italians were the ‘first-bom among the sons of 
modem Europe’.
In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness -  that which was 
turned within as that which was turned without -  lay dreaming or half 
awake beneath a common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion, and 
childish prepossession, through which the world and history were seen 
clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of 
a race, people, party, family, or corporation -  only through some general 
category. In Italy this veil first melted into air; an objective treatment and 
consideration of the State and of all the things of this world became 
possible. The subjective side at the same time asserted itself with 
corresponding emphasis; man became a spiritual individual, and 
recognized himself as such.23
Burkhardt’s vision of the birth of modernity is evident in the work of historians 
like Garrett Mattingly who argue that the 1495 Treaty of Venice, rather than the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia, really marks the beginnings of the modem international system.24 
Mattingly claims that the exchange of resident embassies between the courts of the Italian 
city-states during the Concert of Italy, 1455-94, was the precursor to modem diplomatic 
practice. Furthermore, Mattingly suggests that Charles VUI’s invasion of Italy in 1494, 
which lead to the Holy League alliance against France, agreed at the Treaty of Venice 
1495, ‘began the age of modem European diplomacy. ’25 In sympathy with these positions, 
this work will hopefully show that not only modernity and the modem international 
system but also the modem idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy.
22Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance, p. 61.
burkhardt, Civilization, p. 87. One of the many pleasures gained from reading Burkhardt is to 
share in his breadth of vision Unfettered by the boundary markings of today’s disciplines, Burckhardt’s 
history of the Italian Renaissance paints abroad canvas. He draws together the threads that united political 
history with the birth of the individual, humanist culture to the discovery of man and his world, and 
morality and religion with festival and spectacle. Perhaps Burkhardt could be regarded as a pioneer of the 
sort of inter-disciplinary research undertaken here.
24Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc, 1955).
25Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 115.
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The Itinerary
The first three chapters establish the problematic and methodology of the thesis. Chapter 
one shows that the idea of the territorial state is a fundamental component of all schools 
of contemporary Realism because it reinforces Realist views of order, sovereignty and 
violence in the international system and it is integral to the Weberian tradition of modem 
political theory -  of which Realism is one offshoot. Chapter two which discusses various 
theoretical work on space, representation and power establishes the methodology used 
to analyse the relationship between the idea of the territorial state and related discourses 
of space. The third chapter fleshes out the Baroque state thesis. It positions the idea of the 
territorial state within an absolutist-cosmopolitan tradition of modernity, characterised 
by a drive to order and rationalise space.
The second half of the thesis will reveal the origins of the idea of the territorial 
state in various spatial discourses and practices of fifteenth and sixteenth century 
Renaissance Italy. Chapter four identifies a nascent territorial imagination in Niccolo 
Machiavelli’s work. Chapter five examines how an important condition for territoriality, 
that space is ordered horizontally, was established through the Renaissance dismantling 
of the medieval hierarchies of the medieval Christian order. Finally, chapter six explores 
the relationship between the idea of the territorial state and the invention of perspective 
in Renaissance Italy. It examines the representation of territorial sovereignty in paintings 
of princes and at the impact of cartography on the inscription of territorial boundaries.
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Realism and the Territorial State
Sovereignty implies ‘space’, and what is more it implies a space against 
which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed -  a space established 
and constituted by violence.1
The thesis will show that the idea of the territorial state originated in Renaissance Italy. 
This is significant for students of International Relations in so far as the idea of the 
territorial state is a fundamental component of contemporary Realist discourse. Each of 
the three main traditions of Realist thought: Classical Realism, Neorealism and English 
School Realism, endorses the idea of the territorial state. They all assume that the modem 
state is enclosed within, or extends over, a distinct space or territory, delimited by sharply 
defined borders. This rather familiar image of political space, found in any school atlas, 
in which separate states are represented by brightly colored and sharply defined spaces, 
is not unique to Realism in International Relations, but is found in much contemporary 
social and political theory. In this chapter I want to contextualise the Realist idea of the 
territorial state, in terms of a tradition of social and political theory that extends from 
Max Weber to contemporary historical sociology. I shall show how the presence of the 
idea of the territorial state in Realism draws it into the Weberian tradition and its 
aspirations for the ideal order of political space in modernity. The first half of the chapter 
analyses the place and role of the idea of the territorial state in Realist and Weberian 
theory. The second half shows how the idea of the territorial state reinforces Realist- 
Weberian claims about order and violence, and sovereignty and identity.
Realism and the Territorial State
In the 1980s the discipline of International Relations experienced a revival of Realist 
theory in the form of Neorealism. In the context of the debates about Neorealism, Robert 
Keohane declared that ‘Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world 
politics because its focus on power interests and rationality is crucial to any
^enri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1991), p. 280.
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understanding of the subject’ ? Since Keohane's declaration much water has passed under 
the bridge. Two developments in particular: the end of the Cold War and the emergence 
of a critical-theoretical agenda, might have been expected to dislodge Realism from its 
privileged position. Yet, in mainstream International Relations, Realism remains the 
dominant intellectual tradition, and its concepts and principles continue to dictate the 
research concerns of the academic community.
International Political Realism is, as Rob Walker has pointed out, best approached 
as a branch of the Western tradition of political realism that is ‘the site of a great many 
contested claims and metaphysical disputes’.3 Two rich strands of Western political 
thought emphasizing, on the one hand, becoming and difference, and, on the other, being 
and identity, find their Realist expressions in historicist Classical Realism and structural 
Neorealism respectively.4 Realism so conceived is hard to define, but it does have some 
identifying traits. Robert Gilpin, a self-proclaimed Realist, sees Realism as a 
‘philosophical disposition’ based on three assumptions about the world. The first 
assumption is that international affairs are conflictual by nature; ‘ [ajnarchy is the rule; 
[and] order, justice and morality are the exceptions’.5 The second assumption is that 
social reality is not constituted by the Liberal individual nor by the Marxist class, but by 
the tribal group, which in a world of scarcity is a ‘conflict group’. The final Realist 
assumption is that political life reveals the primacy of power and security in human 
motivation. The Realist critic John Vasquez argues that since the Second World War, 
Realism has functioned as a Kuhnian paradigm determining the ‘fundamental 
assumptions’ International Relations scholars have had about ‘the world they are 
studying.’6 Although Realism has not been a particularly good paradigm -  Vasquez
2Robert Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’ in Keohane (ed.), 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York NY, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 158-204, at p. 159.
3Rob Walker, ‘Realism, Change and “International Political Theory”’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 31:1 (March 1987), pp. 65-86, at p. 67.
^ob  Walker, ‘Realism, Change’. Walker is more sympathetic to historicist Realists like Raymond 
Aron, Hans Morgenthau and RN. Berki. In their work ‘beyond all the dubious propositions about the 
innate aggressiveness ofhuman nature or the pursuit of a mysterious national interest, realism does express 
the ontological principles of pluralism, becoming and difference.’ p. 39.
Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’ inKeohane, Neorealism and 
Its Critics, pp. 301-21, quotes from pp. 304-5.
6John A  Vasquez, The Power of 'Power Politics V A Critique (London, Frances Pinter, 1983),
p. 5.
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thinks it has failed to demonstrate any significant explanatory power and that its 
hypotheses have been consistently falsified -  it does possess, in Hans Morgenthau’s 
Politics Among Nations, a paradigmatic text that has established the basic assumptions 
guiding Realist ‘normal science’ research. These assumptions are: first, that national 
states and their decision-makers are the most important actors for understanding 
international relations; second, that there is a sharp distinction between international and 
domestic politics; and third, in so far as international politics is the struggle for power and 
peace, then the purpose of the discipline of International Relations is to understand how 
that struggle occurs and to suggest ways of regulating it.7
Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach claim that there is no agreed understanding 
of the state in International Relations.8 They identify ten different operative concepts of 
the state derived from various normative and subjective preferences held by International 
Relations scholars. They do not view this plurality positively, for they worry that if the 
discipline fails to achieve a consensual understanding of the state it will never achieve 
the status of a science, capable of assuming ‘the objective and operational qualities that 
are prerequisites to scientific observation and analysis.’9 However, the argument that 
there is a surfeit of state theory in International Relations is voiced less often than the 
counterclaim that the discipline suffers from a lack of proper state theory. More common 
is the complaint that ‘it would be difficult to argue that theories of international relations 
possess anything like an adequate account of the nature of the state or the diversity of 
state formations.’10 Many critics of Realism argue that it cannot justifiably theorise the 
interactions between states without a proper theory o f the state. The Realist state is,
7Vasquez points out that all three assumptions contain anomalies which undermine Realism’s 
effectiveness as a paradigm. The assumption that the nation-state is the primary actor has been undermined 
by Foreign Policy Analysis critiques of the rational actor model; the domestic vs international dichotomy 
is undermined by world society theory and transnationalism; and, the struggle for power and peace framed 
as Realpolitik is an image rather than a theory, a description of behaviour rather than an explanation. 
Vasquez, Power o f 'Power Politics'.
^ a le  H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and International 
Politics (Columbia SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1988).
Ferguson and Mansbach conclude that ‘the multiple connotations accorded the concept of “state” 
... and related concepts like “autonomy” casts doubt on the present existence of and prospects for a 
discipline of international relations.’ Elusive Quest, p. 142.
10RB.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 125.
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argues Fred Halliday, ‘the vague and heuristically unhelpful notion’ of a ‘national 
territorial totality’; it ‘comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map 
-  viz. the country as a whole and all that is within it: territory, government, people, 
society.’11
It is true that the ‘national territorial totality’, or variations of it, is present in much
Realist theory. For Classical Realists, like John Herz and Raymond Aron, the state is first
and foremost territorial.12 Herz believed that the modem nation-state is characterized by
a ‘peculiar unity, compactness, and coherence’ that exists
in that substratum of statehood where the state unit confronts us, as it 
were, in its physical, corporeal capacity: as an expanse of territory 
encircled for its identification and its defense by a “hard shell” of 
fortifications. In this lies what will be here referred to as the 
“impermeability,” or “impenetrability,” or simply the territoriality of the 
modem state.13
Reflecting on the state at the beginning of the Cold War, Herz foresaw in subsequent 
years the ‘passing of the age of territoriality’, as state space was penetrated by economic, 
psychological, air and nuclear warfare. However, ten years later, he expressed renewed 
confidence in the ability of the territorial state to survive: the ‘new or neo-territorial’ state 
was capable of resisting both nuclear attack and the forces of transnationalism.14 Not only 
the territorial state, but also the modem form of international relations would remain 
intact, for Herz believed that the state’s territorial impermeability was the underlying 
foundation of the classical system of international relations and its institutions of 
international law, the balance of power and war.15 Aron’s Realism was equally tempered 
by geopolitical discourse -  he entitled one of the chapters of Peace and War, ‘On 
Space’.16 Aron argued that the space or milieu a state occupies is an important source of
nFred Halliday, ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’, Millennium, 
16: 2 (1987), pp. 215-29, at p. 217.
12John H. Herz, ‘The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’ reprinted in Herz, The Nation-State 
and the Crisis of World Politics (New York NY, David McKay Company, 1976), pp. 99-123; and 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 
1966).
13Herz, ‘Rise and Demise’, pp. 100-1.
14John Herz, ‘The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State’ 
reprinted in Herz, The Nation-State, pp. 226-52, at p. 238.
15See Herz, ‘Rise and Demise’, pp. 108-14.
16Aron discusses space and power in Peace and War, pp. 181-209.
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its power; it provides the resources and manpower required for defense. The aim of states
is therefore to increase their space, and the history of the international system has been
one of conflict over space, as states seeking to increase their power dispute the territories
occupied by some and desired by others.
Like their Classical forefathers, Neorealists also regard territory to be a defining
characteristic of the modem state.17 The modem state, argues Robert Gilpin -  in an
analysis which, it must be admitted, is considerably more sophisticated than the banalities
of ‘national-territorial totality’ -  is defined by its territoriality. Gilpin wants theorists of
international relations to recognise that the modem nation-state is a specific historical
phenomenon that can be distinguished from its predecessors in terms of three qualities:
the control of a territory, complex class and social structures, and national identity.18 Of
these, the control of a territory is the most distinctive; only the modem state has
a strong central authority that is differentiated from other social 
organizations, and ... exercises control over a well-defined and 
contiguous territory. The sovereign has a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force and is served by a bureaucracy and single set of laws that 
reach down into the everyday lives of the people.19
Furthermore, the state’s role in the international system is derived from its territoriality.
The primary external function of the state is to protect the property rights and personal
security of its members against the citizens and the actions of other states. States can
increase their control over the international system by consolidating and increasing their
control over territory:
In international affairs, territoriality is the functional equivalent of 
property rights. Like the definition of property, the control of territory 
confers a bundle of rights. The control and division of territory constitutes 
the basic mechanism governing the distribution of scarce resources among 
the states in an international system. Whereas domestic political change 
involves redefinition and redistribution of property rights, international 
political change has been primarily a matter of redistributing territory 
among groups or states following the great wars of history.20
English School Realists seek to distance themselves from, what they see as, the
17Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1981).
t o
Gilpin, War and Change, p. 15.
19Gilpin, War and Change, p. 122.
20Gilpin, War and Change, p. 37.
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crude mechanics of Neorealism by emphasizing the legal and normative constraints of
International Society. However, they have not managed to provide an alternative to the
territorial state, as is clearly demonstrated by Hedley Bull’s observation that membership
of international society is restricted to those ‘independent political communities’ that
‘possess a government and assert their sovereignty in relation to a particular portion o f
the earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population.’21 Robert Jackson
also views the sovereign states of international society as territorial bodies:
A sovereign state... consists traditionally of a bordered territory occupied 
by a settled population under effective and at least to some extent civil -  
that is ‘civilized’ -  government.22
Even if, as Cornelia Navari hopes it will, international theory abandons the Machstaat,
which focuses attention on state autonomy and power, in favour of a Rechstaat,
embodying the collective agency of social power through representative institutions,
created by laws, customs and practices, this would not mean that territoriality is
abandoned.23 The Rechstaat is still a territorial body; it is ‘a particular kind of political
community, one which is territorially located, with a more or less delimited set of persons
distinguished from the citizenry by the name of government, and which is conceived as
law maker.,24 It is possible that the legal affirmation of state territoriality found in English
School state theory reflects this school’s interest in international law. In contemporary
international law the state is defined as a body possesing a territory, people and power.
State territory is, as Hans Kelsen observes,
that space within which, in principle, one state, the state to which the 
territory belongs, is entitled to carry out coercive acts, a space from which 
all the other states are excluded. It is the space for which, according to 
general international law, only one definite national legal order is 
authorized to prescribe coercive acts, the space within which only the 
coercive acts stipulated by this order may be executed. It is the space
21Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, Macmillan, 
1977), pp. 8-9. Italics added.
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and The Third World 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 38.
^See Cornelia Navari, ‘Introduction: The State as Contested Concept in International Relations’ 
in Navari (ed.), The Condition of States (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991), pp. 1-18.
24Navari, ‘State as Contested Concept’, all quotes from pp. 12-5.
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within the so-called boundaries of the state.25
Max Weber and the Modern Territorial State
Kelsen emphasizes that state territory is a space over which only one authority has the
right to carry out coercive measures. Force, coercion and violence are recurring motifs
in the Realist idea of the territorial state. They are all, especially violence, also prominent
motifs in a tradition of modem social and political theory that started with Max Weber’s
definition of the state as the institution with legitimate access to the means of violence
within a defined territory. This section analyses the relationship between Weber’s
definition of the territorial state and his concerns with the geopolitical issues of his time.
In drawing together the themes of territoriality and geopolitics it reaffirms once more that
‘more than any other modem figure Weber established the discourse of the realist
approach to international relations.’26
Weber’s classic definition of the state is in ‘Politics as a Vocation’:
Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly o f the legitimate use o f physicalforce 
within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics 
of the state.... The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use 
violence.27
Outside of Realism, Weber’s definition of the territorial state continues to inform the 
work of many historical sociologist -  some of whose work on the state Halliday 
recommends as an alternative to the Realist national-territorial totality.28 The state,
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg, (New York NY, Russell 
and Russell, 1945), pp. 210-11.
26Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge LA, Louisiana 
State University Press, 1986), p. 53.
27Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (London, Routledge, 1970), pp. 77-128, at p. 78.
28Halliday views the institutional state theory of historical sociology as an alternative to the 
Realist ‘national-territorial totality’. The institutional state is not a ‘ social-territorial totality, but a specific 
set of coercive and administrative institutions, distinct from the broader political, social and national 
context in which it finds itself. ’ The value, for Halliday, of this approach is that it highlights the interaction 
between the state and its international setting; in particular ‘why and how participation in the international 
realm enhances and strengthens states, and, in particular, why it enables them to act more independently 
of the societies they rule.’ Halliday, ‘State and Society’, pp. 218-9. However, the institutional state of 
historical sociology is, in essence, Weber's territorial state. As a result, the historical sociological view of 
international relations is often couched in standard Realist vocabulary. As Michael Mann says, ‘ [t] he very
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according to the neo-Weberian Michael Mann, is
a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, embodying... centrality, 
in the sense that political relations radiate outward from a centre to cover 
a ... territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises ... a monopoly 
of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the 
means of physical violence.29
Whether ancient or modem, all states are, for Mann, distinguished by territorial
centralization. The state is the only political or social institution that is centralized over
a ‘delimited territory over which it has binding powers’. Whether a state is despotic -
able to carry out its activities without routine institutionalized negotiation with civil
society -  or infrastructural -  able to control and infiltrate social life through a dialectic
with civil society -  its autonomous power is partially derived from its territoriality.30 The
state is ‘both a central place and a unified territorial reach’ because the resources and
authority of state elites radiate out from a centre to territorial boundaries.31 Neo-
Weberians regard the territorial state to be the mainstay of a geopolitical international
system. Gianfranco Poggi suggests that the modem state -  an autonomous, territorially
distinct, centralised organization -  secures its territory in three ways: first, through
sovereignty or the state’s ability to control its population by means of its access to the
means of coercion; second, by geographically distinct and militarily defensible
boundaries; and third by the state’s participation in geopolitics: ‘the modem state exists
in a system of other nation-states, thus its international environment is, as it was for
Weber, the geopolitical realm of power politics.’32 Likewise, Theda Skocpol regards the
modem state, ‘as conceptualised by Weber and Hintze ... as part of a system of
definition of the state as a delimited territory suggests a further set of political relations between this state 
and other states -  that is, geopolitics. Indeed, ‘[pjolitics and geopolitics are intertwined; the one should 
not be studied without the other. ’ Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume Two: The Rise of 
Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 56.
29Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’ 
in John A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1986) pp. 109-36, at p. 112.
3 °From various combinations of infrastructural and despotic power, Mann constructs four ideal- 
type state forms: feudal, imperial, bureaucratic and authoritarian. See Mann, ‘Autonomous Power’, pp. 
115-6.
31Mann, ‘Autonomous Power’, p. 123.
Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1990), at pp. 22 & 5.
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competing and mutually involved states.’33 The modem state is ‘Janus faced, with an 
intrinsically dual anchorage in class divided socioeconomic structures and an 
international system of states.’34 It is the state’s participation in the international system 
that provides it with potential relative autonomy from the interests of civil society or the 
dominant classes, which it may have to disregard depending on the actions required to 
guarantee the state’s international standing.
Weber’s own interest in the ‘geopolitical realm of power politics’ derived from 
his aspirations for Germany. Weber believed that all political structures strive for prestige 
or the ‘glory of power’, but that only ‘big political communities’ are the ‘natural 
exponents of such pretensions.’ Any nation-state able to achieve the status of a great 
power by occupying a large space was rewarded with considerable ‘value-prestige’, and 
Weber sought for the German people the prestige that would accompany the achievement 
of great power status.35 However, he believed that in return for this prestige the great 
Machstaaten had duties to the smaller nation-states. In a ‘world of power states’ the 
balance among the Great Powers must not threaten the independence of smaller nations, 
and Germany’s particular duty was to prevent the world being carved up between the 
‘regulations of Russian officialdom’ and the ‘convention of Anglo-Saxon society.’36
Although Weber opposed the cult of Machtpolitik, his aspirations for Germany 
reflected the concerns of the newly established discourse of geopolitics.37 The rise of 
geopolitics during the fin  de siecle was, as Stephen Kem notes, one response of Western 
European culture experiencing a sense of collapsing distances as new technologies -
33Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’ in Peter 
B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37, at p. 8.
34Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 32.
35For Weber’s discussion of great powers, see Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretative Sociology, Vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York NY, Bedminster Press, 
1968), pp. 910-1.
36See Weber’s wartime article ‘Zwischen zwei Gesetzen’ referred to in David Beetham, Max 
Weber and the Theory of Modem Politics, 2nded., (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985),p. 137. Weber almost 
considered it Germany’s duty to become a great power, otherwise ‘[w]hat would become of the 
independence of the Scandinavians, the Dutch, the people of Tessin, if Russia, France, England, Italy did 
not have to respect our armies? Only the balance of the great powers against one another guarantees the 
freedom of the small states.’, p. 142.
37Weber despised ‘the parvenu-like braggart with power, and the vain self-reflection in the feeling 
of power, and in general every worship of power per se .\ ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 116.
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railways, roads, telegraphs and telephones -  ‘knitted distant places together with 
unprecedented speed and efficiency.38 This perception that the world’s spaces were 
getting smaller and coming together, revitalized the European desire ‘embedded in their 
historical consciousness’ to take command of space.39 In the discipline of geopolitics the 
control of space was paramount. Geopolitical writers explained how the size, location and 
distance between states determined their politics and history. Friedrich Ratzel, the 
discipline’s founder and Weber’s contemporary, applied Darwinian evolutionary theory 
to questions of space and politics and represented national struggles for survival as 
struggles over space. States were rooted, living organisms that had to evolve by 
increasing their territories. Ratzel believed that because national cultures were grounded 
in the ‘spatial unity of life’, that is, the land -  culture meaning literally, the tillage of soil 
-  cultural development was dependent on territorial expansion. The larger a state was the 
more civilized it could become, and, conversely, ‘[a]ll people who remain at lower stages 
of cultural development are also spatially small (kleinraumigy .40 Ratzel, implicitly 
justifying imperialist expansion, argued that the development of all states “stands under 
the law of progress from small to big spaces.”41
Echoes of Ratzel’s view that national culture is based in land, can be heard in 
Weber’s warnings that the increasing numbers of Polish peasants working on the Junker 
estates of Prussia’s Eastern border posed a serious threat to German national Kulture,42 
German peasants had left the Eastern territories because of a general decline in working 
and living conditions, and the Junker land owners had been forced to replace them with 
cheap labor from Poland. The net result of this, Weber pointed out using decidedly racist 
language, was a ‘victory of the less developed types of human being’ because the Poles, 
with their ‘habitually low physical and intellectual standard of living’, were better able 
to adapt to the worsening conditions. In order to halt this devaluation of German culture,
38StephenKem, The Culture ofTime and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 236.
39Kem, Culture of Time and Space, p. 236.
40Ratzel, quoted in Kern, Culture ofTime and Space, p. 224.
41Ratzel, quoted in Kern, Culture ofTime and Space, p. 226.
42Max Weber, ‘The Nation State and Economic Policy’, inaugural lecture delivered at Freiburg 
in May 1895, in Max Weber, Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Spiers, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1 -28. All the quotes in this paragraph are from pp. 10-2.
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Weber advised the government to close the Eastern frontier and to systematically 
purchase land, either by extending crown demesne lands or by colonizing suitable soils 
with German Peasants. These measures were, he felt, legitimate because ‘our state is a 
nation state’ and the interest of the German people demanded the ‘stemming [of] the tide 
of Slavs ... [through] the transfer of significant tracts of eastern Germany into the hands 
of the state.’
Inside and Outside the Territorial State
For most Realists the distinguishing feature of the modem state is its sovereignty. The 
international system is made up of individual sovereign states. In this section I want to 
look at the, by now well-established, argument that the claim to sovereignty lies at the 
heart of both international relations theory and practice. I want to look, in particular, at 
how the confluence of sovereignty and territory in Realist discourse serves as the 
fundamental spatial pivot around which the separate orders of inside and outside are 
established. The section will provide a backdrop for the following discussion of the 
relationship between territory and order, violence and identity in Realist and Weberian 
state theory.
For English school Realists sovereign territoriality is the minimum requirement 
for entry into the society of states. Membership of International Society is, as Alan James 
makes quite clear, limited to those political organizations able to demonstrate sovereignty 
or ‘constitutional independence’ in combination with frontiers enclosing people, some 
form of government and a territorial base. Each of the member states of international 
society must represent a defined ‘physical sector of the land mass of the globe’ and ‘at 
the international level represents it exclusively’. The landscape of international society 
is ‘divided into states by frontiers rather as a farm is into fields by fences and walls.’43 
Today, now that international society has expanded globally, ‘almost every square 
kilometer of the earth’s land surface’ has been allocated to ‘one sovereign state or
43Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1986), p. 13.
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another, with virtually all frontiers being tidily delineated or clearly demarcated.’44 These 
territorial frontiers, says Bull, demarcate the separate realms of internal and external 
sovereignty:
On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, 
what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all 
other authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, 
they assert what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant 
not supremacy but independence of outside authorities.45
The very existence of the discipline of International Relations requires that these
internal/external, inside/outside distinctions are not erased or blurred. The representation
of international relations as the space of anarchy requires its separation from domestic
politics and, suggests Justin Rosenberg, from social, economic and cultural phenomena
generally: ‘[t]he borders and landscape of this environment are set and policed by the
twin concepts of sovereignty and anarchy.’46 Further, ‘the same absolute character of the
sovereignty of the modem state which is the foundation of order within national
boundaries simultaneously dictates the persistence of an external condition of anarchy
among states.’47 This distinction between internal order and international anarchy is
reflected in the common categorical distinction made between Political Theory and
International Relations Theory. Political Theory, as Martin Wight tells us, explores the
possibility of the ‘good life’ within sovereign states and is a discourse amenable to
progress. However international theory, whose subject matter is the relations between
states, amounts to little more than a rather depressing history of perpetual war and
balancing of power:48
The study of international politics presupposes absence of a system of 
government, the study of domestic politics presupposes the existence of 
one. ... while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and 
circumscribed by the framework of laws and institutions, in international 
politics laws and institutions are governed and circumscribed by the
^James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 31.
45Bull, Anarchical Society, pp. 8-9.
^Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of The Realist Theory oflntemational 
Relations (London, Verso, 1994), p. 30.
Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society, p. 142.
48Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), pp. 17-34.
27
struggle for power.49
To understand how pervasive this inside/outside mark of the sovereign territorial
state is, we can turn to the critical readings of Realism by Richard Ashley and Rob
Walker. They note that in International Relations theory the state is generally represented
as a unitary actor possessing sovereignty and capable of choosing its actions based on
rational decision-making. However, they suggest that this portrayal of the state is not
disinterested, for it sets up an hierarchical opposition between the sign of ‘sovereignty’
embedded in the state, and the sign of ‘anarchy’ as all that which is non-sovereign i.e.
outside of the state:
the sign of ‘sovereignty’ betokens a rational identity: a homogeneous and 
continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique center 
of decision presiding over a coherent ‘self, and that is demarcated from, 
and in opposition to, an external domain of difference and change that 
resists assimilation to its identical being. ... the sign of ‘anarchy’ 
betokens this residual external domain: an aleatory domain characterized 
by difference and discontinuity, contingency and ambiguity... .50
Ashley points out that for the state to be imagined as a rational actor capable of
pursuing its interests, it must ‘be represented as an entity having absolute borders
unambiguously demarcating a domestic “inside” and setting it off from an international
“outside”’.51 For Ashley this representation of the state mirrors the ideal qualities of
Western man as a rational, sovereign self-identical presence; while for Walker the
political discourse of state sovereignty is a particular manifestation of the general
principle of ‘sovereign identity’ found throughout Western thought.52 Sovereign identity
is secured through the establishment of difference; it is derived from the ‘claim to be able
to fix a point of identity -  a universality in space and time against which all differences
in space and time can be measured, judged and put in their place’.53 This principle
49Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, (Leicester, Leicester 
University Press, 1978), at pp. 101&2.
50Richard K. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique’, Millennium, 17:2 (Summer 1988), pp. 227-62, at p. 230.
51Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State’, p. 248.
52R. B. J. Walker, ‘Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of 
Contemporary Political Practice’ in Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), Contending Sovereignties: 
Redefining Political Community (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159-85.
53Walker, ‘Sovereignty, Identity’, p. 175.
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pervades the entire culture of modernity, starting with the dualism of modem philosophy, 
which constructs epistemologies upon the grounds of an ontology of spatial separation 
between an autonomous knowing subject and a known object. Walker interprets modem 
philosophical categories as attempts to overcome ‘a metaphysics of distance, a dialectics 
of here and there, the delineation of presence and absence in the stately measure of 
eternal geometry.’54 In political thought the principle of sovereign identity underpins a 
hierarchical opposition between ‘domestic community as presence' and an ‘international 
absence o f community'55 The universal values of freedom, truth and obligation have been 
allocated to those communities which can claim to be within the boundaries of a 
sovereign state. Outside the state there is only the residual realm of the particular, the 
different and the other.
The ‘demarcation between an inside and an outside, a self and an other’ is 
produced in discourse about states and through the practice of states themselves.56 Ashley 
claims that the domestic domain of sovereign men, enclosed within the territorial state, 
is constituted and differentiated from the foreign, dangerous and external by means of the 
knowledge-practices o f‘statecraft’.57 Statecraft produces and secures the identity of the 
domestic state-society by marking off as dangerous and as requiring discipline and 
control other forms of knowledge and ways of being, such as the insane and the criminal. 
By inscribing specific problems and dangers as exterior to sovereign men, statecraft 
differentiates the space of the ‘domestic population’ over which the state is dominant and 
able to secure its claims to legitimacy.58 One realm marked out by statecraft as ‘other’ is 
‘International Politics’ envisioned as the permanent threat of war and anarchy.
54Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 128.
55Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory 
of International Politics’, Alternatives, 17:4 (October 1987), pp. 403-34. See esp. pp. 413-420.
56 R. B. J. Walker, ‘International Relations and the Concept of the Political’ in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge, Polity, 1991), pp. 306-27, at p. 321. 
Walker claims that the formalization of the principle of state sovereignty through debates serves to reify 
‘the practices of state sovereignty -  the disciplining of boundaries, the affirmation of inclusions, the 
defamation of foreigners, the inscription of danger, the legitimation of violence.’ See ‘Sovereignty, 
Identity’, p. 160.
57Richard K. Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War’ in James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World 
Politics (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989) pp. 259-321, at p. 301.
58Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines’, p. 302.
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‘International Politics’ is not, as it is represented in modem discourse, the original source
of danger and threat to modem societies. It is, rather, a product of statecraft that, in order
to produce modem domestic societies as social identities consisting of populations
subordinate to a rational center, must inscribe the external dangers of ‘international
politics’ as a permanent threat to the identity of the society within:
‘international politics’ is a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the 
extemalization and totalisation of dangers, and the mobilization of 
populations to control these dangers -  all in the name of a social totality 
that is never really present, that always contains traces of the outside 
within, and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which 
total dangers are inscribed.59 The sign of international politics is invoked 
in opposition to a ‘domestic society’ conceived as an identical social 
whole.60
Ashley and Walker show us that the spatial demarcation of political and international 
political theory and practice is constructed around the principle of sovereign identity. In 
the following section I develop these themes with reference to the idea of the territorial 
state in Realist and Weberian theory.
The Territorial Spaces of Order, Identity and Violence
Weber’s extensive definition of the state in Economy and Society highlights the way in
which the idea of the territorial state serves to ground a complex matrix of modem
assumptions about political order, identity and violence:
The primary formal characteristics of the modem state are as follows: It 
possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, 
which are also controlled by regulations, are orientated. This system of 
order claims a binding authority, not only over the members of the state, 
the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also 
to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. 
Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far 
as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. ... The claim of 
the modem state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its
59Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines’, p. 304.
60Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines’, pp. 303-4.
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character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.61
Weber’s view of the state as a ‘system of order’ provides one immediate 
connection to Realist discourse, for, as Helen Milner points out, although Realists 
represent the international system as an anarchy, for many the primary task of 
international theory is to account for regulative order underpinning it. Few Realists accept 
the crude proposition that international relations is nothing more than an unmitigated 
realm of chaos and irrational violence. To claim that the international system is 
anarchical is not necessarily to insist that it is a Hobbesian state of nature in which 
sovereign states, unconstrained by an enforceable system of law, are left to judge their 
own ‘grievances and ambitions’ based on their own ‘reason and desire’.62 On the 
contrary, Realists detect many practices and institutions that produce order in 
international anarchy: International Society is regulated by common rules, values and 
customs; the Neoliberal world order is distinguished by co-operation enhancing 
international regimes; and even the Neorealist’s system is regulated by the balance of 
power.
More significantly, the Realist hypothesis that order is possible in anarchy is 
based on the Weberian premise that state territory is ordered. The English School 
supposition of an anarchical society -  in effect, an ordered anarchy -  is premised upon 
the existence of domestic order. Bull defines order in international society as ‘a pattern 
of activity that sustains the elementary and primary goals of the society of states’, i.e. 
first, the preservation of the society of states itself, second, the sanctity and security of 
state sovereignty and, finally, peace.63 Order is embodied in the common rules, values and 
institutions through which states are able to maintain formal relations. However, Bull 
recognizes that in modernity order has primarily been exercised in ‘local areas of order 
established by the authority of states.'64 Domestic order, unlike that of international 
society, is coercive; it is derived from the authority of the government which, because it
61Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, p. 56.
62KennethN. Waltz, Maw, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York NY, Columbia 
University Press, 1959), p. 159.
63Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 8.
M edley Bull, ‘The State’s Positive Role in World Affairs’, Daedalus, 108: 4 (Fall 1979), pp. 
111-23, at p. 115.
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‘possesses a near monopoly of physical force’, can make and enforce laws via sanction
in the courts backed up by the police and armed forces.65 This claim is readily interpreted
as part of the discourse of sovereign identity. For without the existence of a hierarchical
coercive domestic order extending over a delimited space, it would not be possible to
posit the existence of an ‘other’ or ‘different’ order -  non-hierarchical, non-coercive -
as underpinning international society. If they both shared similar structures of order or
degrees of anarchy, it would be conceptually impossible to distinguish the space of
international society from the territory of domestic society. This is one of the reasons why
the doctrine of non-intervention precludes intervention by foreign states onto the territory
of other state -  except in situations where order has been replaced by anarchy.
Bull’s acknowledgment that domestic order is maintained by coercion is a variant
of Weber’s view that all political community is based in domination and the use of force
over a specific space:
The term ‘political community’ shall apply to a community whose social 
action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants 
a ‘territory’ and the conduct of the persons within it, through readiness to 
resort to physical force.66
Politics, at its most basic, is the exercise of rule or domination within a defined territory.
What marks out the state is that it is the only form of territorially-based political
community that has the exclusive legitimate claim to use the means of violence:
A “ruling or dominating (Herrschaftverband) organization” will be called 
“political” insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded 
within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical 
force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political 
organization with continuous organizations (politischer Anstaltbetrieb) 
will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully 
upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
in the enforcement of its order.67
Weber’s view that only states have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
over a specified territory, is also employed to reinforce the Realist distinction between 
inside and outside. Kenneth Waltz, for example, adopts the Weberian position that all 
politics is about struggle and the use of force, but points out that
65Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 57.
66Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, p. 901.
67Weber, Economy and Society: Vol. 1, p. 54.
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[t]he difference between national and international politics lies not in the 
use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing 
something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, 
arrogates to itself the right to use force -  that is, to apply a variety of 
sanctions to control the use of force by its subjects. If some use private 
force, others may appeal to the government. A government has no 
monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective 
government, however has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and 
legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and to 
counter the private use of force.68
Aron also views the domestic/international divide along a fracture defined by the
legitimate use of force. Inter-state relations ‘take place within the shadow of war’ and are
driven by the desire of state authorities to preserve their own monopolies of violence
within their territories, their recognition of one another’s monopolies, and their mutual
endorsement of the legal right to resort to war. The possession of a monopoly of violence
by ‘territorially organized political communities’ is what distinguishes domestic politics
from international relations:
So long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, 
an essential difference will exist between internal politics and internal 
politics. The former tends to reserve the monopoly on violence to those 
wielding legitimate authority, the latter accept the plurality of centers of 
armed force.69
Once a state looses the monopoly of violence and several centers of violence arise within 
the space over which it claims authority, the boundaries separating domestic from 
international politics become blurred: where international relations consists of 
overlapping realms of violence, or where the state is not juridically organized, or when 
a civil war is being fought, then the spaces of internal and external politics tend to blend 
with ‘the former not being essentially pacific and the latter not being radically 
bellicose.’70 Bull also viewed the state’s monopoly of violence benignly, arguing that the 
only historical alternative to the modem states-system, in which war between states is 
regulated by the twin principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bellum, has been ubiquitous 
violence and disorder. The modern states-system is unique in that states are ‘united in
68Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory oflnternational Politics (Reading MA, Addison Wesley, 1979), pp.
103-4.
69Aron, Peace and War, p. 6.
70Aron, Peace and War, p. 7.
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maintaining that they are entitled to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, both 
domestically and across state frontiers’. This arrangement is largely beneficial, for the 
fact that war is not available to ‘self-appointed political groups of all kinds is one of the 
most vital barriers we have against anarchy.’71
The modern state is able to coerce its population not just because it can access 
physical violence, but also because it has an extensive bureaucratic machinery through 
which it disciplines the everyday activity of society. Modernity as a whole, claimed 
Weber, is characterized by the triumph of purposeful rationality -  whereby an actor 
rationally assesses the possible consequences of using various means to achieve a desired 
end -  over value rationality -  where an actor pursues an end single-mindedly with little 
regard for the consequences. Rationalization determines action in all spheres of modem 
life, from the scientific mastery of nature to the bureaucratic control of society. It 
routinizes human action, making it ‘calculating, instrumentalist, and predictable.’72 In 
modem Western society, technical means of capitalist production are complemented by 
rational structures of law and administration.73 The main conduit of rationalization is 
bureaucracy. The modem world has experienced the proliferation of bureaucracy which 
has invaded all forms of organization that depend on expertise and technical knowledge 
directed towards the efficient achievement of goals. Rationalization through bureaucracy 
reaches its apotheosis in the political sphere, where the bureaucracy of the modem state
71Bull, ‘The State’s Positive Role’, p. 117.
72Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory’ in Asher 
Horowitz and Terry Maley (eds), The Barbarism of Reason: Max Weber and the Twilight of Enlightenment 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 287-309, at p. 297. Rationalization in modem science 
produces ‘intellectualization’ or the belief that ‘one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.’ The 
implication of such intellectualization which rejects ‘mysterious incalculable forces’ is the ‘disenchantment 
of the world’ in which ‘the ultimate and sublime values’ have retreated from public life into either ‘the 
transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. ’ See 
Max Weber, ‘Science as aVocation’ inFromMax Weber, pp. 129-156,atpp. 139 & 155. Rationalization 
is not, however, entirely homogeneous. Different forms of rationalization dominate in different areas of 
life and culture. There are ‘rationalizations of economic life, oftechnique, of scientific research, of military 
training, of law and administration, each of which may be rationalized in terms of very different ultimate 
values and ends.’ Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons, 
(London, Routledge, 1992), p. 26. There are also non-Western forms of rationalization, although, as Colin 
Gordon notes, they display limitations which disqualify them from ‘providing a matrix for modernity in 
the Western manner.’ Colin Gordon, ‘The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on 
Rationality and Government’ in Scott Lash and Sam Whimster (eds), Weber: Rationality and Modernity 
(London, Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 293-316, at p. 301.
73Weber, Protestant Ethic, pp. 25-6.
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is ‘superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, 
and in its reliability.’ Bureaucracy is ‘domination through knowledge’ and in its purest 
monocratic form in the modem state is the ‘most rational known means of exercising 
authority over human beings ... superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the 
stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.74 However, the relentless 
bureaucratization of the modem state concerned Weber who warned that the state was 
in danger of becoming a ‘frozen spirit’ or a ‘living machine’, which [t]ogether with the 
dead machine (in the factories) ... is in the process of erecting the scaffolding of that 
future subjection or enslavement.’75
Rationalization through bureaucracy underpins certain disciplinary practices 
which regulate the body’s location in space and time. Weber traced the history of 
discipline -  ‘the consistently rationalized, methodically trained and exact execution of 
the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the 
actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command’ -  from its 
origins in the medieval monastic communities, to capitalist factories, and later into 
administrative rationality in the army, sciences and state administrations.76 For Neo- 
Weberians the themes of rationalization and discipline are recast as surveillance. Anthony 
Giddens suggest surveillance is a twofold process, combining the collection and 
organization of information stored by agencies used to monitor the activities of an 
administered population, with the direct supervision of the activities of subordinates by 
superiors in a particular organization. Together they form the basis of an administrative 
power that controls the timing and spacing of human activity. Giddens claims that the 
modern state is the most effective organization of surveillance.77 All states engage in 
surveillance activity, but only the modem state is capable of concentrating of surveillance 
as governmental power. The modem state’s ability to maintain a monopoly of violence
74Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, pp. 225 & 3.
75Weber, quoted in Fred Dallmayr, ‘Max Weber and the Modem State’ in Horowitz and Maley, 
Barbarism of Reason, pp. 49-67, at p. 59.
76Max Weber, ‘The Meaning of Discipline’ in Gerth and Wright Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 253- 
64, at p. 253.
77Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990), pp. 55-63; 
and Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), p. 47.
35
‘rests upon the secular maintenance of new codes of criminal law, plus the supervisory
control of “deviance.”’ The order imposed through surveillance is what allows the state
to co-ordinate its administrative scope with the borders its territory:
All states have a territorial aspect to them but, prior to the advent of the 
nation-state, it is unusual for the administrative power of the state 
apparatus to coincide with defined territorial boundaries. In the era 
dominated by the nation-state, however, this has become virtually 
universal.78
Rationalization also extends into the legal basis of state authority in modernity.
State legitimacy per se depends on the justification of the claim to the monopoly of
violence within a defined territory. This claim is particularly significant for the modem
state, being as ‘essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous
operation.’79 The modem state is the only political body to base its claim to violence in
the ‘legal rational authority’ that comes from the shared belief of the members of the
political community in ‘the legality of the enacted rules and the right of those elevated
to authority under such rules to issue commands’.80 Legal rational authority differs from
traditional forms of state domination which rest on ‘established belief in the sanctity of
immemorial traditions’, and charismatic domination based in a sense o f ‘devotion to the
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the
normative pattern or order revealed or ordained by him.’ While all forms of legitimacy
are derived from subjective belief in the existence of a legitimate order, only in modernity
is this legitimacy derived from a belief in positive enactment or legality. Weber’s theory
of legitimate order ‘takes as prototypical (at least in modernity) the model of a
deliberately constructed legal order governed by positive enactments or formal law.’81
Weber recognized that all law, even positive law, has to be guaranteed by coercion.
However, only state law is guaranteed specifically by the capacity of state authorities to
use physical violence over the entire space occupied by the political community:
Today legal coercion by violence is the monopoly of the state. ... We 
shall speak of “state law” i.e., of law guaranteed by the state, only when
7 o
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p. 49.
79Weber, Economy and Society: Vol. 1, p. 56.
80Weber’s discussion of legal orders is in Economy and Society: Vol. 1, pp. 212-301. All the 
quotes in this paragraph are taken from p. 215.
81Fred Dallmayr, ‘Max Weber and the Modem State’, p. 55.
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legal coercion is exercised through the specific, i.e. normally directed 
physical means of coercion of the political community82
The Realist ideal of state sovereignty has considerable parallels with Weber’s
notion of legitimate domination. Both concepts assume that a centralized authority has
the capacity to make law backed up by a monopoly of violence over a defined space.
Hans Morgenthau views the modem legal doctrine of sovereignty much as Weber saw
legitimate domination, as positive empirical fact. He presents sovereignty as a basic
‘political fact’ that arises when, in a given territory, a certain group of persons become
more powerful than other groups and their power becomes institutionalized and manifests
‘itself as the supreme authority to enact and enforced legal rules within that territory.’83
Order and legitimacy grounded in territoriality are, in Realist and Weberian
theory, further complemented by the assertion of identity as nationhood. Weber
anticipated that in a disenchanted world the procedural criteria of legal and political
legitimacy could not secure political commitment to the state. Modem states faced a
‘legitimacy deficit’ which had to be compensated by emotional attachments to the nation
and charismatic leaders. Once natural law no longer served as a foundation for the
legitimacy of the state, Weber sought ‘to prop up the state by an appeal to certain
irrational political instincts in the masses towards the nation-state.’84 Weber’s views on
nationalism can also be read as a response to the ‘insecurities of a shifting relative space’
that Harvey suggests characterized fin  de siecle Europe. The increasingly heterogeneous
nature of space combined with a general sense of impotence in face of collapsing
distances, lead to attempts to reaffirm identities in terms of place. In the late nineteenth
century, links between place and personal and communal identity were accentuated as
invented traditions aestheticized politics, and newly established memorial institutions
such as museums, libraries, exhibitions and mins, attempted to re-affirm the experience
of identity in place, which was being eroded by abstract capitalist space.85
82Weber, Economy and Society: Vol. 7, p. 314.
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, 6th ed., (New York NY, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1985), p. 335.
84Biyan S. Turner, ‘Nietzsche, Weber and the Devaluation of Politics: The Problem of State 
Legitimacy’ in Turner, Max Weber: From History to Modernity (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 184-208, 
at p. 197.
85David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodemity (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1989), pp. 258-
83.
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Weber considered nationalism to be simultaneously subjective -  a nation exists 
where a people have a sense of belonging to a ‘community of sentiment’ -  and objective 
-  the subjective sense of solidarity is based in objective factors, such as common race, 
language, religion, customs and political experience. A nation must meet three criteria: 
there must be an objective common factor between the people which differentiates them 
from others; this common factor must be considered as a source of value, able to produce 
‘a feeling of solidarity against outsiders’; and this feeling of solidarity must be expressed 
in autonomous political institutions co-extensive with the community.86 A nation’s 
identity is secured through its Kulture or ‘those particular values which distinguish a 
group or society from others ... and which are given self-conscious formation, typically 
in the art or literature of the society.’87 Where national Kulture is inscribed within the 
state, state and nation develop a mutually-reinforcing relationship. The state provides the 
protection necessary for safeguarding Kulture, while national communities generate the 
feelings of solidarity that reinforce the state’s legitimacy. However, while state and nation 
are ideally co-extensive, Weber recognized that this was not always so: ‘[tjhere are three 
rational components of a political boundary, military security, economic interest, 
community of national culture; the three do not just coincide like that on a map.’88
Charles Turner had pointed out that Weber’s concern to stress ‘the continuing 
relevance of spatial boundaries’ contrasts with his sensitivity to the transformations 
accompanying modernization which seemed to be erasing spatial boundaries and 
prioritizing the temporal nature of being -  changes which he acknowledged in other parts 
of his work.89 Walker reads this paradox in Weber’s work in the context of Weber’s 
account of the nation-state as an attempt to reinforce state autonomy in a world of‘radical
86Much of the following discussion of Weber’s theory of the nation-state is adapted from David 
Beetham, Max Weber and Modem Politics,^. 119-47, quote p. 122.
87Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, quoted in Beetham, Weber and Modem Politics
p. 125.
88Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, pp. 169-170, in Beetham, Weber andModem Politics,
p. 129.
89For a commentary on the spatial nature of Weber’s thought, see Charles Turner, Modernity and 
Politics (London, Routledge, 1992), at p. 10. Weber also established rigid spatial boundaries between the 
five value spheres: economic, political, aesthetic, erotic and intellectual. Max Weber, ‘Religious Rejections 
of the World and their Directions’ in Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 322-59.
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historicity’ by fixing ‘history on a spatial terrain’.90 By means of a nationalist appeal to 
history ‘[t]he initial assumption of territoriality, is rewritten as an autonomous 
nationalism that fills the spatial form, that gives life and agency to the abstract claims of 
the modem state.’91 Weber’s analysis of the state places him in a tradition that assert the 
‘spatial delineation of an inside and an outside’ and wants to limit political life to the 
former. The space over which the monopoly of violence may be exercised by state 
authorities is a restricted territory. The implication of this is that other states must be able 
to claim to similar monopolies over other territories: ‘Weber takes the spatial separation 
for granted, the relevant territory is a spatial segment among other spatial segments, and 
the state of which he speaks is only a monopoly among other monopolies.’92
The Realist ‘national-territorial totality’ is a direct descendent of Weber’s ideal 
nation state. In Politics Among Nations Morgenthau revisions Weber’s Kulture as 
Coleridge’s “invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people .. .”.93 A strong sense 
of national culture is important not only because it contributes to a state’s power, but also 
because it is another pole of sovereign identity that differentiates in space ‘one nation 
apart from others.’94 The state is the expression of the sovereignty of the nation, which 
is inscribed into the spaces of its territory. For Morgenthau, ‘on a given territory only one 
nation can have sovereignty -  supreme authority -  and ... no other state has the right to 
perform governmental acts on its territory without its consent.’95 In modernity, which, 
following Weber, Morgenthau describes as a disenchanted age, it is the state’s expression 
of national sentiment which has allowed it to become a ‘mortal God’. Furthermore, in an 
age that no longer believes in an ‘immortal God’ this means that ‘the state becomes the 
only God there is.’96
90RB.J. Walker, ‘Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International Relations’ in 
David Campbell and Mick Dillon (eds), The Political Subject o f Violence (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1993), pp. 137-58.
91Walker, ‘Violence, Modernity, Silence’, p. 150.
92Walker, ‘Violence, Modernity, Silence’, p. 152.
93Coleridge, quoted in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 147.
94Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 147.
95Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 330.
96Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 
1946), p. 197.
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Conclusion
Weber’s theory of the state as a human community that successfully claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory is the paradigm for the 
Realist idea of the national territorial totality. Both Realists and Weberians stake their 
claims about the nature of identity, order and violence in modernity upon the ground that 
is provided by the idea of the territorial state. In so doing, both Realism and Weberian 
theory reinforce the inside/outside spatial demarcation as determined by the principle of 
sovereign identity. It is this spatial distinction that makes possible the conception of 
international relations as a distinct realm of practice and theory. In the next chapter I 
propose to take the analysis further. I want to show that a constructive way to think about 
the idea of the territorial state is as one discourse on space, forming part of a complex 
network or matrix of discourse and practice that have represented and produced the 
social, political and cultural spaces of modernity.
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Space in Theory
All people, everywhere, in all ages, have a distinctive experience of time 
and space and, however unconscious, some conception of it. It is possible 
to interpret how class structures, modes of production, patterns of 
diplomacy, or means of waging war were manifested historically in terms 
of changing experiences of time and space.1
We have established that the idea of the territorial state is a mainstay of Realist and 
Weberian theory. The idea of the territorial state is the pivot upon which the practice of 
sovereign identity inscribes the space of domestic political community, marks it as inside, 
and separates it from the outside spaces of international relations. Further, it is the ground 
upon which the resolution of order, violence and identity is settled in Realist and 
Weberian theory.
At its most basic, the term territory signifies a space constituted by power. Robert
Sack insists that territory is not synonymous with space.2 Spatial designates activities and
events which take place in and through space and which have spatial properties such as
location, shape and orientation. Territory refers to the dominant geographical expression
of social power and control. Merely circumscribing things in space or on a map does not
create territory. Territoriality involves the sustained ‘attempt by an individual or group
to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and
asserting control over a geographic area.’3 Delimitation becomes territory only when the
control of access determines behaviour and the boundaries are used ‘to mould, influence
and control activities.’4 The most effective instrument of territorialisation is the abstract
form of power embodied in the modem state, which controls a society made up of
different classes pursing distinctive economic activities abstracted from place. However,
to make this power more accessible, visible or “real”, the state is endowed 
with the most basic attribute of objects -  location and extension in space.
In civilisation, the political power of the state is areal or territorial. The
Stephen Kern, The Culture ofTime and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1983), p. 4.
•y
Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
3Sack, Human Territoriality, p. 19.
4Sack, Human Territoriality, p. 19.
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state is reified by placing it in space. Whatever else a state may be or do,
it is territorial.5
In this chapter I want to look at the way in which the territorial space of the 
modem state is produced. The French philosopher Michel Foucault agrees with Sack that 
territory is not just ‘a geographical notion’ but a ‘juridico-political one: the area 
controlled by a certain kind of power.’6 However, unlike Sack, Foucault argues that the 
form of power through which territory is circumscribed is ‘discursive’. Drawing on 
Foucault’s work I want to put forward a number of propositions that will allow us to view 
the idea of the territorial state not as an objective intellectual category, but as a discursive 
practice that produces and legitimises the dominant order of political space in modernity. 
I shall extract from the work of several French writers, who have analysed the 
representation and production of space in modernity, some guidelines for situating the 
idea of the territorial state not as part of an unfolding narrative of political theory, but in 
terms of a set or network of interrelated discourses and practices that have produced the 
spaces of modernity.
The argument will unfold as follows. The first section, which will establish the 
background scenography, will examine the spatial consciousness of French structuralism 
and the critique of it advanced by historical materialist geographers. This discussion will 
focus on the use of spatial metaphor and vocabulary in Foucault’s archaeology of the 
human sciences, and will introduce the meaning of the term discourse as it is used in this 
work. The second section will compare and contrast two different theoretical approaches 
to theorising the relationship between space, knowledge and power: Foucault’s later 
genealogies of power/knowledge will be considered alongside Henri Lefebvre’s work on 
the representation and production of space. In the final section I bring the question of the 
state more sharply into focus by means of a discussion of the themes o f‘territorialisation’ 
and ‘striated’ state-space as presented in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari.
5Robert David Sack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective 
(London, Macmillan, 1980), pp. 40-1.
6Michel Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’ in Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton, The Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 63-77, at p. 
68 .
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Space, Structure, Discourse
The geographer Edward Soja has claimed that twentieth century social and political 
thought has privileged time at the expense of space.7 Liberals and Marxists have a 
‘historical imagination’ in which social being and becoming have been interpreted in the 
context of time. This preoccupation with man’s social and political association in light 
of the unfolding of history has meant that the instrumentality of space has been 
overlooked. The historical imagination has failed to recognise modernity’s ‘spatial fix’, 
that is the radical restructuring of the spatial organisation of society as a response to the 
crisis of capitalism, and the role of the state -  itself a ‘socially produced space’ -  in 
reproducing capitalist space.8 However, one branch of twentieth century theory, French 
structuralism and its post-structuralist derivatives, has had more of a spatial than 
historical imagination.9 In his recent history of structuralism, the French historian 
Francis Dosse argues that structuralism rejected ‘the dialectic of temporalities’ for ‘a 
spatial logic with its multiple games of positions.’10 The structuralists’ penchant for 
spatial metaphors: inside, outside, borders and boundaries complements a distinctive 
landscape; albeit one of absence and lack, one that is ‘void of content and meaning’.11 
Structuralism, according to Dosse,
7Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion o f Space in Critical Social Theory 
(London, Verso, 1989).
o
Soja, Postmodern Geographies, pp. 34-5.
9Michael Lane views structuralism as a method that has six distinctive properties. First, its 
advocates consider it applicable to all realms of human social phenomena; all manifestations of social 
activity (clothes, books, stories, kinship and marriage) are viewed as constituting formal languages whose 
regularities can be reduced to a set of abstract rules that define and govern those languages. Second, 
structuralism is holistic; it gives logical priority to the whole over the parts, although the whole can only 
be explained in terms of the relations between parts or the networks which link and unite the elements. 
Third, structuralism seeks structure not at the surface level of empirical observables, but beneath or behind 
the empirical reality; its domain is the unconscious laws and rules governing behaviour. Fourth, 
structuralists assume that all the social phenomena of a society are indivisible and therefore that it is 
possible to identify the homologies and correspondences between, say, structures of language, myth and 
kinship. Fifth, relations discerned at the abstracted level of deep structure can be reduced to relations of 
binary opposites {raw/cooked, fire/water, sun/moon). Finally, structuralist analysis emphasises 
synchronicity rather than diachronicity, the relations across a moment in time rather than through time. See 
Michael Lane, ‘Introduction’ to Lane, Structuralism: A Reader (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1970), pp. 
11-42.
10Fran?ois Dosse, History of Structuralism, Vol. 2: The Sign Sets, 1967-Present, trans. Deborah 
Glassman, (Minneapolis MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 437.
nDosse, History of Structuralism, p. 437.
43
looked for its logic not in the vertical depths of an impossible genesis, but 
in the horizontality of the many possibilities organized by a certain 
number of operators of generalised exchange: phonemes, incest taboos, 
the objet petit a. This was the space wherein structural logic was 
constructed, yet “spacing means nothing, nothing which is, no present to 
set at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible outside and, at the same 
time, the index of a movement, a shift indicated by an irreducible 
alterity.”12
We can get some sense of the spatial imagination of (post)-structuralism from
Foucault’s early archaeological work on the constitution of knowledge in the human
sciences.13 In The Order o f Things -  his classic work of archaeology -  Foucault sought
to expose the shared ‘conditions of possibility’ that structured the enunciation of
statements in different discourses of man. He wanted to know ‘how it is that the human
subject took itself as the object of possible knowledge? Through what forms of rationality
and historical conditions? And, finally at what price? This is my question: at what price
can subjects speak the truth about themselves?’14 The Order o f Things explored the
history of the order circumscribing the modem discourses of man: philology, political
economy and biology, which identified man as a user of language, as a wealth creator,
and as a living organism. Foucault asked,
what modalities of order have been recognized, posited, linked with space 
and time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge as we find it 
employed in grammar and philology, in natural history and biology, in the 
study of wealth and political economy.... on what basis knowledge and 
theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was 
constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of 
what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience 
be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed.15
In The Order o f Things Foucault found, at the unconscious level of rule
12Jacques Derrida, quoted in Dosse, History of Structuralism, p. 438.
13In the preface to the English translation of the Order o f Things Foucault dismisses as ‘half­
witted’ the French commentators who ‘persist in labelling me a “structuralist”. I have been unable to get 
it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts or, key terms that characterize 
structural analysis.’ Michel Foucault, The Order ofThings: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences, trans. 
Alan Sheridan, (London, Routledge, 1970), p. xiv. Nevertheless, I shall, for the sake of this introductory 
argument, adopt Dosse’s view that Foucault, at least as an archaeologist, was, with Ldvi-Strauss, Barthes 
and Lacan, a major figure in the French structuralist movement of the 1960s.
14Foucault, quoted in J. G. Merquior, Foucault (London, Fontana, 1985), p. 17.
15Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. xxi-ii.
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formation, in the discourses of natural history, economic exchange and general grammar
of the Classical period (roughly 1650-1800) a common archaeological system, a set of
‘discursive regularities’, a ‘polymorphous cluster of correlations’ that determined which
objects were studied, how concepts were formed and the premises of theory
construction.16 Foucault termed this system an interdiscursive configuration or
episteme}1 The spirit of the classical episteme, the episteme of representation, was
‘discrimination’: the identities of things were established by marking out their differences
from others; its main structures were mathesis -  ‘a universal science of measurement and
order’ -  and taxonomia -  the principle of classification or ordered tabulation. The spatial
imagery of the episteme is quite striking. J. G Merquior understands the episteme as ‘a
basement (sous-sol) of thought, a mental infrastructure underlying all strands of
knowledge (on man) at a given age, a conceptual ‘grid’ (grille, in Foucault’s Levi-
Straussian wording) that amounts to an ‘historical a priori’ -  almost a historicized form
of Kant’s categories. ’18 Similarly, Dosse suggests that Foucault conceived of the episteme
‘as a vast transversal anchor that could only shift rather than evolve between the quakes,
or give way to another layer that would superpose itself on the first and become sediment’
and that it ‘found its parallel in the geologists approach.’ He describes Foucault as a
‘stratigrapher of discursivity and its discontinuities’ and his archaeology as substituting
‘a horizontal, synchronic, spatial orientation for a genetic, historical approach.’19 Spatial
metaphors infuse Foucault’s own accounts of his project:
what is available to archaeological knowledge is the ... threshold that 
separates us from Classical thought and constitutes our modernity. It was 
upon this threshold that the strange figure of knowledge called man first 
appeared and revealed a space proper to the human sciences. In 
attempting to uncover the deepest strata of Western culture, I am restoring 
to our silent and apparently immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws; 
and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet.20
16Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and 
Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 53-72, at p. 
58.
17Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan-Smith, (London, 
Tavistock Publications, 1972), p. 191.
1XMerquior, Foucault, p. 38.
19Dosse, History of Structuralism, p. 441.
70Foucault, Order of Things, p. xxiv.
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The spatial language of structuralism has, however, failed to convince all of its 
critics of its validity. Taking aim at the epistemological studies of Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, the Marxist theorist Henri Lefebvre charged them 
with purveying an intellectual sophistry that fetishised space as a ‘mental thing’ or 
‘mental place’ and promoted the untenable claim that the mental realm envelops the 
social and physical ones.21 Criticising Foucault’s archaeology, Lefebvre claimed that 
Foucault’s liberal use of spatial metaphors -  as in the statement “knowledge [savior] is 
also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with 
which he deals in his discourse” -  is problematic because he does not make it clear what 
sort of space he is referring to, or how it bridges the gap between epistemology and the 
social use of space.22 Although Lefebvre was sympathetic to the semiotic claim that space 
could be read, decoded and deciphered, he felt that formal semiotics was unable to 
convey a sense of how man experiences space, or to explain the role of power in the 
production of space. To add to its woes, epistemological-philosophical thinking failed to 
provide a strong basis for a ‘science of space’, which has only managed to produce 
fragmentary descriptions of space, rather than profound theory or analysis; the spatial 
sciences merely provided ‘inventories of what exists in space’ or ‘discourses on space’, 
and were unable to provide ‘knowledge o f  space’. Structuralist theory transferred ‘onto 
the level of discourse, of language per se -  i.e. the level of mental space -  a large portion 
of the attributes and ‘properties’ of what is actually social space.’23
In the next section I shall suggest that Lefebvre’s approach to theorising space as 
a social product is, in fact, quite similar to Foucault’s genealogical conceptualisation of 
space as the product of power/knowledge. However, I want to end this section with a 
consideration of Foucault’s characterisation of the discourses uncovered by the 
archaeology. The single most important point to bear in mind about Foucault’s 
understanding of discourse is his claim that discourse produces the objects about which 
it speaks. Foucault dismissed the traditional epistemological position that discourse 
denotes ‘the sign of something else’ o f‘things’ which are ‘silently anterior to it.’ Things
21Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1991).
Lefebvre, Production of Space, pp. 3-4.
Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 7.
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or objects (choses) are not just revealed through discourse (mots) but are formed in it.24 
Foucault’s view that objects are produced by discourse effectively overturns the 
epistemological view that signs represent a pre-existing reality, and that words are linked 
to things by relations such as symbolisation, reference or truth.25 Discourse is not ‘groups 
of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)’, but ‘practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak.’26 We must, therefore, avoid the 
temptation to
resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not 
imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would 
have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; 
there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our 
favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, 
or in any case as a practice which we impose on them.27
There are two immediate implications of conceiving of the idea of the territorial
state as a discourse in Foucault’s sense. First, any reference to the idea of the territorial
must not be treated simply as a disinterested statement about the objective order of
political space in modernity; rather the idea of the territorial state must be seen as a
discursive configuration which assists in the production of that order. Second, the term
discourse allows us to extend our understanding of the relationship between the idea of
the territorial state and violence. It is not simply that the state has, as in Weberian
terminology, the exclusive legitimate access to the means of violence, but that the
enunciation of the statement ‘the state is territorial’ implicitly legitimises the violence by
which the spaces of politics in modernity have been demarcated and legitimised. I shall
develop these themes in the next section, where I shall discuss the production of space
in light of the themes of knowledge, power and representation.
24Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 47.
25See, for a discussion of Foucault’s epistemology, Richard Rorty, ‘Foucault and Epistemology’ 
in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp. 41-9.
0 ( \Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 49.
27Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ in Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text: A 
Poststructuralist Reader (Boston MA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 48-78, at p. 67.
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Space, Knowledge and Power
Soja argues that the Western spatial imagination could be enriched by a critical 
geography, which would reveal how space hides consequences from us and ‘how 
relations of power and discipline are ‘inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of 
social life.’28 Foucault is one theorist whose work Soja thinks offers a potentially 
rewarding analysis of space, knowledge and power in modernity.
Foucault’s understanding of discourse changed as his work shifted from the 
archaeology of knowledge in the human sciences to the genealogy of power and 
knowledge; as he became less of an archivist and more of a cartographer,29 Robert 
Young captures the difference between these two moments of Foucault’s work aptly: 
archaeology is a ‘method for the synchronic analyses and representation of the history of 
systems of thought’, while genealogy or cartography is ‘a more directly political mapping 
of the forms of power exercised in discursive and other practices.’30 In his later 
archaeological work, Foucault began to be impressed by the institutional constraints and 
controls exercised over the formation of discourses. He noted that in all societies ‘the 
production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a 
certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers.’31 To 
account for this institutional factor, he replaced the episteme with the dispositif or 
‘apparatus: a ‘heterogeneous ensemble’ whose elements include discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions -  in short, ‘the said as 
much as the unsaid.’32 The dispositif \s a formation that, at a given historical moment, 
responds to an urgent need, has a strategic function and manipulates specific relations of 
force. As an example, Foucault claimed that the apparatus which controlled and subjected 
madness and neurosis arose as a response to the need of the mercantilist economy to 
assimilate the mobile population. The dispositif highlights a complex interplay between
Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 6.
29See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sedn Hand, (London, The Athlone Press, 1988).
30Robert Young, ‘Introduction’ to Foucault, ‘Order of Discourse’, p. 48.
31Foucault, ‘Order of Discourse’, p. 52.
32Michel Foucault, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ in Power/Knowledge, pp. 194-228, at p. 194.
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relations of power and ‘coordinates of knowledge’: ‘the apparatus consists in: strategies 
of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.’33 Thus, while 
‘the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus -  the apparatus in its general form is 
both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous.’34 It 
is worth emphasising two features of the relationship between power and knowledge 
uncovered by the genealogy. First, power through knowledge creates subjectivity and 
gives identity. It
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must 
recognize and which other have to recognize in him. It is a form of power 
which makes individuals subjects.35
Second, power produces truth. Truth is not the ‘mythic reward of free spirits’ orthe ‘child
of protracted solitude’, but is constituted in power relations: ‘Each society has its regime
of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true, and which is reproduced in institutions, techniques and regimes
of truth.36 Power is exercised ‘through the production of truth.’37
In terms of our immediate concern with the relationship between territoriality and
the broad discursive production of space in modernity, several aspects of Foucault’s work
on power/knowledge stand out. First is the role of disciplinary power in the production
of space. We may recall that Weber had observed that modem life is ordered by the
disciplines. Bryan Turner suggests that Weber’s writings on discipline anticipated
Foucault’s work on the power/knowledge practices which discipline both individual and
social bodies: ‘Foucault’s analysis of “disciplines” can... be regarded as a contemporary
33Foucault, ‘Confession of the Flesh’, p. 196.
34Foucault, ‘Confession of the Flesh’, p. 197. Dreyfus and Rabinow illustrate the dispositifwith 
reference to Charcot and Freud’s experiments on hysterical women given amyl-nitrate to excite them to 
act out fantasies. While Charcot’s etiology of neurosis sought out the objective cause of these actions, and 
Freud wanted to interpret the actor’s hidden intentions so as to discover their sense, Foucault is interested 
in the dispositifde sexualite which is ‘not the obj ective causes of sexual neurosis, nor the hidden intentions 
of the hysterical woman, but the organization, coherence, and intelligibility of all of the practices which 
make up die performances in Charcot’s clinic. Foucault seeks to analyse exactly what these practices are 
doing.’ See Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 119-22.
35Michel Foucault, ‘Afterward: The Subject and Power’ in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, pp. 208-26, at p. 212.
36Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 109-133, at p. 131.
37Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp. 78-108, at p. 93.
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version of Weber’s analysis of the iron cage’.38 According to Foucault, disciplinary power 
emerged with the discovery of ‘the body as object and target of power’ in the classical 
age.39 The ‘docile’ body is inserted into a machinery of power which ‘explores it, breaks 
it down and rearranges it’ and restricts its operations and actions according to techniques 
determining speed and efficiency.40 Disciplinary power distributes individuals in space 
according to four principles. First, from the ‘great confinement’ of vagabonds and 
paupers to the imposition of the monastic cell model in colleges, schools, barracks, 
workshops and factories, enclosure produces heterogeneous, closed-off spaces. Second, 
partitioning ensures that every individual is assigned a separate place; groups and 
pluralities are broken up, so reducing desertion and vagabondage. Through partitioning 
the individual’s location could always be known and his conduct constantly supervised: 
‘ [i]t was a procedure therefore aimed at knowing, mastering and using. Discipline 
organises an analytical space.’41 Third, discipline produces functional sites or ‘useful 
spaces’ coded for particular operations rather than for general multi-purpose use. Finally, 
disciplinary elements are interchangeable: they are defined by the place they occupies in 
a series. For Foucault the primary unit of spatial discipline is not ‘the territory (unit of 
domination), nor the place (unit of residence), but the rank, the place one occupies in a 
classification’:42
In organizing “cells”, “places”, and “ranks”, the disciplines create 
complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical.
It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve 
out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places 
and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also 
better economy of time and gesture. They are mixed spaces: real because 
they govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, 
because they are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, 
assessments, hierarchies. The first of the great operations of discipline is, 
therefore, the constitution of “tableaux vivants”, which transform the
38Bryan S. Turner, ‘Nietzsche, Weber and the Devaluation of Politics: The Problem of State 
Legitimacy’ in Turner, Max Weber: From History to Modernity (London, Routledge, 1992), pp. 184-208, 
at p. 205.
39Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1979), p. 136.
40Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 138.
4'Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 143.
42Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 146.
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confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities.43 
If we are to remain true to Foucault’s conceptualisation of disciplinary power we 
must acknowledge that he posited it as an alternative to state or sovereign power. He 
insisted that the disciplinary techniques of power could only be exposed if we rid 
ourselves of the old notion of ‘juridico-discursive power’ based in the ‘discourse of 
right’. Juridico-discursive power operates by prohibition, negative interdiction and 
repression; it is the power of ‘sovereign, law and prohibition’, and, since the Middle 
Ages, has dominated our conceptualisation of power. Foucault wants us to forget our 
obsession with the person of the sovereign, to dispense with this representation of power, 
and to ‘cut off the King’s head’, so that we might understand the mechanisms and 
techniques of modem power, which the juridico-discursive notion of power not only fails 
to describe, but also masks.44 Nevertheless, as our discussion of the Realist-Weberian 
tradition of state theory revealed, many consider the modem state’s bureaucracy to be the 
most efficient instrument of disciplinary power. We saw how thinkers in this tradition, 
like Giddens, have reframed discipline in terms of state surveillance and how it is 
implicated in the idea of the territorial state. Michel de Certeau sees disciplinary 
strategies ordering space at all levels of modem power relations, from states down. A 
strategy is the
calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a 
city, a scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can 
be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with 
an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, 
enemies, the country surrounding the city, objectives and objects of 
research, etc.) can be managed.... A Cartesian attitude, if you wish: it is 
an effort to delimit one’s place in a world bewitched by the invisible 
powers of the Other. It is also the typical attitude of modem science, 
politics and military strategy.45
43Foucault continues: ‘The drawing up of “tables” was one of the great problems of the scientific, 
political and economic technology of the eighteenth century.... In the eighteenth century, the table was 
both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge. It was a question of organising the multiple, of 
providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it an 
“order”.’ Discipline and Punish, p. 148.
44Michel Foucault, The History o f Sexuality: Vol 1 (London, Penguin, 1984), p. 85; and Foucault, 
‘Truth and Power’, p. 121.
45Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall, (Berkeley CA, 
University of California Press, 1984), pp. 35-6.
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There are, according to de Certeau, three effects of this strategy of marking out in space
the loci of self and other. First, it produces a triumph of space over time, which is
effectively mastered through the ownership of an autonomous place. Second, this mastery
of place is achieved through sight: ‘[t]he division of space makes possible a panoptic
practice proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forms into objects
that can be observed and measured, and thus control and “include” them within its scope
of vision.’ Third, the capacity to ‘transform the uncertainties of history into readable
spaces’ is the power o f knowledge.46 These strategies produce a knowledge that is
sustained and determined by the provision of one’s own space; this power is not only the
precondition of this knowledge, but (re)produces itself in and through this knowledge.
Foucault felt that the genealogy was capable of exposing the production of space
by regimes of power/knowledge. Responding to a question about the use of spatial
metaphors (territory, site, position) in his work, Foucault suggested that they allowed him
to conceive of the relations between power and knowledge: ‘[there is an administration
of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and
which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination
designated by such notions as field, region and territory.47 Strategic spatial metaphors
allow discourse to be deciphered; they expose the ‘points at which discourses are
transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power.’48 Discourse formation
and the genealogy of knowledge should not be analysed
in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of 
ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and 
strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, 
control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make 
up a sort of geopolitics .. .49
Themes of space, power and knowledge are also emphasised by Henri Lefebvre 
-  the second author in whose work Soja identifies the seeds of a critical geography. We 
have already encountered Lefebvre’s critique of Foucault’s use of spatial language. 
However, Lefebvre’s own analysis of the production of space has much more in common
46de Certeau, Practice o f Everyday Life, p. 36.
47Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’, p. 69.
48Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’, p. 70.
49Foucault, ‘Questions on Geography’, p. 77.
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with Foucault’s genealogical work than Lefebvre seemed to be prepared to admit. 
Lefebvre always maintained his historical materialist credentials and insisted on the 
social rather than linguistic production of space. All societies produce a particular space 
in which the dominant relations of production are reproduced. Space for Lefebvre, is ‘a 
precondition and a result of social superstructures’; it is not an a priori condition for the 
state and its institutions but is organised by them for their specific needs.50 Although 
space has
been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements... this has
been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It a product
literally filled with ideologies.51
The politics and ideologies hidden in social space can be revealed by ‘spatial 
architectonics’, which traces shifts in the relationship of the body to space. It shows that 
in Western culture there has been a process of decorporealization from the ‘space of the 
body’ -  in which spaces were ordered and conceived in terms of the body’s organisation 
-  to the ‘body-in-space’ -  where the body becomes fragmented and decomposed into 
localised functions. Space is produced through three modalities: ‘the perceived, ‘the 
conceived’ and ‘the lived’. Perceived space is embodied in spatial practices or the time- 
space routines and spatial structures through which social, political and economic life is 
produced and reproduced. Lived space is experienced through the representational 
spaces of historically embedded signs and images -  these spaces are often sites of 
resistance inaugurated by cultural and artistic movements in opposition to the spatial 
practices of the dominant social order. Representational spaces are lived spaces -  those 
analysed by ethnologists, psychoanalysts and anthropologists -  and are redolent with 
imaginary and symbolic elements. Representational space ‘is alive: it speaks, it has an 
affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or; square, church,
50Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 85.Two points are worth noting here. First, although Lefebvre 
contends that social spaces mirror the dominant relations of production, he does not suggest that space is 
reducible to them. Each mode of production has a space, but the characteristics of space are not equivalent 
to the mode of production. Indeed he regarded the tendency to reduce the aesthetic, social and mental 
realms to the economic as a ‘disastrous error’. Lefebvre quoted in Derek Gregory, Geographical 
Imaginations, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 38. Second, Lefebvre was aware that social spaces 
are not distinct and bounded, but overlapping, interpenetrating and superimposed on one another; they 
cannot be explained in terms of isolated discourses (urban, geographic, architectural or anthropological) 
which focus on aspects rather than the whole of social space.
51Henri Lefebvre, ‘Reflections on the Politics of Space’, Antipode, 8:2 (1976), pp. 30-7, at p. 31.
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graveyard. It embraces the loci of passion, of action, and of lived situations...’52 The third
-  and most relevant for our historical investigation into the origins of the idea of the
territorial state -  modality is conceived space, produced through representations o f space.
Representations of space are the abstract, visual and imaginary spaces of social engineers,
urban planners, architects and cartographers which materially inscribe the dominant
social order’s relations of production. Representations of space, like Foucauldian
apparatuses, are the axes through which knowledge of space leads to the production of
space through practice:
representations of space are shot throughout with a knowledge (savoir) -  
i.e. a mixture of understanding (connaissance) and ideology -  which is 
always relative and in the process of change. Such representations are thus 
objective, though subject to revision. ... Representations of space are 
certainly abstract, but they also play a part in social and political practice: 
established relations between objects and people in represented space are 
subordinate to a logic which will sooner or later break them up.. .53
Representations of space intervene and modify spatial textures and have a substantial role
in the production of space. Their intervention occurs through ‘construction’: ‘by way of
architecture, conceived of not as the building of a particular structure, palace or
monument, but rather as a project embedded in a spatial context and a texture which calls
for “representations” that will not vanish into the symbolic or imaginary realms.’54
Foucault’s analysis of technologies of power/knowledge shares with Lefebvre’s
analysis of representations of space a suspicion of, what Martin Jay has called,
modernity’s ‘empire of the gaze’ and the ‘ocularcentric discourse’ of Western culture.55
(I will address these themes more substantially in chapter six, where I assess the
relationship between the Renaissance idea of the territorial state and the invention of
perspective.) For Lefebvre the conceived or conceptual space produced by
representations o f space is primarily visual. In modernity the power of the eye dominates
the construction and imposition of abstract space. Thought
sours up into the abstract space of the visible, the geometric. The architect
52Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 42.
Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 41.
54Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 42.
55Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1994).
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who designs, the planner who draws up master-plans, see their “objects”,
buildings and neighbourhoods, from on high and from afar They pass
from the “lived” to the abstract in order to project that abstraction onto the 
level of the “lived”.56
Foucault shares this concern that modem society is controlled by the ‘eye of power’
embodied in the panopticon.57 Panopticism is a response to a realisation that space is a
historical and political problem which must be specified and made functional. Bentham’s
famous panopticon complements Rousseau’s dream of a ‘transparent society’ in which
all of its parts were ‘at once visible and legible’ and not obscured by the ‘privileges of
royal power or the prerogatives of a given body’. Each man should be able to see the
whole of society from wherever he stands. Bentham’s panopticon both embodies and
restricts these ideals for
[h]e poses the problem of visibility, but his conception of visibility is 
organised completely around a dominating and observing gaze. He 
initiates the project of a universal visibility that would function on behalf 
of a rigorous and meticulous form of power. In this sense the technical 
idea of the exercise of an “all-seeing” power, which is Bentham's 
obsession, is connected to the great Rousseauian theme .. .58
The Striated Space of the Territorialising State
It will have been noted that neither Foucault’s analysis of the micropolitics of discipline 
nor Lefebvre’s discussion of the social production of space say much about the particular 
relationship of the state to its territory. Both Foucault and Lefebvre tell us much about 
the general discursive and representational dynamics which produce space in modernity 
-  and as we shall see these dynamics feed into the production of state territory -  but they 
do not isolate the space of the state for specific consideration. Two thinkers who do are 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their two volume work, Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia.59 Like Foucault they are interested in the micropolitical dynamics of
56Lefebvre, quoted in Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 404.
57Michel Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’ in Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961- 
1984, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 226-40, at p. 230.
58A11 quotes from Foucault, ‘Eye of Power’, p. 230-1.
59Gilles Deleuze and F£lix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley, (London, The Athlone Press, 1984); and Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brain Massumi, (London, The Athlone Press, 1988).
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power, but they also analyse the molar power embodied in the state. Of particular interest 
for us is the distinction they find between the smooth space of micropolitical or nomadic 
forms of becoming and the State’s being in striated space.
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which they call schizoanalysis or rhizomatics, is an 
idiosyncratic conflation of historical materialism -  particularly Marx’s notion of 
‘primitive accumulation’ -  and psychoanalytic theory. They bring together the operations 
of large socio-economic structures with individual psyches. One concept they use to 
convey this conjunction is ‘territorialization’ -  an idea adapted from Lacan, for whom 
it designates the imprint of the mother’s nourishment and care on the child’s libido, 
producing charged erogenous zones and objects out of organs. Territorialization signifies 
the regulation and coding of flows of material bodies and desire 
by social and political ‘machines’. Coding flows is the ‘business of the socius’; society 
is not a milieu of free-exchange and circulation, but ‘a socius of inscription where the 
essential thing is to mark and be marked.’60
Three different abstract social machines: primitive, despotic and capitalist 
produce three different moments of territorialization -  which is at once a process of 
^territorialization and reterritorialization (for example, the English Enclosure Acts 
served the capitalist machine by ^territorializing dispossessed peasants thereby 
establishing the conditions for their reterritorialization in the textile looms).61 The only 
machine that is strictly territorial is the primitive one, which literally inscribes bodies on 
an indivisible earth. It controls the productive forces by ‘tattooing, excising, carving,
60Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142.
61See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 139-271, for the ‘universal history’ of the three 
‘social machines’. Universal history is an abstraction and the social machines, rather than describing 
particular societies, suggest a set of abstract figures in terms of which particular societies may be 
understood. Universal history is also ‘anti-historicist’; the abstract machines are not stages of evolution 
with one machine resulting from the effects of another. Patton points out that they all ‘co-exist in 
abstraction, which is eternal. Concrete history is simply the working out of these processes in particular 
cases.’ Paul Patton, ‘Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in Mille Plateaux', SubStance, 13:3/4 
(1984), pp. 62-80, at p. 68. The ‘social machines’ are literally machines, which have ‘an immobile motor 
and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and 
portions of the tasks to be performed are distributed. Coding the flows implies all these operations.’ Anti- 
Oedipus, p. 141. See also, for a discussion of territorialization, Eugene W. Holland, ‘Deterritorializing 
“Deterritorialization”: From the Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus', SubStance, 20:3 (Winter 1991), 
pp. 55-65.
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scarifying, mutilating, encircling and initiating’ bodies.62 In the primitive socius the
enjoyment of rights and the assignation of duties are legitimised by marking the
primitive’s body and consigning his organs and their exercise to the collectivity. The first
signs in human history are, therefore, these ‘territorial signs that plant their flags in
bodies’ through which the primitive’s body is attached and inscribed to the
undifferentiated, undivided earth.’63 Primitive rural communities are eventually invaded
by barbarian despotic states, which extend division to
the earth itself, by virtue of an administration that is landed and 
residential, this cannot be regarded as a promotion of territoriality; on the 
contrary, it is rather the effect of the first great movement of 
deterritorialization on the primitive communes. The immanent unity of 
the earth as the immobile motor gives way to a transcendent unity of an 
altogether different nature -  the unity of the State; the full body is no 
longer that of the earth, it is the full body of the Despot. ..64
The despotic State machine over codes the territorial codes and filiations of the primitive
machine and transfers them to the ‘body of the despot’ which becomes the focus of desire
and production. The third moment is the social machine of capitalism which consists only
of decoded flows. Capitalism is a ‘general axiomatic of decoded flows’ that evolves from
the conjugation of decoded and deterritorialized flows of unqualified wealth and
unqualified labour; it replaces intrinsic codes with an ‘axiomatic of abstract quantities in
the form of money’.65 Capitalism deterritorializes not by over-coding but by de-coding:
it substitutes the codes and overcodes of primitive and despotic machines for an
axiomatic of abstract quantities determined by exchange. The risk of this decoding, which
releases subjectivity as both labour and desire, is that desire may not be reintegrated into
exchange. Hence the emphasis on schizophrenia as the exterior limit of capitalism, as that
which ‘causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialised body without organs’
and resists their reintegration into the capitalist axiomatic.66
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 144.
63Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 145.
^Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 145-6.
65Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 453; and Anti-Oedipus, p. 139. This resume of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of capitalism is greatly simplified. See Anti-Oedipus, pp. 222-71, for 
a fuller discussion. See also the commentary by Robert D’ Amico, Marx and the Philosophy o f Culture 
(Gainsville FA, University Presses of Florida, 1981), pp. 58-99.
66For Deleuze and Guattari: ‘Schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary 
its difference, its divergence and its death.’ Anti-Oedipus, p. 246.
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The role of the state in the logics of territorialization is to reterritorialize, to code
and segment deterritorialized flows of desire and production. This function reaches its
apotheosis in capitalism:
the conjunction of the decoded flows, their differential relations, and their 
multiple schizzes or breaks require a whole apparatus of regulation whose 
principle organ is the State. The capitalist State is the regulator of 
decoded flows as such, insofar as they are caught up in the axiomatic of 
capital.67
The modem state is not displaced by global capitalism, but serves as a space wherein 
capitalism is realised: it groups together and combines the various flows required by 
capitalist production. Capitalist territorialization combines ‘trans-national capital as locus 
of high-speed deterritorialization and ... various forms of State as loci of 
reterritorialization.,68 Modem states are the realised models of ‘an independent, 
worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or “megamachine” of which 
the States are parts, or neighbourhoods.’69
Deleuze and Guattari, like Walker and Ashley, view the state as the main spatial 
pivot upon which the political settlements of inside and outside are articulated. The state 
is a ‘milieu of interiority’, which captures flows of populations, commodities, commerce, 
money and capital. However, its outside, its exteriority, its ‘other’ is not simply the arena 
of foreign policy or relations among states, but is constituted by worldwide machines 
(commercial organisations, industrial complexes, artistic movements and religious 
formations) which extend over the entire ecumenon and which are largely autonomous 
from states. In this realm of exteriority, local mechanisms of bands, margins and 
minorities -  the nomadic -  continue to affirm their rights against state power.70 All 
pervasive in this space of exteriority is the war-machine, which ‘is of an other species, 
another nature, another origin than the State apparatus.’71 In their depiction of the war-
67Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 252.
68Holland, ‘Deterritorializing “Deterritorialization”’, p. 63.
69Delueze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 434-5. Lefebvre also considers the most 
important function of the modem capitalist state to be ‘the organization of space, the regularization of its 
flows, and the control of its networks.’ Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 383.
70Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 360.
71Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 452. See Plateau 12, ‘1227: Treatise on 
Nomadology -  The War Machine ’, pp. 351 -423, for the distinctions between the nomadic war machine and 
the State-form.
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machine, Deleuze and Guattari deconstruct the Weberian premise that physical violence 
is integral to the identity of the state. The war-machine is not embodied in the institutions 
and tools of state violence -  the structural and legal violence of ‘capture which employs 
‘police officers and jailers’. On the contrary, they argue, the war-machine is not of the 
state but of its other: the nomadic warrior, and the State has no intrinsic relation to war. 
For states to conduct war they must first capture a war-machine, which is outside of the 
two poles of political sovereignty: the magician-king and jurist-priest: ‘Indra the warrior 
god is in opposition to Varuna no less than to Mitra,’72 Furthermore, the war-machine 
itself does not have war as its object, but operates in many constituencies including 
literature, philosophy and science; it only becomes engaged in war when appropriated by 
the State.
The opposition between the State and the nomadic war-machine extends across 
diverse fields of knowledge and practice. Both the state and the nomad produce and are 
reproduced in different types of knowledge. Archimedean and atomist science, 
characterised by ‘flux and flows’ and emphasising becoming and heterogeneity are 
nomadic knowledges, marginalised by the keepers of ‘royal’ or ‘State science’: the 
science of Euclidean space and Newtonian gravity, which emphasises the stable, the 
eternal and the identical. Similarly, modem philosophy as embodied in the Kantian 
critique and the cogito takes the form of State-thought; as in the modem rational state 
everything ‘revolves around the legislator and the subject. ’73 State-thought striates mental 
space in terms of two universals: ‘the Whole as the final ground of being’ and ‘the 
Subject as the principle that converts being into being-for-us’.74 State-thought is the 
tumour that produces what Gaston Bachelard refers to as the ‘geometrical cancerization 
of the linguistic tissue of contemporary philosophy’ in which
[ojutside and inside form a dialectic of division, the obvious geometry of
which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains.
It has the sharpness of the dialectics of yes and no, which decides
72Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 352. The exteriority of the war machine to the 
state is evident in the traditional hostility between warriors and statesman. ‘Colonel Kurtz, in the film 
Apocalypse Now, provides an example of a warrior or war-machine gone out of control, an arm of the 
military apparatus of the State which has surrendered to the flow of total violence and therefore can no 
longer be tolerated.’ Patton, ‘Conceptual Politics’, p. 70.
7^Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 376.
74Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 379.
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everything. Philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think 
in terms of being and non-being. Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in 
an implicit geometry ... The dialectics of here and there has been 
promoted to the rank of an absolutism according to which these 
unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with unsupervised powers of 
ontological determination.75
However, state thought and its geometrical cancerization are resisted by the nomadic
thought of thinkers like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche -  as well as, of course, Deleuze and
Guattari themselves -  who seek to overthrow the universal thinking subject and to resist
any grounding in totality.76
State thought and practice produces a fundamentally different space to that
produced by nomadic thought and practice. Nomads occupy smooth space, while states
striate space. The relations between points and lines differ in smooth and striated space:
in striated space a line is something going between two points, as in geometry, while in
smooth space the priority is given to the line, with the points acting merely as relays
between successive lines. The lines themselves have different characteristics: in smooth
space lines are locally directional with open intervals, while in striated space lines are
subordinate to global dimensionality and have closed intervals. In sum, ‘striated space
closes a surface, divides it up at indeterminate intervals, establishes breaks, whereas a
smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by frequency or along paths.’77
Hence nomadic territoriality is exercised across smooth space, it constitutes points, such
as water holes and assembly points, as mere relays on a trajectory, subordinate to and not
determining of paths: ‘the in-between has its own autonomy and the life of the nomad is
in the intermezzo.’ Nomadic trails or routes have a different function to sedentary roads
which parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating
communication. The nomad’s trajectory ‘distributes people (or animals) in an open
75Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston MA, Beacon Press, 1994), pp. 211-2.
Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 379. Nietzsche’s aphoristic method is typical of 
nomadic thought, a ‘force that destroys both the image and its copies, the model and its reproductions, 
every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, 
Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc.). A “method” is the striated space of the cogitato universalis and draws 
a path that must be followed from one point to another. But the form of exteriority situates thought in a 
smooth space that it must occupy without counting, and for which there is no possible method, no 
conceivable reproduction, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences.’ Thousand Plateaus, p. 377.
77See Plateau 14, ‘1440: The Smooth and the Striated’, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 474-500.
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space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating.’78 Nomos is opposed to the law of
the polis, as the backcountry, mountainside or expanse around a city. Sedentary space is
striated, by ‘walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures’, while nomad space is
smooth, ‘marked only by “traits” that are effaced and displaced with the trajectory.,79 The
nomad not only inhabit smooth spaces, but seeks to expand them. Nomads are ‘vectors
of deterritorialisation’ who use the war-machine, ‘the constitutive element of smooth
space’, to ‘increase the desert.’80
The state opposes the nomad’s drive to expand smooth space and, guided by
theories of geometric and mathematical space, imposes a linear segmentarity that
homogenises spatial segments while ensuring equivalence and translatability between
units. As with Foucault’s disciplined spaces, striated state space is produced by vision:
‘the central eye has as its correlate a space through which it moves, but it itself remains
invariant in relation to its movements.’81 The Greek city-states introduced a
‘homogeneous isotopic space’, and later the Roman Empire imposed a geometrical or
linear reason o f State on its space marking the boundaries of segmented spaces by the
lines of camps and fortifications. The state’s priority is to
striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a 
means of communication in the service of striated space. It is the vital 
concern of every State not only to vanquish nomadism but to control 
migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire 
“exterior”, over all of the flows traversing the ecumenon. If it can help it, 
the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of 
all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc.
There is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined directions, which 
restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in 
detail the relative movement of subjects and objects. This is why Paul 
Virilio’s thesis is important, when he shows that “the political power of 
the State is polis, police, that is, management of the public ways”, and 
that “the gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against 
the fluidity of the masses, against the penetration power of migratory 
packs”, people, animals, and goods.82
Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 380.
70Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 381.
OA
Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 382.
o i
Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p. 211. 
82Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, pp. 386-7.
61
This territorializing logic, which pits the state against the nomadic flows, is, 
suggests William Connolly, integral to the ideal of the modem territorial state. The idea 
of the territorial state is one of the most important modem institutions for fixing identity 
and marking out difference in space. Connolly takes Rousseau’s text, The Government 
o f Poland, as an illustration of how in modem political discourse the establishment of 
identity on the territory of the modem state legitimises a necessary violence against the 
‘other’. Rousseau argued that if the Poles were to be a free people, they had to have a 
strong identity with a particular territory. Rousseau’s text, suggests Connolly, reveals an 
important set of correspondences: ‘to be free you must belong to a people; to be a people 
you must have a common identity burned into you; to be a flourishing people you must 
exclusively inhabit a contiguous territory; to flourish freely as a territorialized people you 
must stringently limit contact with the foreign.’83 According to Connolly, Rousseau was 
aware that Poland could only be endeared to its citizens through the violence ‘done to the 
internal other (those inhabiting the territory who do not belong), the interior other (the 
other within the self which resists such strong identification with the collectivity) and the 
external other (those who are foreign).’84 This logic is also present in Tocqueville’s 
narrative of the founding of the American state, Democracy in America. Tocqueville had 
to justify the founding of the American ‘civi-territorial complex’ which was basically the 
imposition of an alien social form on the pre-existing Indian communities. Tocqueville’s 
resolution was to argue that the Indians were nomadic, wandering tribes who lived on the 
surface of the land, and who, because they lacked agriculture, only occupied but did not 
posses the land they inhabited. Hence, the continent of North America was effectively 
empty, waiting for the introduction of ‘civilisation’ by newcomers who would overcode 
the territory by means of agri-culture, possession, and the exploitation of natural wealth. 
With the arrival of the Europeans, America became a ‘civi-territorial complex’ in which
83William E. Connolly, ‘Tocqueville, Territory and Violence’, Theory, Culture and Society, 11:1 
(Feb 1994), pp. 19-40, at pp. 22-3.
84Connolly, ‘Tocqueville, Territory’, p. 22. Connolly notes that violence is evident in the 
etymology of territory, which the lOED says, is presumed by most modems to derive from terra. Terra 
means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of sustaining medium, soil, fading off into 
indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the OED says, suggests that it actually derives from terrere, 
meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And territorium is “a place from which people are warned”. Perhaps these 
two derivations continue to occupy the same territory today. To occupy a territory is to receive sustenance 
and to exercise violence. Territory is land occupied by violence.’ pp. 23-4.
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civilization was coded onto a contiguous territory and reinforced by the cultural glue of
Christian monotheism. However, in this ‘civi-theo-territorial’ culture, pluralism did not
extend to atheism or nomadic religions. The establishment of the sovereignty of the
American people required the displacement of those human beings who diverged from
the essence of civilization. The Indian had to be eliminated.
The Indian is thus simultaneously the first Other of the civi-territorial 
complex, the first sign of violence inscribed in its boundaries and the first 
marker of how that violence is obscured or forgotten by the complex that 
requires it.85
Conclusion
Our review of the work of several thinkers who have analysed the production and 
representation of space in modernity has revealed a number of themes that we can carry 
through into the rest of this work. Foucault and Lefebvre reveal that space, including that 
of the territorial state, is produced through discourse or representations of space. Deleuze 
and Guattari show that the idea of the territorial state is a product of a whole tradition of 
state-thought which in many areas of knowledge and practice marks out the spaces of 
inside and outside and provides the framework for state authorities to discipline and 
striate their territories. All four thinkers remind us that the discursive production of state 
territory is inherently violent. The state notes Lefebvre, has a ‘totalitarian vocation’: it 
seeks to concentrate political life into itself while asserting the superiority of political 
over social and cultural existence while justifying its own authority through an appeal to 
sovereignty. Sovereignty constitutes the state ‘as an imaginary and real, abstract-concrete 
being’, which recognises no authority other than its own and is only able to endure ‘by 
virtue of violence directed towards a space.’86 State-power ‘introduces its own particular 
way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses 
about space and about things and people in space.’87
85Connolly, ‘Tocqueville, Territory’, p. 27,
Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 279.
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Histories of the Territorial State
A whole “history of spaces” could be written, that would be at the same 
time a “history of the powers” (both these terms in the plural), from the 
great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of housing, institutional 
architectures, from the classroom to the hospital organization, by way of 
all the political and economic implantations.1
In the previous chapter we saw that space is produced in discourse. In this chapter I want 
to make a related argument that modem territoriality has a history, or rather lends itself 
to interpretation by a number of histories. Most of this chapter discusses the standard 
history of the idea of the territorial state, which claims that it originated in the political 
culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history is part of the Baroque 
or Classical narrative of the territorial state which, as I suggested in the introduction, is 
endorsed in Realism. It is this narrative or, at least, its originaiy claim that I shall 
challenge in the rest of the thesis by showing that the idea of the territorial state had its 
foundations in the spatial discourses and practices of Renaissance Italy.
It is important to establish that territoriality is not to be regarded as a universal 
ideal-type feature of all human political or social formations. Primordialists claim that 
all human political activity is territorial and that there is nothing particularly ‘modem’ 
about the territorial organisation of the modem state. This primordialist thesis has a 
strong following in the human sciences, most notably among theorists of nationalism. 
Primordialists often cite Aristotle’s concept of the polis as the first articulation of the 
territorial basis of society. The Aristotelian notion of territoriality was advanced in social 
thought by Ferdinand Tonnies in his description of Gemeinschaft societies. The soil on 
which the closely knit Gemeinschaft lives acquires symbolic value, even sacredness, so 
that residence in and contact with it becomes qualification for membership of the 
community.2 Primordialist theorists of nationalism also stress an identification with soil. 
A territory signifies not just a society’s location in space, but it is an aspect of social life 
where individuals establish their obligations and identities. It is not, they claim, a modem
1Michel Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’ in Sylv6re Lotringer (ed.), Foucault Live: Collected 
Interviews (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1996), pp. 226-40, at p. 228.
2 See, for a discussion of the Aristotelian territorial legacy, Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: 
Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1975).
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phenomenon related to the modem state, but, as Steven Grosby states, ‘a fundamental 
feature of all human societies.’3 Primordialists reject the modernist argument that man’s 
relation to space has undergone fundamental change in modernity. Territory is the space 
inhabited by people and has always been life-sustaining and the repository of symbolic 
value. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge detect a primordialist view of territoriality in 
International Relations theory that continues to endorse the idea of the ‘national-territorial 
totality’ and which reifies state territories ‘as set or fixed units of sovereign space’, 
constituting the state as ‘a sacred unit beyond historical time.’4
This primordialist argument is rather easily dispensed with on the basis that it is 
precisely the idea of the sovereign territorial state which distinguishes the political spaces 
of modem or civilised society from those of primitive or traditional societies. John 
Ruggie has demonstrated that only in modernity is the division of political space in 
distinctive territories underpinned by the principle of differentiation; it is differentiation 
that differentiates medieval and modem systems of rule over space.5 Ruggie accepts the 
Weberian premise that all politics is about rule and that any system of rule entails 
legitimate domination over spatial extension, but he does not accept that this is 
necessarily resolved in the form of modem territoriality. There have been non-territorial 
systems of rule: for example those based on kinship and those which assume nomadic 
property rights. For our purposes the most significant non-modem form of mle over space 
described by Ruggie is that in which the claim to territory is non-exclusive. Ruggie 
characterises the spatial order of medieval Europe as one in which mle over space was 
‘structured by a nonexclusive form of territoriality; authority was both personalized and 
parcelized within and across territorial formations.’6 The shift to the differentiated 
modem form of territoriality is, for Ruggie, summed up in Locke’s question: “how men 
might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in
3Steven Grosby, ‘Territoriality: The Transcendental Primordial Feature of Modem Societies’, 
Nations and Nationalism, 1:2 (1995), pp. 143-62, at p. 155.
4 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International 
Political Economy (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 83 & 89.
5John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organisation, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp. 138-74.
6Locke, quoted in Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, p. 150.
65
common.”7 Determined by the principle of differentiation, the order of political space in 
modernity is one of ‘territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, 
sovereign states.’8 The process by which autonomous state territories began to claim 
exclusive authority over their territories parallelled a widespread Bachelardian ‘ geometric 
cancerization’ of the social and political worlds, as the divisions between public and 
private and internal and external were consolidated. Because spatial organisation in 
modernity is organised by differentiation, which divides ‘its subject collectivity into 
territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion’, so 
the international relations of modernity have been played out against the backdrop of this 
‘peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space.’9
The immediate question that arises from Ruggie’s work is to ask when this 
peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space first arose? The standard 
Realist response is to point to the early modem political culture of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. For Realists the territorial state was a fact of European political life 
after Westphalia as is shown by its presence in political theory from Hobbes to Hegel. In 
the first section of this chapter we shall examine the Classical political theory of Hobbes, 
Rousseau, Kant and Hegel to confirm that the idea of the territorial state was, in 
Mumford’s terms, clearly ‘visible’ in these texts.10 Political discourse is never isolated 
and the second section will consider how the visibility of the idea of the territorial state 
in political theory reflects a complementary history of the rise of the absolutist state and 
cosmopolitan modernity in Europe. Cosmopolis is defined by an all-pervasive ‘will to 
order’ and is represented as a fundamental rift with the humanist tradition of modernity 
that came before it. In the third section, inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s history of the 
abstract space of modernity -  a history which underline the importance of the 
Renaissance in this development - 1 want to propose an alternative history of the idea of 
the territorial state that is not fixed to the cosmopolitan reading of modernity, but which 
views it as an integral part the modem culture of space, founded in the spatial discourses
7Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, p. 149.
8Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, p. 151.
9Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, pp. 151 & 144.
10My use of the term ‘Classical’ is borrowed from Foucault, who uses it to describe Western 
European culture between (roughly) 1630 and 1790.
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and practices of Renaissance Italy. Lefebvre’s history of abstract space provides the 
backdrop for the subsequent argument that although the idea of the territorial state 
became clearly visible in the political culture of Classical Europe, its foundations were 
established in the spatial discourses -  political and non-political -  of the Renaissance.
The Idea of the Territorial State from Hobbes to Hegel.
Thomas Hobbes is often, at least within International Relations, portrayed as the most 
important seventeenth century political writer. Although John Vincent has shown that 
Hobbes’ Realist credentials are often more imagined than real, his famous image of the 
state of nature is still regarded by many to be the paradigmatic foundational statement of 
international anarchy.11 For some contemporary political theorists, Hobbes’ political 
theory was original precisely because it sought to provide a spatial frame for political 
community. Rob Walker argues that Hobbes attempted to overcome the temporality of 
political life -  which for Renaissance humanists was always exposed to the capricious 
whims offortuna -  by attempting to fix politics within a secure and permanent spatial 
structure.12 Likewise, Sheldon Wolin reads Hobbes as a thinker who believed that 
‘scientific and geometric method could be applied to politics and that ‘man could 
construct a political order as timeless as a Euclidean theorem.’13
Nevertheless, it is not clear from Hobbes work that he anticipated the 
characteristics which would define the political spaces of the modem territorial state. In 
the Leviathan, Hobbes does not put a strong emphasis on the territorial aspect of the 
Common-wealth and his discussion of territory is largely restricted to passages where he 
considers the rights that the European Common-wealths have over their colonies. Hobbes 
points out that God has distributed the raw materials over different parts of the ‘face of 
the earth’ and this has resulted in the need for trade between different Common-wealths,
n R. John Vincent, ‘The Hobbesian Tradition in Twentieth Century International Thought’, 
Millennium, 10:2 (Summer 1981), pp. 91-101.
12Rob Walker, ‘Realism, Change and “International Political Theory’”, International Studies 
Quarterly, 31:1 (March 1987), pp. 65-86.
13Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Hobbes: Political Society as a System of Rules’ in Wolin, Politics and 
Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), 
pp. 239-85, at p. 243.
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which are distinguished, at least partly, by their dominion over different territories: [t]his 
Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Forraign: Native, that 
which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: Forraign, that which is 
imported from without.’14 Further there is little indication that Hobbes saw the territorial
1. Frontispiece, Hobbes, Leviathan
state as the proper locus of identity and violence except, perhaps, in the image of the 
Leviathan presented on the frontispiece (Fig. 1). Here the figure of the Leviathan towers 
over a landscape in the foreground. The spaces of this landscape -  a city and the 
surrounding countryside -  are clearly protected by and ruled over by the Leviathan who 
is represented brandishing a sceptre of justice in his left hand -  a sign of sovereignty -  
and a sword in his right -  a sign of violence.
In the previous chapter we saw how Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings on Poland 
-  at least as interpreted through Connolly’s Deleuze and Guattari-influenced reading -
14Hobbes’ concern with territory is almost entirely confined to one chapter o f  Leviathan. See 
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap 
XXXIV, ‘O f the Nutrition and Procreation o f  the Common-wealth’, pp. 170-6, at p. 171.
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seems to express the ethical dilemma at the heart of the modem idea territorial state: the
sovereign identity of a political community can only be established on a territory through
practices which do violence to the other. Questions of space and politics appear
throughout his work. First, in the Social Contract Rousseau engages in a ‘ geopolitical-
type’ discussion of the optimum size a state should be. For Rousseau size matters. A
successful political community must have an appropriate balance between the size of its
territory and the number of people that inhabit it: men ‘make up the State and the land
feeds the men. ’15 Rousseau’s admiration for the ancient polis and Renaissance city-states
possibly influenced his conclusion that social harmony is achieved more easily in small
rather than large communities. In large states the social bond becomes too protracted,
producing ‘deficient government’. Rousseau warned those intent on expansion that ‘the
larger the State grows, the less freedom there is.’16
Second, Rousseau points out that the social contract is forged in a bond between
the private property of individuals and the state’s territory. In order to establish a political
community each individual must give himself, ‘his force and possession’ to it: ‘[ie]ach
o f us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction o f the
general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part o f the
whole f 1 Under such an arrangement Rousseau thinks that it is understandable
how the combined and contiguous lands of private individuals become 
public territory, and how the right of sovereignty, extending from the 
subjects to the ground they occupy, comes to include both property and 
persons, which places those who possess land in a greater dependency and 
turns even their force into a guarantee of their loyalty. This advantage 
does not appear to have been well understood by ancient monarchs who, 
only calling themselves Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the 
Macedonians, seem to have considered themselves leaders of men rather 
than masters of the country. Today’s kings more cleverly call themselves 
Kings of France, Spain, England, etc. By thus holding the land, they are 
quite sure to hold its inhabitants.18
Finally, in a discussion which allows Rousseau to partially redeem himself after
15Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right in Rousseau, 
Collected Writings Vol. 4, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith R. Bush, Masters and 
Kelly, (Hanover NH, University Press of New England, 1994), pp. 127-224, at p. 160.
16Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 168.
17Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 139. Italics in original.
18Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 143.
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Connolly’s criticisms, he argues that the European powers do not have to right to
dispossess the inhabitants of lands they ‘discover’ even if they are not arranged into state-
type communities. The inhabitants of any land are protected by ‘the right of first
occupant’ secured through the institution of private property. However, in order to secure
this right the first inhabitants must only occupy preciously uninhabited land, they must
only occupy the amount of land required for subsistence, and possession must be taken
by labour and cultivation rather than ‘vain ceremony’. From these premises Rousseau,
perhaps with an eye to the exclusion of the French from the conquest of South America,
criticises the territorial claims of the European Imperial Powers:
How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and deprive the 
whole human race of it except through punishable usurpation, since this 
act takes away from the remaining men the dwelling place and foods that 
nature gives them in common? When Nunez Balboa, standing on the 
shore, took possession of the South Sea and all of South America in the 
name of the crown of Castile, was this enough to dispossess all the 
inhabitants and exclude all the Princes of the world?19
By the time Immanuel Kant came to write his famous essay Perpetual Peace, the
idea of the territorial state, negotiated through the principle of sovereign identity, was
firmly established in European political thought20 Kant affirms the legitimacy of
international politics based on independent sovereign territorial states in three arguments.
First, he argues that the Ancien Regime habit of acquiring states by ‘inheritance,
exchange, purchase, or gift’ is illegitimate because ‘a state, unlike the ground upon which
it is based, is not a possession (patrimonium). It is a society of men, which no-one other
than itself can command or dispose of. Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it on
to another state as if it were a shoot is to terminate its existence as a moral personality
and make it into a commodity.’21 Second, for republics to combine in a pacific federation
each one must have established its control over its territory: the pacific federation is not
in any sense the single space of a universal international state. This spatial separateness
19Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 143.
20Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ in Kant, Political Writings, trans. 
H. B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-130.
21Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 94. Kant accepts the contemporary distribution of political 
territories, even though many were acquired by these illegitimate means, on the grounds that ‘the 
prohibition relates only to the mode of acquisition, which is to be forbidden henceforth, but not to the 
present state of political possessions.’
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is the basis of international right: ‘[t]he idea of international right presupposes the 
separate existence of many independent adjoining states.’22 Although this state of affairs 
is ‘essentially a state of war’ and can only be pacified by a federal union it is still, Kant 
concludes, ‘in the light of the idea of reason’ ... to be preferred to an amalgamation of 
the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a 
universal monarchy’. As for Rousseau, so for Kant: small is better. Laws loose their 
impact over distance; larges states tend towards ‘soulness despotism’ and eventual 
anarchy.23 Finally, territorial differentiation is a necessary precondition of the 
cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality, which requires that the ‘stranger not to be 
treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.’24 While the stranger 
may be turned away, as long as he behaves in a peaceable manner he must not be treated 
with enmity.25
It is worth noting that as regards discourses of space Kant is more famous for his 
philosophical categorisation of space in the Critique o f Pure Reason. In the Critique, 
Kant posits space and time as two pure forms of sensible intuition, which make possible 
the a priori knowledge of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’.26 Kant views space and time 
as a priori particulars and not as the properties of, or relations between, particulars. This 
is derived from two sources: Newton -  whom ‘Kant revered’ -  and Euclid. Kant accepted 
both Newton’s concept of absolute space that ‘in its own nature, without relation to 
anything external, remains always similar and immovable’, and Euclidean geometry 
understood ‘as a body of synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of perceptual 
space’.27 Kant’s Euclidean-Newtonian spatial framework has several prominent 
characteristics. First, Kant rejects the idea that space is empirical on the basis that the 
representation of an object outside of oneself, or as different from other objects,
22Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 115.
23Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 113.
24Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, p. 105.
25The stranger may claim a ‘right of resort’ as all men are entitled to present themselves in the 
society of others ‘by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface’. See Kant, 
‘Perpetual Peace’, pp. 105-8, for his discussion of Universal Hospitality.
2 6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 
Press, 1929). Kant’s discussion of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ is on pp. 65-91.
27S. Komer, Kant (London, Penguin Books, 1955), quotes at p. 33 & 5.
presupposes the representation of space. Second, space has to be regarded as a necessary 
a priori representation underlying all outer intuitions because it is not possible to 
represent to ourselves the absence of space. Third, space is a pure intuition because it is 
only possible to represent one and not multiple spaces to ourselves; ‘space is essentially 
one’; an ‘infinite given magnitude.’28 Kant did however acknowledge the subjective 
element to space, which as an a priori intuition ‘has its seat in the subject only’ and 
which precedes objects and allows the concept of the object to be determined a priori. 
For Kant ‘[sjpace is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the 
subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. 
... It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of 
extended things.’29
Hegel is the final classical thinker in whose work we can see a visible territorial 
consciousness. In International Relations Hegel’s communitarianism is often set against 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism.30 Hegel views the modem state as an arena within which the 
necessary conditions of freedom in modernity: subjectivity and expressive unity, come 
together. The state is also the locus in which Spirit achieves ‘its highest and most 
differentiated political expression.’31 Hegel’s philosophical reading of the state, as the 
‘actuality of the ethical idea’ and as an absolutely rational being, regarded ‘external 
appearances’, such as ‘force’ and ‘riches’, as merely indications of moments in the 
historical development of the state, rather than as features of its essential being.32 
Although territoriality could be regarded as an aspect of the state’s external appearance,
28Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 69.
2 9 All quotes from Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, pp. 70-1. Kant continues: ‘The transcendental 
concept of appearance in space ... is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, 
that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in 
themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer objects are nothing but mere 
representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space.’ p. 74.
30Kant is accredited with establishing the universalist cosmopolitan principle that denies that 
existing political structures are the source of ultimate value. Hegel is the forerunner of communitarians who 
believe that ‘value stems from the community, that die individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or 
her membership of a political community.’ Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative 
Approaches (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 55.
31 William E. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1988), 
p. 121. Connolly provides a far more profound discussion of Hegel’s state theory than I can offer here, see 
pp. 116-25.
32G. W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952),
p. 157.
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Hegel was sensitive to the spatial dimension of the state. Henri Lefebvre argues that the 
modem understanding of the relationship between space and politics is derived from 
Hegel. It is with Hegel that historical time gives birth to the space which the state 
occupies and rules over: ‘[f]or Hegel space brought historical time to an end, and the 
master of space was the state. Space perfected the rational and the real -  
simultaneously.’33 Reflecting on international law, Hegel observes that for states to be 
sovereign individuals they must be autonomous and differentiated in space by well- 
established borders: ‘autonomous states are principally wholes whose needs are meet 
within their own borders.’34 The individual state, like the individual human being, is an 
individual to the extent that it is aware of its own existence ‘as a unit in sharp distinction 
from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which 
is autonomous vis-a-vis the others.’35 Further, because ‘[t]he nation state is mind in its 
substantive rationality and immediate actuality and is therefore the absolute power on 
earth. It follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbours.’36 
By the end of the eighteenth century the idea of the territorial state was a 
mainstay of Western political theory. Hegel articulates a sense of sovereign territoriality 
that anticipates the Realist image of the autonomous sovereign territorial state in almost 
every detail. In this section, perhaps at the risk of providing Realists with support for their 
claim that the national territorial totality has a good pedigree, I have shown that the basic 
premises of the Realist theory of the state are inherited from the Classical tradition of 
Western political thought. In the next section I want contextualise the whole Classical- 
realist) tradition of state theory itself, as part of a larger structure of discourse about 
modernity. This discourse, which I shall call absolutist-cosmopolitanism, is characterised 
by the claim that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was a rupture with the 
civilization of the Renaissance; and that this rupture was the midwife of modernity.
33Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1974), p. 279.
3 4 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 213.
35Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 208.
36Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 210.
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The Territorial State in the Absolutist-Cosmopolitan Tradition of Modernity
International relations began in 1648, or so the story goes. According to the discipline’s
founding myth, the modem state system came into being as a result of the agreements
reached by delegates present at the Congresses of Munster 1644-8 and Osnabriick 1645-8,
and ratified by the Treaties of Westphalia. At the Congress of Munster, attended by the
Catholic parties, the Hapsburg family complex (uniting Spain, the Empire and various
territories in Italy and central Europe) was effectively broken up as Emperor Ferdinand
III agreed to renounce the right to assist Spain and to pursue any imperial ambitions. At
the Congress of Osnabriick, attended mainly by the Protestant parties, the principle of
religious toleration, cuius regio, eius religio, previously established at the Peace of
Augsburg 1555, was reaffirmed and complemented by the right to private worship.
Osnabriick also confirmed the ancient rights, privileges and liberties of all the Empire’s
polities and gave to the members of the Imperial Diet effective control over the Empire’s
foreign policy -  previously the exclusive prerogative of the Emperor.
Westphalia, according to the standard Realist history of international relations,
signalled the birth of the modem international system. It was the moment when the
Christian medieval order -  structured in multiple hierarchies centered on the Pope and
Emperor -  was replaced by an international order, based on individual bounded sovereign
states. The Peace of Westphalia, argues K.J. Holsti,
legitimized the ideas of sovereignty and dynastic autonomy from 
hierarchical control. It created a framework that would sustain the 
political fragmentation of Europe. ... it delegitimized all forms of 
hegemony and the vestiges of hierarchical controls. ... By sanctifying 
Europe’s centrifugal forces, by providing a legal basis for the developing 
territorial particularisms of Europe, and by terminating the vestiges of 
relations between superiors and inferiors, with authority emanating 
downward from the Emperor and Pope, the documents licensed an 
anarchical dynastic states system and the internal consolidation of its 
members.37
Many Realists date the origins of the modem international system, composed of 
differentiated sovereign territorial states, to the Westphalian settlements or, more
37Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 39.
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generally, to the political discourse and practice of the middle of the seventeenth century.
In Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau argues that by the end of the Thirty Years
War, sovereignty or supreme power over a particular territory was the predominate
‘political fact’ of early modem Europe. This ‘political fact’ reflected the ‘social reality’
that the territorial princes had triumphed externally over the Holy Roman Emperor and
the Pope and internally over local barons. The legal doctrine of territorial sovereignty was
formulated in the latter part of the sixteenth century with reference to the 
new phenomenon of the territorial state. It referred in legal terms to the 
elemental political fact of that age -  the appearance of a centralised power 
that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a certain 
territory.38
In Realist history state autonomy and sovereignty were no the only things established 
during this period. John Herz claims that states also acquired their monopolies of the 
means of violence in Classical Europe. The victors of the civil and religious wars of early 
modem Europe were ‘neutralist central powers’ each one of which ‘eventually managed 
to establish itself in and for each of the different territories like so many rochers de 
bronze. ’ Peripheral spaces of political authority, such as noble estates and the town 
jurisdictional zones, were eradicated, independent fortifications were destroyed, and 
monarchs built and manned fortresses on the borders of their states.39
The Realist Westphalian narrative of the origins of the territorial state is 
complemented by contemporary political theory. Cornelia Navari suggests that it was in 
the seventeenth century that the identity of the territorial state was secured through 
political discourse which established the state of nature as its ‘other’. Through a 
combination of epistemology and political theory the architects of the new state created 
the state’s own frame of knowledge about itself as modem: i.e. as bounded, abstract, 
institutional, demythologised and secularised.40 At the same time, ‘a number of princes 
sitting in a field uttering the words, cuius regio, eius religio’ effectively invented
38Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by 
Kenneth W. Thompson, 6th ed., (New York NY, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1985), p. 327.
39John H. Herz, ‘The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’ reprinted in Herz, The Nation- 
State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York NY, David McKay Company, 1976), pp. 99-123, at pp. 
103 & 4.
40Comelia Navari, ‘Knowledge, the State and the State of Nature’ in Michael Donelan (ed.), The 
Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp 
102-21, at p. 108.
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international relations as a state of nature:41
It was scarcely natural to the men of the time that social organisation be 
cut off from external authority, formed into billiard balls and the space 
between emptied. The notion of the state as a billiard ball is a convention; 
it was instituted. That condition of affairs is maintained by other 
conventions, such as non-intervention and recognition which were also 
instituted. To say simply that the space between is ‘empty’ is not true. It 
is ‘empty’ in the sense that the state is for certain purposes a billiard ball.
But the space is full of the convention that maintains that image .. ,42
The type of state that was busy creating this frame of knowledge about itself,
while consolidating its control over territorial space through violence and sovereignty,
was the absolutist state. For Zygmunt Bauman the rise of the absolutist state was one
manifestation of the post-Renaissance European drive to impose order -  any order -  on
things, so as to compensate for the perceived collapse of the structures and hierarchies
of the medieval world.43 The superficial presentation of the early-modern world as one
of ‘absolute monarchs and absolute truths’ hid a deep sense of discomfort and malaise
precipitated by ‘a desperate search for structure in a world suddenly devoid of
structure.’44 The search for a perfect world driven by the ‘will to order’ was expressed in
discourses and practices that marginalised and excluded misfits and aliens: ‘ [i]n the city
of reason there were to be no winding roads, no cul-de-sacs and no unattended sites left
to chance, and hence no vagabonds, vagrants or nomads.’45 The design, creation and
legitimation of this new order was overseen by
a specifically modern state: one that modelled its intentions and the 
prerogatives it claimed after the pattern of a gardener, a medical man, or 
an architect: a gardening state, a therapeutic/surgical state, a space- 
managing state. It was a gardening state, in so far as it usurped the right 
to set apart the ‘useful’ and the ‘useless’ plants, to select a final model of 
harmony that made some plants useful and others useless, and to 
propagate such plants as are useful while exterminating the useless ones.
It was a therapeutic/surgical state in so far as it set the standard of 
‘normality’ and thus drew the borderline between the acceptable and the 
intolerable, between health and disease... It was a space-managing state, 
in so far as it was busy landscaping the wasteland (it was the landscaping
41Navari, ‘Knowledge, the State’, p. 119.
42Navari, ‘Knowledge, the State’, p. 119.
43Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodernity (London, Routledge, 1992).
4 4 Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p. xv.
45Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodernity, p. xv.
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intention that cast the operating territory as wasteland), subjecting all
local features to one unifying homogenizing principle of harmony.46
The absolutist desire to impose order on things, including the spaces of state 
territory, was not just limited to the political realm. The widespread ‘will to order’ of 
Classical or Baroque culture has been identified by Stephen Toulmin as the rational of 
a tradition of modernity that he terms Cosmopolis.47 Toulmin argues that the architects 
of the Cosmopolitan tradition of modernity consciously departed from the principles and 
ideals of a Renaissance humanist tradition of modernity that preceded it. Unlike the 
humanist tradition which was grounded in classical literature, the Cosmopolitan tradition 
of modernity was predominately scientific and rooted in natural philosophy.48 The 
thought of the major figures in Renaissance humanism: Montaigne, Rabelais, 
Shakespeare and Erasmus, was open-minded and characterised by a ‘sceptical tolerance’ 
of plurality and ambiguity. Renaissance modernity was characterised by a lack of 
certainty that embodied a ‘respect for the rational possibilities of human experience ... 
[and] ... a delicate feeling for the limits of human experience.’49 However, in the 
seventeenth century there was a widespread ‘Retreat from Renaissance’. Partially 
precipitated by the economic crises and the extreme violence of the Thirty Years War, 
seventeenth century rationalists embarked upon a ‘Quest for Certainty’. This quest found 
its holy grail in the ideal of Cosmopolis -  a rational order combining nature (cosmos) and 
human society (polis), in which the structure of nature reinforced a rational social order 
according to the dictates of reason. The humanistic and literary .modernity of the 
Renaissance was submerged beneath the waters of a rational, scientific and philosophical 
modernity. Cosmopolis was promoted in the rationalist architectonic projects of Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton, but was most pronounced in philosophy where, ‘from 1630 on, 
the focus of philosophical enquiries has ignored the particular, concrete, timely and local 
details of everyday human affairs: instead it has shifted to a higher, stratospheric plane,
46Bauman, Intimations, p. 178-9. Bauman suggests that the architects of modernity recognised 
that their man-made order was vulnerable and ‘bound to remain an artificial imposition on the unruly 
natural state of things and humans’. Consequently modernity was distinguished by ‘constant supervision 
and policing’ of the created order. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p. xv.
4 7 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago IL, University of 
Chicago Press, 1990).
48Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 43.
49Toulmin, Cosmopolis, at pp. 25 & 7.
77
on which nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless, general and universal 
theories.’50
This sense of cosmopolis is the proper context for understanding Richard Ashley’s
claim that a ‘Cartesian practice of spatialization’ distinguishes domestic from
‘international politics’. Cartesian practice draws an absolute boundary between ‘inside
and ‘outside’, and privileges the former at the expense of the later:
The inside is taken to be the space of identity and continuity -  the 
privileged space of the Self. Here, it is assumed, is a sharply bounded 
identity -  an identity that is hierarchically ordered, that has a unique 
centre of decision presiding over a coherent Self, and that is demarcated 
from and in opposition to an external space of difference and change 
beyond its boundaries and eluding its rational control. Here, too, 
according to Cartesian practice, resides the very possibility of rational 
political subjectivity, be it that of an individual or a political community.
As for the outside, this is the space of difference and discontinuity -  the 
residual space of the Other that escapes the rational truth and meaning 
presiding within.51
Ashley does not tell us which themes in Descartes’ work contribute to the Cartesian 
practice of spatialization. Descartes’ most significant contribution to the mathematical 
understanding of space came with his use of co-ordinates to determine the position of a 
point in a plane by its distance from two fixed lines.52 However, it is more likely that 
Ashley is drawing upon the philosopher’s famous dualism of mind and matter as the two 
mutually exclusive divisions of the universe: ‘man is a thinking mind; matter is extension 
in motion.’53 Nevertheless, Rob Walker agrees with Ashley that the epistemological and 
ontological structures of cosmopolis are the context for the seventeenth century European 
discourse of the sovereign territorial state and a whole ‘politics of spatial containment’.54 
Walker suggests that the combination of the political doctrine of state sovereignty with
50Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 35.
51Richard K. Ashley, ‘Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War’ in James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings o f World 
Politics (Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1989) pp. 259-321, at p. 290.
52See Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London, Unwin Paperbacks, 1984), pp.
544-5.
53For a discussion of Descartes’ philosophy see Anthony Kenny, ‘Descartes to Kant’ in Kenny 
(ed.) The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
110-27.
54R. B. J. Walker, ‘International Relations and the Concept of the Political’ in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge, Polity, 1991), pp. 306-27, at p. 321.
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certain ‘spatial constructs associated with Euclid and Newton’ produced a ‘sense of
inviolable and sharply delimited space.’55 In the Classical period the political discourse
of territorial sovereignty is underpinned by, intersects with and, is to some extent
produced by, contemporaneous spatial concepts and discourses; the discourse of
sovereignty fed off a ‘spatial consciousness’ which extended ‘from Descartes’ philosophy
to Mercator’s cartography, from Galilean mechanics to the magnificent constructions of
Isaac Newton and Immanuel Kant.’56
These spaces were carved out by the agents of capitalist interests and absolutist
state rulers. David Harvey notes that the Enlightenment conquest and control of space
was co-ordinated through cartographic projects that conceived of space as abstract,
homogeneous and universal:
Euclidean representations of objective space could be converted into a 
spatially ordered physical landscape. Merchants and landowners used 
such practices for their own class purposes, while the absolutist state 
(with its concern for the taxation of land and the definition of its own 
domain of domination and social control) likewise relished the capacity 
to define and produce spaces with fixed spatial co-ordinates.57
Practices, designed to realise Enlightenment aspirations for a better society that
would guarantee individual liberties and human welfare practices, assumed a mechanistic
Newtonian vision of the universe, in which the absolutes of homogeneous time and space
formed the limits to thought and action. Many Enlightenment projects shared a common-
sense view of time and space as qualities that could be rationally ordered by man.
Enlightenment time, symbolised by the mechanical pendulum, was linear -  with a past,
a present and a future -  and so leant itself to scientific prediction, social engineering and
rational planning. Similarly, homogeneous space was known and colonised by rational,
mathematical cartographic projects and cadastral surveying. Property rights, territorial
boundaries, communication routes and administrative domains were fixed and
legitimised by means of such discursive practices. Harvey even claims that the ability of
55Rob Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 129.
56R. B. J. Walker, ‘Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of 
Contemporary Political Practice’ in Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), Contending Sovereignties: 
Redefining Political Community (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159-85, at p. 172.
57David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity ( Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 254.
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Enlightenment cartographers to map the global system as a unity and to represent the 
location of the earth’s population within a single spatial frame, provided the conditions 
for a distinctive conception of otherness: ‘Enlightenment thought perceived “the other” 
as ... having ... a specific place in the social order that was ethnocentrically conceived 
to have homogeneous and absolute qualities.’58
The social and cultural spaces of Cosmopolis and the political spaces of absolutist 
territoriality were fashioned from an absolute, abstract, homogeneous space that could 
be controlled by rational man. Because space has not always been represented this way, 
we may legitimately ask if it is possible to write an alternative history of the origins of 
the idea of the territorial state; a history which reads the idea of the territorial state as one 
spatial discourse among spatial discourses that together make up modernity’s unique 
culture of space. After all, if, as we have seen Sack argue, the modem territorial state is 
an abstract form of power, is it not possible that its rise in Western modernity is related 
to the increasing abstraction of space in the same cultural formation.
The History of Abstract Space and Its Origins in the Renaissance
Space, which common-sense tells us has a secure ontological existence within the 
parameters revealed by Euclid, Newton and Kant, now has a history. Recent work by 
cultural historians has shown that our conceptions of space are conditioned and structured 
by the intellectual categories and practices of our culture. To demonstrate this, Stephen 
Kem has shown that in the Western world between 1880 and 1918 similar vocabularies 
of space (and time) structured knowledge in discourses that varied from philosophy to 
aesthetics, from architecture to urban design, and from anthropology to studies of the 
natural world.
For Kem three parallel developments in the fin de siecle representation of space 
stand out. First, homogeneous space was replaced by heterogeneous space. In physics 
Einstein’s theory of relativity had no place for absolute space which it replaced with an 
infinite number of spaces perpetually changing position relative to one another. In art the 
Cubists ‘abandoned the homogeneous space of linear perspective and painted objects in
58Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, p. 252.
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a multiplicity of spaces from multiple perspectives.’59 The anthropologist Emile 
Durkheim concluded from his studies of primitive religions that space was not a universal 
category of knowledge, but the product of diverse cultural collective representations.60 
Because different primitive societies had different spatial orders and ways of dividing up 
space, Durkheim claimed that they could not be ‘based exclusively on the inborn nature 
of man.’61 Second, the established view of space as an inert void, within which objects 
existed, was challenged by an increasing awareness of the constituent function of space. 
In ‘positive negative space’ distinctions between primary and secondary in the experience 
of space -  matter/void, subject/background, figure/ground and sacred/profane -  were 
levelled and ‘new constituent negativities’ appeared in ‘physical fields, architectural 
spaces, and town squares’.62 Architects no longer saw space as a negative element 
between walls, ceilings and floors, but began to ‘compose with space’, making 
architecture an ‘art of space’. Third, there was a levelling of traditional spatial 
hierarchies. The Cubist subversion of the traditional view that the subject of a painting 
was more important than its background, mirrored the levelling of aristocratic society, 
the emergence of democracy and the collapse of the distinction between the sacred and 
profane spaces of religion.
Kem admits that it is not always possible to identify the causal factors -  the 
Foucauldian epistemes perhaps? -  that determine widespread changes in the experience 
and representation of space. He admits that often the best he is able to do is to describe 
analogous developments in different fields. However, the merit of his approach is to
59Stephen Kem, The Culture o f Time and Space 1880-1918(Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 
p. 143.
60Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields, (New York 
NY, The Free Press, 1995), p. 9.
61Durkheim, Elementary Forms, fii to p. 11. In one primitive society space has the form of a circle 
reflecting the camp’s circular form. The spatial circle is divided in the same manner as the tribal circle; 
there are as many regions as tribes in the clan, and the orientation of the regions is determined by the 
position of the clans in the encampment. The Zufli classified and ordered things according to their own 
spatial system: everything in nature is ‘classed, labelled and assigned’ to fixed places in an integrated 
system whose guiding principle is ‘a division of space into seven regions: north, south, west east, zenith, 
nadir and the centre. Everything in the universe is assigned to one or other of these seven regions.’ Emile 
Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification, trans. Rodney Needham, (London, Cohen and West, 
1963), p. 43.
62Kem, Culture of Space, p. 179.
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suggest that there is a distinct modem culture of space -  which underwent several
transformations during the fin de siecle -  that determines the way that space is thought
about and represented across heterogeneous fields of knowledge. Henri Lefebvre agrees
that modernity has its own space. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries a
modem code of space, ‘existed on the practical basis of a specific relationship between
town, country and political territory, a language founded on classical perspective and
Euclidean space.’63 Deciphering the codes of modem space, we find a space of
common-sense, of knowledge (savoir), of social practice, of political 
power, a space hitherto enshrined in everyday discourse, just as in abstract 
thought, as the environment of and channel for communications; the 
space, too, of classical perspective and geometry, developed from the 
Renaissance onwards on the basis of the Greek tradition (Euclid, logic) 
and bodied forth in Western art and philosophy, as in the form of the city 
and town.64
In The Production o f Space Lefebvre narrates a history of space which traces a transition
from ‘absolute’ to ‘abstract’ space’ in Western European civilisation. This history also
records the triumph of the ‘logic of visualization’.
Absolute space dominates the early modes of production. In ‘primitive’ societies
space is analogical. The physical form of dwellings and villages represent and reproduce
a divine body that is itself a projection of the human body. With the rise of ancient
civilizations analogical space is replaced by cosmological space, in which the built form
of the political city, its elements and configurations, expressed the architecture of the
cosmos. The city-state
establishes a fixed centre by coming to constitute a hub, a privileged focal 
point, surrounded by peripheral areas which bear it stamp. From this 
moment on, the vastness of pre-existing space appears to come under the 
thrall of a divine order. At the same time the town seems to gather in 
everything which surrounds it, including the natural and the divine, and 
the earth’s evil and good forces. As image of the universes (imago 
mundi), urban space is reflected in the rural space that it possesses and 
indeed in a sense contains.65
63Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 17.
64Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 25. Like Kem, Lefebvre suggests that modem space was 
fundamentally altered around 1910, when its codes and practices began to dissolve. However, common- 
sense space, Euclidean space and perspectivist space did not disappear completely, but left traces in 
consciousness, where it continues to inform words, images and metaphors.
65Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 235.
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Analogical and cosmological space are absolute and iconic. They do not refer to or 
symbolise a reality outside or behind them. For its citizens ‘the city constituted their 
representation of space as a whole, of the earth, of the world.’66 These spaces are both 
imaginary and real, ‘[t]he “mental” is “realized” in a chain of “social” activities because, 
in the temple, in the city, in monuments and palaces, the imaginary is transformed into 
the real.’67
With the emergence of the feudal mode of production in Western Europe, these 
absolute spaces are replaced by symbolic space. Symbolic space literally de-crypted the 
underworld spaces of death which had embodied the space of the Christian cosmology. 
In the twelfth century space is turned on its head and inverted. Tombs and crypts give 
way to the spaces of the monumental Gothic cathedrals, which conveyed illumination and 
elevation and marked an ‘emancipation from the crypt and from cryptic space’. The 
structures of these buildings, based in the hierarchical allocation of horizontal layers, 
drew the observer’s thought up from the mundane world of appearances to contemplation 
of the divine order. These vast symbolic spaces were also social because they were 
suffused with signs of power. The vertical towers and emblematic facades signified the 
prestige and authority of ‘Church, King and city to the crowds flocking to the porch.’68
The symbolic spaces of the feudal order were partially constituted through a 
visual logic, ‘in collusion on the one hand with abstraction, with geometry and logic, and 
on the other with authority.’69 However, the ‘logic of visualisation’ really came into its 
own with the perspectival space of Renaissance Europe. The Renaissance early capitalist 
mode of production was, for Lefebvre, based in a logical space bom out of the discovery 
of linear perspective. I shall discuss the implications of perspectival space for the 
Renaissance discourse of the territorial state in some depth in chapter six, but for the 
moment, it is worth noting the significance of Renaissance perspectival space in 
Lefebvre’s account of the emergence of abstract space. The technique of perspectival 
representation,
[t]he vanishing line, the vanishing point and the meeting of parallel lines
66Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 244.
67Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 251.
68Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 261.
69Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 261
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at infinity were the determinants of a representation, at once intellectual 
and visual which promoted the primacy of the gaze in a kind of ‘logic of 
visualisation’. This representation ... now became enshrined in 
architectural and urbanistic practice as the code of linear perspective.70
This code stratified and extended hierarchies onto all possible configurations of space:
‘the room, the building, the group of buildings, the quarter, the town, and its insertion
into the surrounding space.’71
Among the many consequences of the Renaissance triumph of perspectival space
mentioned by Lefebvre, three are particularly worthy of note. First, the invention of
perspective was a urban-based revolution which complemented the rise of the town and
the decline of the feudal landed order. Towns were conceived of as wholes and urban
space was unified in terms of a political principle. The town was no longer ascribed a
metaphysical character as imago mundi -  the centre and epitome of the Cosmos, but
assumed its own identity and represented itself graphically according to plans in
perspective. Second, the representation of space codified in linear perspective came to
dominate a representational space, ‘of religious origin, which was now reduced to
symbolic figures, to images of Heaven and Hell, of the Devil and the angels.’
Nevertheless, this representational space continued to express the common-sense view
that the forces of good and evil were engaged in a complex interplay in the places that
held special significance for the individual, such as his house, body, church and land.
Many artists continued to portray this representational space, but the important point for
Lefebvre is ‘that some artists and men of learning arrived at a very different
representation o f space', a homogeneous, clearly demarcated space complete with horizon
and vanishing-point.’72 Third, anticipating the role Foucault gives to the panopticon in
ordering the disciplinary space of the Classical age, the Renaissance regime of
perspectival-logical space privileges the eye and the gaze at the expense of the body:
Space remained symbolic of the body and of the universe, while at the 
same time becoming measured and visual. The transformation of space 
towards visualization and the visual is a phenomenon of the utmost 
importance... [Perspectival space] recaptures nature by measuring it and
70Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 41.
71Lefebvre, De Vetat, pp. 288-9, quoted in Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 391.
72Lefebvre, Production of Space, p. 79
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subordinating it to the exigencies of society, under the domination of the 
eye and no longer of the body as a whole.73
The triumph of abstract space was completed with the global spread of the late
capitalist mode of production in the twentieth century. In the aesthetic register, abstract
space was created through the spatial language of modernists like Picasso, Klee and
Kandinsky, who privileged opticality as the basis of aesthetic practice. In Picasso’s art
the space of modernity is ‘an unreservedly visualized space, a dictatorship of the eye and
of the phallus’ and it reflects the fact that in modernist culture as a whole ‘space has no
social existence independently of an intense, aggressive and repressive visualization. It
is ... a purely visual space... [that]... overwhelms the whole body and usurps its role.’74
Modernist culture reflects the pervasive impact of abstract space on social, economic and
political life. The modem state embraces the abstract space of late capitalism. In the
twentieth century the concrete space of everyday life has become totally colonised by
abstract space. Space is both commodified and bureaucratized. The commodification o f
space imposes a geometric grid of property relations and property markets on the earth,
while commodification through space installs economic grids of capital circulation
through which abstract space inscribes abstract labour and the commodity form. This
commodification is complemented by bureaucratisation. The bureaucratisation o f  space
occurs where an administrative system “maps out its own territory, stakes it out and
signposts it”. Meanwhile bureaucratization through space installs juridico-political grids
which allow the state to survey and regulate social life75 Abstract capitalist space is
a space of quantification and growing homogeneity, a merchandised space 
where all the elements are exchangeable and thus interchangeable; a 
police space in which the state tolerates no resistance and no obstacles. 
Economic space and political space thus converge towards the elimination 
of all differences.76
73Lefebvre, De Vetat, p. 287, quoted in Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 389.
74Lefebvre, Production of Space, pp. 302 & 286
75This summary of the colonisation of lived by abstract space is taken from Gregory, 
Geographical Imaginations, p. 401.
76Henri Lefebvre, ‘Space: Social Product and Use Value’ in J. W. Frieburg (ed.), Critical 
Sociology: European Perspectives (New York NY, Irvington, 1979), pp. 285-95, at p. 293.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the idea of the territorial state has a history. It is not a 
universal ideal-type category that defines the distribution of political space in all human 
societies. We have seen that the standard history of the origins of the idea of the territorial 
state locates it foundation and consolidation in Classical political discourse and practice 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This history is endorsed by Realists who 
point to the Peace of Westphalia as the temporal sign of the birth of the international 
territorial system and by critical thinkers who show that the presence of the idea of the 
territorial state in Classical political discourse reflects an absolutist-cosmopolitan desire 
to order and control space.
Typical of this history is a claim that there is a rupture between the modernity of 
the seventeenth century and the Renaissance culture which preceded it. Walker, for 
example, draws a sharp distinction between the temporal concerns of Machiavelli’s 
political theory -  preoccupied with the foundation and maintenance of new principalities 
and republics in the context of fortuna -  and Hobbes’ political theory that seeks to 
overcome time and fortune by establishing a universal theory of sovereign power through 
the combination of novel spatial categories with the timeless truths of a rational 
metaphysic: it is ‘only after Machiavelli that the principle of state sovereignty came to 
be framed within the context of the Euclidean-Galilean principle of absolute space rather 
than the complex overlapping jurisdictions of the medieval era.’77
However, many regard the Renaissance to be the forge of modernity. Harvey 
claims that the ‘Renaissance revolution in concepts of space and time laid the conceptual 
foundations for the Enlightenment project.’78 Once again, Renaissance perspective has 
a particular importance. Harvey claims that because it conceived of the world from the 
individual’s standpoint it provided the material foundation for the Cartesian principle of 
rationality central to Enlightenment. In our discussion of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel we 
saw that the idea of the territorial state was firmly established, became clearly visible, in 
the political theory of the Classical age. These thinkers were not articulating this idea for
77Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 46.
78Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, p. 249.
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the first time and so we must turn to a previous age of Western culture: Renaissance Italy 
between 1430 and 1530, to find the first statements, the intellectual foundations of the 
idea of territorial sovereignty. Later chapters will look for signs of a territorial 
consciousness in the discourse of cosmology and the power/knowledge technology of 
perspective. However, we shall begin our survey of Renaissance spatial discourse in the 
next chapter which traces the idea of the territorial state in Machiavelli’s political theory.
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Machiavelli and the Territory of Lo Stato
So far we have established as the thesis problematic the idea of the territorial state, 
considered the discursive approach we shall adopt in analysing it, and discussed various 
histories of its origins. Chapter one showed that Realist theories of international relations 
are based on a theory of the state that prioritises its spatial attribute of territoriality. This 
emphasis on territory connects Realism with a Weberian tradition of thought that defines 
the state as the institution with legitimate access to the means of physical violence over 
a delimited space. Chapter two argued that the Realist-Weberian theory of the territorial 
state does not simply reflect a pre-existing reality but, as a part of a discursive regime, 
produces and legitimises the territorialised space of modernity. The third chapter 
discussed the standard Realist history of the idea of the territorial state, which locates its 
origins in the political culture and practice of the Classical Age, and offered an alternative 
history of the idea of the territorial state that sees it as one element of modernity’s culture 
of space, rather than as part of an unfolding narrative of political theory. The modem 
culture of space is characterised by the increasing abstraction of space, a process which 
was particulary pronounced in Renaissance Italy. Following on from this the rest of the 
thesis will flesh out my general argument that the idea of the territorial state is a product 
of the discourses and practices of political space that first emerged in the Italian 
Renaissance between 1430 and 1530. Later chapters will look at the production of 
territoriality in Renaissance discourses of cosmology, perspective and cartography, but 
in this chapter we start on slightly more familiar territory with the political theory of 
Machiavelli.
Several historians of political theory (whose work I shall discuss later) claim that 
the political writings and practices of Renaissance Italy reveal a sense of the state, which 
if not fully ‘modem’, certainly anticipated later theories of the modem state. This chapter 
aims to uncover a modem understanding of territoriality in Renaissance political 
discourse. Rather than attempting to survey the entire body of Renaissance political 
thought for signs of territoriality, it focuses on the work of the paradigmatic political 
theorist of the Italian Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli. The framework for discussion 
is provided by the chapters of The Prince in which Machiavelli discusses the nature of
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the space occupied by principalities.
Two preliminary caveats should be noted at this stage. First, in choosing to focus 
on The Prince I am not denying the probability that Machiavelli, who had served as 
Chancellor to Soderini’s republican government for fourteen years, was committed to the 
ideals of civic republicanism laid out in The Discourses} Furthermore, I recognise that 
even though Machiavelli was aware of the relative weaknesses of the Italian city 
republics compared to the ‘territorial ’ kingdoms of the North, he remained convinced that 
the political communities of Tuscany could survive if they continued to develop the 
traditions of civic humanism upon which their liberties and greatness had depended upon 
in the past.2 Second, I shall not read Machiavelli with the aim of adjudicating between
1The challenge of reconciling The Prince with The Discourses has produced three different 
responses in the twentieth century. Meinecke and his followers deny that there is any real opposition. They 
argue that Machiavelli was less interested in the relative merits of republicanism or princely rule than in 
writing a dispassionate study of the technique of politics: the nature of political action, die study of the 
autonomous realm of politics and the consequences of its separation from that of morality. The second 
approach, that of Chabod, acknowledges the differences, but explains then in terms of a gradual shift in 
Machiavelli’s outlook away from a nostalgic affection for the virtues of republicanism to a painful 
awareness that the city-republics of central Italy, corrupt and outdated, had to give way to the rational 
political expediency of princely absolutism if Italy was to be rid of foreign powers. Chabod argues that 
there is a change of tone in The Discourses from the earlier chapters where Machiavelli confidently 
expresses his hopes republicanism, to the more dispiriting discussion of the present state of Italy’s 
republics in chs XVI-XVII. This shift, suggests Chabod, supports the thesis that Machiavelli interrupted 
The Discourses in the autumn of 1513 to write The Prince. Third, Hans Baron argues that Machiavelli did 
not break off The Discourses to write The Prince, but that there is a natural progression in his thought. The 
‘realistic pragmatism’ of The Prince reflected Machiavelli’s experience as Secretary of Florence during 
power struggles for Italy which threatened Florence’s dominions in Northern Tuscany. In contrast, the 
‘civic humanism’ of The Discourses was influenced by the humanist philosophy of political history 
favoured by the members of the Orti Oricellari circle, which led Machiavelli to reconsider the acquisition 
and defence of political power, not ‘exclusively in diplomatic craftsmanship but also -  and primarily -  in 
the creation of a social and constitutional fabric allowing civic energies and a spirit of political devotion 
and sacrifice to develop in all classes of a people.’ See, for this discussion, Hans Baron, ‘Machiavelli the 
Republican Citizen and Author of The Prince’ in Baron, In Search of Civic Humanism: Essays on the 
Transition from Medieval to Modern Thought, Vol. I f  (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988), 
pp. 101-51, at p. 146.
Machiavelli was not the only one to have this aspiration. At the end of the fifteenth century the 
triumph of the modem territorial state was not taken for granted in Renaissance Europe. Although by the 
1480s the four major territorial states, France, England, Castile-Aragon and Burgundy-Castille, were 
consolidating their power and spaces through dynastic and legal diplomacy, only a few decades earlier ‘the 
chief monarchies of Christendom seemed to touch nadir’ to the extent that ‘ [a] detached observer, scanning 
Europe in the 1460s, might excusably have concluded that the greater feudal monarchies were played out, 
and that the only political hope lay in such islands of relative peace and security as the Italian and German 
city states.’ Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc, 1955), p. 
106.
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various interpretations of his work in International Relations.3 The Prince is not read as 
a storehouse of time-honoured principles of power-politics and the reason of states. So, 
Martin Wight’s claim that Machiavelli is the ‘tutelary hero of International Relations’, 
and E.H. Carr’s contention that Machiavelli was the ‘first important political realist’ are 
left to the realm of speculation.4 Nor shall I endorse or refute Hayward Alker’s reading 
of The Discourses as a theory of civic humanism having an interpretative disposition that 
could assist us in understanding the international relations of postmodemity.5
I read Machiavelli in light of the modem understanding of the relationship 
between space and politics as resolved in the idea of the modem territorial state. The first 
section sets the scene by looking at the various meanings that lo stato has in Renaissance 
political discourse. In the chapter on Realism we saw how the idea of the territorial state 
complements specific understandings of sovereignty, violence and identity. These three 
themes provide the framework for our discussion of territoriality in Machiavelli’s 
political theory. I concentrate on The Prince because of its sensitivity to the 
consequences that the territorialisation of power was having on politics. In section two 
I shall argue that Machiavelli’s understanding of dominion anticipates the modem idea 
that sovereignty is restricted to well-defined territories. In section three I shall note that 
Machiavelli was aware that political space could only be consolidated through violence 
and the acquisition of a monopoly of violence in the form of a militia. Finally, in the 
fourth section I focus on the last chapter of The Prince, which has been interpreted by 
many as an appeal to nationalism on behalf of the territorial integrity of the Italian people.
The best discussion of the different interpretations Machiavelli has inspired is Isaiah Berlin, ‘ The 
Originality of Machiavelli’ reprinted in Berlin, Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. 
Henry Hardy, (London, The Hogarth Press, 1979), pp. 25-79. Berlin notes that although Machiavelli’s 
work is clear and lucid, it has inspired a mass of different interpretations and aroused much hostility. This 
is due to Machiavelli’s dispassionate acceptance of two incompatible moral orders, Christian and Pagan, 
with irreconcilable ultimate values, respectively, the redemption of the individual and the preservation of 
the polis. Machiavelli’s moral relativism unsettled the fundamental assumption of Western civilisation 
since Plato that one overarching principle -  Nature, God, The Chain of Being -  regulates life and sets the 
standard by which means and ends can be evaluated.
4Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), p. 20; and E. H. Carr, The 
Twenty Years Crisis, 2nd ed., (London, Macmillan, 1989), p. 63.
5Hayward R. Alker, Jr., ‘The Humanistic Moment In International Studies: Reflections on 
Machiavelli and las Casas’, International Studies Quarterly, 36:4 (1992), pp. 347-71.
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Lo Stato in Renaissance Political Discourse
In order to assess how important territory was to Machiavelli’s understanding of the state 
we must first consider the general meaning of lo stato in his political philosophy. This 
has been much debated by Machiavellian scholars who contest both the originality and 
modernity of Machiavelli’s stato.6 Today few accept Chiapelli’s bold claim that 
Machiavelli’s stato ‘bears the meaning of “State” in its full maturity.’7 More common is 
the view of contextualists like Felix Gilbert and Quentin Skinner who read Machiavelli 
in terms of the narrative conventions of Renaissance political writing and who do not 
regard his use of lo stato as a radical departure from standard usage. They reject the view 
that Machiavelli’s stato was the modem state in all its glory. Of course, this begs the 
question of what we might mean by the modem state. If one views, as Felix Gilbert does, 
the modem state as everything belonging to the body politic, Machiavelli’s notion of lo 
stato as a body with its own laws of existence, anticipates, if it does not fully express, the 
idea of the modem state.8 If, however, like Quentin Skinner, one understands the modem
6The literature on the meaning of lo stato in Renaissance political theory, including Machiavelli’s 
work, is extensive. I have relied chiefly upon Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (New York NY, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); Nicolai Rubinstein, ‘Notes on the Word Stato in Florence before 
Machiavelli’ in J. G. Rowe and W.H. Stockdale (eds), Florilegium Historiale: Essays Presented to 
Wallace K. Ferguson (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 313-26; Quentin Skinner, The 
Foundations o f Modern Political Thought, Volume One: The Renaissance (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1978); Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’ in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson 
(eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
90-131; Federico Chabod, ‘Esiste uno Stato del Rinascimento?’ in Chabod, Scritti sul Rinascimento 
(Torino, Giulio Einaudi editore, 1967), pp. 593-623; and Federico Chabod, ‘Alcune questioni di 
terminologia: Stato, nazione, patria nel linguaggio del Cinquecento’ in Chabod, Scritti sul Rinascimento, 
pp. 625-61.
7F. Chiappelli, Studi sul linguaggio del Machiavelli (Florence, F. Le Monnier, 1952), quoted in 
Skinner ‘The State’, p. 102.
8Gilbert’s ‘contextualist’ reading of Machiavelli and Guicciardini stresses the influence of 
contemporary political events, personal aspirations and established traditions of political writing and 
historiography on their work. Gilbert downplays the originality of Machiavelli’s thought, noting that much 
of Machiavelli’s vocabulary was well- established, that his historical methods and allegorical interpretation 
were commonplace, and that his intention to clarify and codify the principles which the ancients had 
followed in politics mirrored his contemporaries’ aspirations for art, jurisprudence and medicine. In the 
context of the political and intellectual frameworks of his time, Machiavelli’s ideas were not particularly 
original, however, what was novel was his capacity to synthesis them into a new form of politics. This 
synthesis was derived from Machiavelli’s position outside of the two main groups of political writers in 
Renaissance Florence: the humanists and the aristocrats. First, although Machiavelli shared the humanists’ 
interest in the recovery of the istoria of classical Rome, his personal desire for active involvement in 
politics meant that he was more interested in producing practical and useful guides for those actively 
engaged in politics rather than in entering into debates over ideal political communities. Second, as regards 
the dominant aristocratic class, Machiavelli resented the fact that because his relatively poor family was
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state as a ‘single, supreme authority within a body politic’, distinct from both the person 
of the monarch or the magistrates entrusted with the exercise of its power and from the 
society or community from which it derived its authority through contract, then 
Machiavelli’s state theory, which fulfilled neither of these criteria, was in no sense 
modem.9 Federico Chabod argues that if the modem state is conceived of as a sovereign 
unit, distinct from the mler, confined within defined territorial boundaries, incorporating 
the notion of a nation or patria, and represented institutionally by a rationalised 
bureaucracy of appointed officials, then only the last of these was present in the 
Renaissance state from Lorenzo di Medici to Richelieu. The characteristic feature of the 
Renaissance state was that it was concentrated around two poles, ‘the power of the 
sovereign and the hierarchy of the “officials’” .10
If the Renaissance stato is not the modem state, what are we to understand by the 
term in Renaissance political discourse? Not one thing for sure, because it is well 
acknowledged that lo stato has several different meanings in Renaissance political texts.11 
Two of the meanings are not directly relevant to our concerns and are only mentioned in 
passing. The first, common in the Northern kingdoms such as England and France, is the 
Roman law idea of status to denote the status or standing a ruler enjoyed, that is the status 
of majesty, or the status of the political community. In quattrocento Italy this sense is 
found in humanist texts like Giovanni Campano’s De regendo magistratu where he 
argues that republics could only achieve bonus status respublicae if their leaders strove 
for justice. According to Skinner, Machiavelli gives this meaning to lo stato where he 
advises new princes on how to ‘tenere or mantenere lo stato\ i.e. how to maintain their
not part of the elite class of Florentine families, his own access to political life had been relatively curtailed 
-  hence, his criticism of those who hold political office on the basis of wealth and prestige, criteria which 
do not guarantee virtii and success in politics. See Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics 
and History in Sixteenth Century Florence (New York NY, W.W. Norton and Co, 1965), pp. 153-200.
9For Skinner this concept of the modem state was a product of the seventeenth century tradition 
of natural law absolutism represented by Bodin, Suarez, Grotius and Hobbes. Nevertheless, Skinner admits 
that this idea of the modem state was derived in part from the Renaissance republican writing that stressed 
that in the res publica the community was the ultimate source of authority, and that the rulers and 
magistrates were merely elected officials: ‘there is a distinct form of “civil” or “political” authority which 
is wholly autonomous, which exists to regulate the public affairs of an independent community, and which 
brooks no rivals as a source of coercive power within its own civitas or respublica. ’ Skinner, ‘The State’, 
p. 107.
10Chabod, ‘Esiste uno Stato del Rinascimento?’, p. 604. My translation.
nThe following discussion relies heavily on Skinner, ‘The State’, esp. pp. 90-102, from where 
most of the citations to humanist political works are taken.
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position as rulers over their new territories.12 Second, evolving out of the humanist use 
of status to translate Aristotle’s types of government constitutions, lo stato is also 
employed to denote forms of government. In this context Bruni translates Aristotle’s 
distinction between democracy and aristocracy as statuspopularis and status optimatum; 
and the typology of legitimate regimes in Filippo Beroaldo’s Libellus de optimo statu are 
status populare, status paucorum and status unius.13 During the fourteenth century the 
Florentines described their own popular regime government as populare stato or 
popularis status.u
However, notes Nicolai Rubinstein, the use of lo stato to denote different forms 
of government gave way to stato as an indication of effective power; ‘[s]tatus, defined 
by “what has the supreme power in the state” comes close to the meaning with which 
stato was widely used in fifteenth-century Florence.’15 This use of lo stato ‘to refer to the 
institutions of government and means of coercive control that serve to organize and 
preserve order within political communities was a major linguistic innovation of the 
Renaissance.16 Although this sense of lo stato to denote the governmental and 
administrative apparatus was kept conceptually distinct from citta or republica -  the 
political community or state as a whole -  it was not always clearly distinguished from 
those who had effective control of it. Sometimes the distinction is relatively clear as when 
Vespasiano describes how Alessandro Sforza conducted himself “in his government of 
lo stato”, and when Guicciardi in his Ricordi asks how the Medici “lost control of lo stato 
in 1527.”17 Writing to Lorenzo about the security that is likely to result from a proposed 
treaty with Naples, the Florentine Chancellor pointed out that the benefits will be felt by 
‘you and the regime which is joined to you and for the state which is joined to the 
regime.’18 However, by the time Lorenzo had overcome the Pazzi plot in 1477 ‘the 
transformation of the stato of Florence into the Medici regime’ was almost complete, and
12Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 98.
13These examples are from Rubinstein and Skinner respectively.
14Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, p. 315.
15Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, p. 317. Rubinstein contextualises Machiavelli’s stato not just in terms of 
Italian humanist writing generally, but specifically in terms of Florentine political vernacular.
16Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 101.
17Vespasiano and Guicciardini both quoted in Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 101.
18Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, p. 319. My translation.
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lo stato came to refer not to the power structure o/the state but to the dominant regime 
in control of it: lo stato di Medici.19 For Skinner, Machiavelli’s work reveals these 
ambiguities over the meaning of lo stato. On the one hand, Machiavelli does occasionally 
distinguish the institutions and structure of lo stato from those who control it; stati have 
their own foundations, laws, customs and ordinances and are agents capable of choosing 
between different courses of actions and of drawing on the citizen’s loyalties. In this 
context we can read The Prince not just as a handbook of princely conduct, but as a 
reflection on abstract issues of ‘statecraft (dello stato) and cose di stato or affairs of 
state.’20 On the other hand, Machiavelli often writes of lo stato as an apparatus of 
government or a power structure that is not independent of those in charge of it; 7o stato, 
as he often puts it, remains equivalent to il suo stato, the prince’s own state or conditions 
of rulership.’21
This third sense of lo stato to denote the apparatus of power brings to mind 
Weber’s institutional concept of the state. However, it is the final meaning of lo stato as 
‘a way of referring to the general area over which a ruler or chief magistrate needs to 
exercise control’ which is of most interest to us.22 In the rest of this chapter I will read 
passages in The Prince where Machiavelli refers to the spatial nature of sovereignty, 
identity and violence, in an attempt to elucidate what was meant when ‘writers 
contemporaneous with Machiavelli used stato to designate a geographical area’.23
The Prince, Dominion and Sovereignty
Machiavelli opens The Prince with the famous declaration ‘Tutti gli stati, tutti e’ dominii 
che hanno avuto e hanno imperio sopra gli uomini, sono stati e sono o republiche o
19Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, p. 318. For Rubinstein, by the time Piero de Medici was ousted in 1494, 
‘the theoretical concept of stato as constitution had lost most of its original meaning by the transformation 
of the power structure of Florence into the Medici regime.’ p. 319. For a vivid description of the events 
surrounding the Pazzi plot, see Christopher Hibbert, The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici (London, 
Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 128-43.
20Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 102.
21Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 103.
22Skinner, ‘The State’, p. 100.
Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 177.
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principati.’24 This translates as ‘[a]ll the states (stati), all the dominions (dominii) that 
have had or now have authority (impend) over men have been and now are either 
republics or princedoms (principati).’25 In the rest of the first chapter, he observes that 
princedoms are either hereditary or new. If new, they are either totally new as Milan was 
for Francesco Sforza, or they can be joined to the hereditary state like new members 
(come membri aggiunti alio stato) as was Naples to the Kingdom of Spain. These 
dominions (questi dominii) are either used to living under princely rule or they are free 
(i.e. they are republics). They can be acquired either by using one’s own forces or those 
of another (mercenaries) and by fortuna or virtu. In the second chapter, Machiavelli 
points out that in hereditary states (nelli stati ereditori) the new prince should have little 
difficulty into holding onto his position (nel suo stato -  here in the sense of status) if he 
continues the customary rule established by his predecessors. As long as he does not 
develop any particularly unpleasant vices, the people of his state should be well disposed 
to him and innovation will be tolerated as bad memories and resentment will be 
subsumed ‘nella antiquita e continuazione del dominio\
The word dominion appears three times in these two opening chapters of The 
Prince and is fundamental to Machiavelli’s conception of lo stato. Indeed, in so far as it 
may be translated as ‘sovereignty’ -  as in the above phrase ‘[t]he remote origin and long 
continuance of such sovereignty’ -  it alerts us to the possibility that a mainstay of the 
modem discourse of the territorial state was already being erected in the political and 
legal discourses of Renaissance Italy.26 Sebastian de Grazia argues that the opening 
sentence of The Prince presents us with the essential components of the Machiavellian 
state. Machiavelli
locates the constituents of a state in three nouns. A state has all three -  a 
dominion, an imperium, and men. It is a special case of dominion (the 
definiens): one that is held by rightful (for which can be substituted just, 
lawful, or authoritative) command (which from its military antecedents 
contains a strong sense of sanctions or force) over men (who are located 
in the territory and obey the commands -  laws, orders, mles, decrees -  as
24Niccol6 Machiavelli, II Principe, ed. Giorgio Inglese, (Torino, Giulio Einaudi editore, 1995), 
p. 7. All subsequent Italian quotes taken from The Prince will refer to this text.
Niccold Machiavelli, The Prince in Machiavelli, Chief Works and Others, Volume I, trans. Allan 
Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 5-96, at p. 11. All subsequent English quotations 
will be drawn from this translation of The Prince, unless otherwise stated.
26Gilbert’s translation of Machiavelli, ThePrince, p. 12.
95
rightful).27
The antecedents of the terms dominium (referring to a domain or territory) and imperium
(denoting the right or authority to command) in Renaissance political discourse can be
traced to the legal, political and military vernacular of the Roman and Holy Roman
Empires. In Roman Law the Latin word dominium denoted ownership or
full legal power over a corporeal thing, the right of the owner to use it, to 
take proceeds therefrom, and to dispose of it freely. The owner’s plena 
potestas in re (full power over a thing) is manifested by his faculty to do 
with it what he pleases and to exclude anyone from the use thereof unless 
the latter has acquired a specific right to i t ... which he might obtain only 
with the owner’s consent.28
However, by the Renaissance the Roman Law sense of dominion to denote private
property or ownership had been supplemented by two public meanings. First was the
‘[t]he power or right of governing and controlling’ where dominion refers to the acts of
exercising control authority or sovereignty. Second, dominion also referred to the space
over which rule or sovereignty is exercised: ‘ [t]he lands or domains of a feudal lord....
The territory owned by or subject to a king or ruler, or under a particular government or
control.’29 In its public meaning dominion denotes both a subject -  the sovereign -  and
an object -  the territory over which sovereignty is exercised -  and as such anticipates the
modem concept of sovereign-territoriality.
We must acknowledge that few historians of political theory accept that the
modem sense of sovereignty or ‘the idea that there is a final and absolute political
authority in the political community ... and no final and absolute authority exists
elsewhere’ was fully developed in Renaissance political discourse.30 F.H. Hinsley argues
that while many Renaissance political theorists did challenge the secular authority
claimed by the Papacy and Emperor, the first explicit justification and recognition of the
legitimate independence of political communities was Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la
27de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, pp. 158-9.
Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia PA, The American 
Philosophical Society, 1953), p. 441.
29Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 949.
30F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 26.
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Republique, which was not published until 1576.31 Likewise, Jens Bartleson finds only 
a loosely developed notion of proto-sovereignty in Renaissance political texts. The 
Renaissance ‘general theory of the state’ did not individuate the state as a sovereign entity 
and prioritise it as the object of study.32 Further, to the extent that the discourse of 
sovereignty presupposes the existence of an ‘outside’ comprising an international system 
of identical sovereign states, then this was lacking from the Renaissance ‘general theory 
of the state’ which had no coherent discourse as to what lay outside it, ‘since what is 
outside it, also is beyond the scope of knowledge.’33
That said, both Hinsley and Bartleson admit that the idea of sovereignty was not 
totally alien to Renaissance political discourse. Furthermore, both acknowledge 
Machiavelli’s role in preparing the ground for the modem concept of sovereignty. For 
Hinsley, Machiavelli made two contributions to the development of the idea of 
sovereignty. First, Machiavelli, like Guicciardini, sought to resolve the competing 
interests of mlers and ruled by conceiving of lo stato as an instrument in the hands of the 
mler to be used in the interests of the mled. However, Machiavelli’s argument that the 
interests of both would be served if the prince was freed from custom and tradition, 
thereby allowing him to act in the interests of the body politic, stopped short of ‘knitting 
ruler and society closer together in a body politic which itself became endowed with
3IHinsley acknowledges that Renaissance political theory challenged three main tenants of the 
Christian order that had held back the emergence of the modem notion of sovereignty: first, that the 
theocratically-based claims of Papacy and Empire to universal authority contained the proper 
understanding of political authority; second, that Christendom was a political society; and third, that 
regional mlers were beholden to laws superior to them.
32Jens Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
pp. 88-136. The Renaissance ‘general theory of the state’ arose out of three conditions. First, the 
replacement of the eternal time-frame of the Augustinian cosmos by Aristotelian time of change and 
contingency in which political communities could be imagined as continuous political beings inscribed into 
an order of change and contingency. Second, the nominalist challenge to the universal whole of theological 
knowledge, which opened up the question of particularity -  although, as in Dante and Marsiglio of Padua’s 
writings, it was generally resolved within a universalist framework. Third, the general theory of the 
continuous and nominal state was supported by an epistemology of resemblance and exempla, and by an 
exemplary historiography drawing on the recovery of ancient political texts.
Bartleson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 136. Bartleson rejects the ‘Renaissance hypothesis’ that 
the French invasion of Italy in 1494 was the moment at which the state became distinguished as a separate 
being from an international system outside its borders. He suggests that there was no firm line of 
demarcation establishing the inside and outside of particular states and thus the notion of the international 
as a realm of the relations between autonomous states, ‘dependent on yet ontologically distinguishable from 
individual states’ was non-sensical. Bartleson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 89.
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sovereign power.’34 Second, Machiavelli dismissed the ancient notion that the ruler in a 
kingdom existed to realise a law superior to him and his government. With Machiavelli 
power has its own rules and raison d ’etre. Bartleson is also forced to admit that 
Machiavelli had some sense of a sovereign subject; ‘ [i]f II Principe was focussed around 
the problem of security and written from the vantage point of the sovereign subjectivity 
of a ruler, this perspective is reversed in the Discorsi. It is written from the vantage point 
of the sovereign subjectivity of a people.’35
Political theorists only begrudgingly admit that the idea of territorial sovereignty 
was part of the Renaissance political consciousness. However, for legal historians by the 
time of the Renaissance the principle of territorial sovereignty was well established. Its 
basic principles had been hammered out during the fourteenth century when regional 
monarchs asserted their independence from the Holy Roman Empire. The test case, which 
had established and then legitimised the principle, was Robert ofNaples’ challenge to the 
authority of the Emperor Henry VII in 1312. Robert was supported by French and 
Neapolitan lawyers who opposed the Holy Roman Emperor’s claim of dominus mundi, 
i.e. to be the lawful overlord and supreme monarch of Europe with jurisdictional 
authority over all kings, was invalid. Lawyers like John of Paris and Andreas de Isemia 
championed the principle of Rex est monarcha in regno suo and denied that the Holy 
Roman Empire had any superior juristic or political status over the regional kings.36 
Andreas regarded the Emperor as one king among equals, whose jurisdiction extended 
only over his own territory. The Emperor had equivalent powers to the other kings; the 
kings have the same powers within their realms as the Emperor has within the imperial 
empire: ‘Rexpoterit in regno suo, quodimperator in terra imperii... liberi reges tantum 
habent in regnis suis quantum imperator in imperio ,’37 On the basis of these principles, 
Robert -  charged with inciting imperial enemies in Lombardy and Tuscany, concluding 
treaties with them, and occupying imperial territory -  rejected the charge of crimen laesa 
majestatis laid against him, and claimed that the Emperor’s claim to universal
34Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 113.
Bartleson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 118.
36For a discussion of these lawyers, see Walter Ullman, ‘The Development of the Medieval Idea 
of Sovereignty’, English Historical Review, 64 (1949), pp. 1-33.
37Quoted in Ullman, ‘Medieval Idea of Sovereignty’, p. 24.
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overlordship was invalid. As a sovereign he, Robert, was inferior to no one. The
Emperor’s claim to overlordship was again refuted by Pope Clement V in the decree
Pastoralis Cura of 1313. Clement, who regarded Naples as a papal fief, had been upset
by Henry’s claim that Neapolitan territory was part of his kingdom, and declared in the
bull that the Emperor could not summon a king extra districtum imperii, nor use force
to bring a king to book extra imperium. In effect the bull stated that the Emperor had no
jurisdictional power over kings resident in territories outside of the Empire, and that he
was no longer dominus mundi. By the time Marsiglio of Padua wrote the Defensor Pads
in 1324, legal discourse had established that the sovereignty of the humanist individual
legislator humanus should be reflected in the sovereign status of the universitas dvium,38
subjectivized sovereignty must be supplemented by it objectivized 
component part, and that means that sovereignty, or what is the same, 
jurisdiction must be territorially anchored, must have a territorial 
connection ... territorial boundaries had become boundaries of the law, 
jurisdiction and hence of sovereignty. The territory had acquired juristic 
personality. Both governmental practice and juristic doctrine had 
postulated that the personal kind of sovereignty must be complemented 
by its territorial counterpart.39
The citizen’s residence was regarded as an integral part of justice. A person’s domicile
linked the res or territory to the personal domicile in legal practice and theory was the
nexus between the animate person and inanimate soil. The territorialisation of the
universitas dvium meant that no government could claim legitimate jurisdiction outside
its own territory and, as was demonstrated in 1312, a citizen with his domicile in one
territory could not be summoned to a court in another.40
This legal sense of territorial sovereignty was part of the Renaissance discourse
of state authority. Indeed, it informed both the internal constitution of jurisdiction and the
relations between the republics and principalities of Italy. As regards internal jurisdiction,
the idea of sovereign territoriality associated with dominion anticipated the coercive
38 Walter Ullman, ‘Personality and Territoriality in The “Defensor Pads”: The Problem of Political 
Humanism’ in Ullman, Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, (London, Variorum Reprints, 1986), pp. 
397-410. Ullman notes that the development of the principle of territorial sovereignty could be seen in the 
changing intitulations of kings from Rex Francorum to Rex Franciae and from Rex Anglorum to Rex 
Angliae.
39Ullman, ‘Personality and Territoriality’, p. 401. Marsiglio’s omission of the territorial elements 
of sovereignty in “Defensor Pads” went against the established conventions of late medieval political 
theory.
40Robert could not “potest trahi extra territorium.” Ullman, ‘ Personality and Territoriality’, p. 402.
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element that was to be so fundamental to the Weberian idea of the territorial state.
Machiavelli experienced this coercive element first hand in November 1512 when,
following the fall of Soderini’s government, he was expelled from the Chancery and
confined in territorio et dominio florentino per unum annum contiuum.41 Machiavelli
experience his confinement within the territory of Florence as a major hardship and after
six months wrote to his friend Venturi in Rome declaring his intention to visit “if I could
get out of this hole of dominion.”42 The legal sense of territorial sovereignty was also
evident in diplomatic treaties where lo stato refers to a combination of political power
and territorial dominion, as in the agreements leading to the formation of the Italian
League 1454 which ‘was concluded adtutelam et conservationem statuum et dominiorum
of the signatories.’43
The presence of the legal notion of territorial sovereignty in Machiavelli’s work
has been noted by Michel Foucault who sees in The Prince
a juridical principal which from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century 
defined sovereignty in public law: sovereignty is not exercised on things, 
but above all on a territory and consequently on the subjects who inhabit 
it. In this sense we can say that the territory is the fundamental element 
both in Machiavellian principality and in juridical sovereignty as defined 
by the theoreticians and philosophers of right. Obviously enough, these 
territories can be fertile or not, the population dense or sparse, the 
inhabitants rich or poor, active or lazy, but all these elements are mere 
variables by comparison with territory itself, which is the very foundation 
of principality and sovereignty.44
Machiavelli’s stato represents a shift in the notion of state territoriality from ‘the state of
justice, bom in the feudal type of territorial regime which corresponds to a society of
laws’ to ‘the administrative state, bom in the territoriality of national boundaries in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a society of regulation and
discipline.’45
41De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 159.
42Machiavelli, quoted in de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 159.
43Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, p. 320. In diplomatic documentation despotic states had the same status 
as republics.
^Michel Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’ in Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), 
The Foucault Effect (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 87-104, at p. 93.
45Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’, p. 104. The third form of the state, and the one Foucault is most 
interested in, is the modem ‘governmental state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, 
of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its volume and density.’ p. 104. While 
the sixteenth century administrative state is defined by its territory, territory is only one of many elements
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However, Foucault suggests that the link between the prince and his territory is
fragile and in need of permanent attention. Because the prince’s links to his principality
were synthetic, fragile and constantly threatened by external enemies and internal
disloyalty, his main interest was to hold onto it. Irrespective of how he had acquired his
principality, whether by conquest or inheritance, the prince remained ‘external to it.’46
The objective of the prince’s exercise of power is to strengthen and protect the
principality -  understood not as ‘the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory,
but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or
acquired, and with his subjects.’47 Foucault’s reading of Machiavelli captures, I think, the
essence of Renaissance territorial sovereignty. On the one hand it shows that during the
Renaissance sovereignty and territory were drawn into the same discursive realm. On the
other hand it shows that they did not become fused as they would in Classical political
theory. Perhaps we can conclude that in Renaissance sovereign-territoriality the hyphen
separates rather than unites; it differentiates the subject sovereign prince from the object
of his power, his territory. For Federico Chabod, Machiavelli’s theory of the state is
predicated upon this understanding that territory is an object to be subjected to the
authority of the prince.
For Machiavelli “State” signifies first of all authority, preeminence, 
political power (of the prince alone or of the dominant political group in 
the republic) which is exercised over a distinctive group of men. That is, 
it is the subject, clearly separated from the object of command, which 
remains outside of and subservient to it. But it also signifies territorial 
extension, “dominio” in the objective sense (the space -  and population 
-  within which and upon which a determined authority is exercised).48
This ‘sovereign as subject, territory as object’ distinction appears in Renaissance
diplomatic documents in which the stato of a ruler is distinguished from his lands and
subjects. For example, under the terms of the treaty between Francesco Sforza and
Federico Montefeltro (31 August 1450), Sforza agrees to take into his protection “el stato,
making up the governmental state For its advocates like Guillaume de La Perrtere, government was about 
the ‘right disposition of things’ i.e. control ofthe population through economic savoir. Machiavelli’s Prince 
with its suggestion that the art of government should have ‘the sole interest of the prince as its object and 
principle of rationality’ was viewed as the antithesis of the proper art of government, p. 89.
46Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’, p. 90.
47Foucault, ‘Govemmentality’, p. 90.
48Chabod, ‘Alcune questioni’, p. 631. My translation.
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citade, terre, castelle, homini, subditi...” of Federico.49 This distinction was especially 
relevant to the territories of the principalities and despotic states, since both the internal 
regime and the territory were held by the signore as his dominions.50
In this section we have seen that historians do not agree whether or not 
Renaissance political and legal discourse articulated a recognisably modem notion of 
sovereign territoriality. I think that it is fair to say that Machiavelli’s understanding of 
dominion, reflecting developments in the legal notion of territoriality, anticipates the 
Classical resolution of space and politics. Although the subjective and objective 
components of sovereign territoriality may not have fused to the extent that they will in 
the modem representation of the state, nevertheless they were both part of Renaissance 
political discourse. In the discussion of the Realist idea of the territorial state in the 
opening chapter it was pointed out that sovereignty and territoriality were cemented 
through violence. In the next section I shall analyse the relationship between territory and 
violence as Machiavelli as presented in The Prince.
The Prince and Violence
Sheldon Wolin has written that Machiavelli was the first political philosopher to confront 
the state as an ‘aggregate of power’ and to depict its profile as ‘that of violence.’51 Indeed, 
one of the central messages of The Prince is that the prince should not shirk from 
employing appropriate economies of violence in order to achieve his desired political 
ends. Machiavelli considered the successful acquisition and maintenance of a principality 
to be dependent on the prince’s capability and prowess in military matters. In chapter x, 
where Machiavelli seeks to establish the criteria by which it is possible to assesses the 
power of princes, he suggests that a strong prince will have ‘tanto stato’ so as to be able
49Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, fh. 79, p. 326.
50Rubinstein reads Machiavelli’s opening sentence in The Prince as following diplomatic use. 
Machiavelli is identifying states with dominions, whose acquisition and preservation by princes is the 
subject of the work.
51Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Machiavelli and the Economy of Violence’ in Wolin, Politics and Vision: 
Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 
195-238, at p. 221.
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to defend himself against any attacker without calling upon other princes for assistance.52 
His advice for weak princes who, under attack are obliged to ‘take refuge behind walls 
and defend them’, is that they will be able to hold onto their states during a siege if they 
make sure that the city is well fortified and that the people remain loyal.53
In this passage Machiavelli also advises the besieged prince to ‘fortify and 
provision his city, and to make no account of the territory lying outside it.’54 Machiavelli 
implies that as long as the city holds fast, the countryside or contado may be regarded as 
peripheral space that the enemy can take without threatening the existence of the state as 
a whole. This image of central and peripheral spaces of state territoriality perhaps 
contrasts to the Weberian ideal in which the state’s authority or capacity to exercise its 
monopoly of violence is distributed evenly across the entire territory. However this image 
of a centre based in the city and a periphery of outlying areas is common among 
republican writers in Florence who use lo stato in a geographical sense to denote the 
territorial dominion. Giovanni Villani divided the stato of Florence into city, contado, 
and distretto, and Guicciardini spoke of Pisa as belonging to “/o nostro stato”55 
According to Elena Fasano Guarani, Machiavelli’s centre-periphery image of territoriality 
reflects the characteristic structure of Italian political communities in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. In the Renaissance states where territoriality extended to spaces 
beyond the surrounding castles and villages already under the jurisdiction of cities, it was 
less ‘a form of immediate sovereignty over a territory’ than ‘jurisdiction exercised over 
the subj ects through the entities and communities representing them. ’56 Territorial control
Machiavelli, II Principe, p. 69. The phrase, ‘se uno principe ha tanto stato, che possa, 
bisognando, per s6 medesimo reggersi’ is translated by Gilbert as ‘whether a prince has so much power that 
by his own strength alone he can repel attack’, The Prince [A], p. 42. However, in light of our concerns, 
perhaps the translation by Russell Price in Machiavelli, The Prince [B], ed. Quentin Skinner and Price, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988) is more pertinent: ‘whether a ruler has sufficient territory 
and power to defend himself.’, p. 38.
53Machiavelli, The Prince [A], p. 42.
54Machiavelli, The Prince [A], p. 43: ‘a fortificare e munirela terra propria e del paese non tenere 
alcuno conto.’ II Principe, p. 70.
55Rubinstein, ‘Notes’, pp. 320-1. The references are to Giovanni Vallani, Cronica, ed. I. Moutier, 
(Florence, 1823), p. 655; and Francesco Guicciardini, Storie Fiorentine, ed. R. Palmarocchi, (Bari, 1931), 
p. 113.
56Elana Fasano Guarani, ‘Centre and Periphery’, The Journal of Modern History, 67:Supplement 
(December 1995), pp. S74-96, at p. S74. Guarani’s work is part of a research project of the Istituto Storico 
Italo-Germanico in Trent, some of which was published as a supplement to The Journal o f Modern 
History in December 1995. Many of these papers appeared earlier in the Italian edited collection, Giorgio 
Chittolini, Anthony Molho and Pierangelo Schiera (eds), Origini dello Stato: Processi di formazione
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of Renaissance states was marked by a divide between centre and periphery which 
revealed a ‘hierarchical and polarized organisation of that space.’57
In Renaissance Italy the city and the countryside closer together than in feudal 
societies, although mutual distrust and resentment remained. The widespread replacement 
of serfdom by more flexible tenancies based in commercial leases and contractual 
sharecropping or mezzadria drew the cities and countryside together in relations of 
dependency: city dwellers relied on food, fuel and labour drawn from rural areas, while 
investment and speculations by the rich and middle classes of the cities brought 
prosperity to the countryside. Like Machiavelli who owned a farm at Sant’Andrea in 
Percussina outside Florence, many city dwellers had farms near the city or were absentee 
landlords in estates further out. Yet, economic ties of necessity between urban upper 
classes and the agrarian economy did not produce feelings of trust or affection between 
city and country people. The landowning patriciate exhibited virulent prejudice towards 
the peasantry and farm workers, who in turn sought to avoid conceding too much of their 
produce to them. The cleavage between urban and rural is expressed in Franco Sacchetti’s 
declaration that “[t]he city should produce good men, the villa good beasts.”58 This spirit 
of difference between the spaces of the city and countryside is, suggests Martin Wamke,
statale in Italia fra medioevo ed eta moderna (Bologna, II Mulino, 1994). Italian historians began to 
emphasise the territorial dimension of state power following the translation of the German socio-historical 
work of Hintze, Weber and Brunner in the 1970s. This paradigm is by now well established, as is revealed 
by the title of Julius Kirschner’s introductory essay to the JMH Supplement, ‘The State is “Back In’”, pp. 
S1-S10. These historians detect signs of the modem state in the consolidation of juridical, military and 
fiscal powers by regional Italian states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but they stop short of the 
claim that ‘autonomous, self-sustaining, centralized administrative structures came into existence.’ p. S5.
57Guarani, ‘Centre and Periphery’, pp. S74-5. For these historians the centre-periphery trope is 
not limited to analyses of the extension of the state’s control over a territory, but informs a general 
tendency to avoid conceiving of the state as a monolithic caricature, ‘connoted by full sovereignty, 
absolutism, coercion, the exercise of power in the name of the public interest.’ Giorgio Chittolini, ‘The 
“Private,” the “Public,” the State’, The Journal of Modern History, 67:Supplement (December 1995), pp. 
S34-61, at p. S46. For Chittolini the institutional arrangements of the Renaissance and ancien regime need 
to be explored in terms of a dialectic between public and private interests -  while recognising that the 
modem distinction between public and private established by ‘the political geometry of absolutism’ should 
not be projected back onto earlier institutional formations. Nevertheless, for Chittolini, ‘the institutions 
of the ancien regime are not the expression of a public order centred entirely on the prince, nor do they 
draw the historians attention only to the “centre”, but focus attention on ‘cities, communities, fiefs, 
corporations, orders, and social groups, examining not only their political forms but also the way they 
complement the prince and the ruling city, and hence their integral contribution to the dualistic 
arrangements of those states as estates-polities.’ p. S48.
58Sacchetti quoted in Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy 
(New York NY, Alfred A Knopf, 1979), p. 165.
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a legacy of the medieval view that the city was the place of law and order and the
countryside a lawless open landscape. Although this vision was in decline during the
Renaissance, its images were still evident, as in, for example, Giotto’s frescos for the
Arena Chapel in which Injustice is depicted as a tyrant sitting outside the city-gate and
ruling over a wilderness were brigands indulge in robbery and murder.59 For Lauro
Martines the image of the city ‘haunts’ countless Renaissance paintings, in which
clustered urban space are presented as testaments to civic life and implicitly reject the
country as organised space for living. Furthermore, artists like Leonardo and Mantegna
stamped on their ‘country views’,
the architecture, geometry, and lapidaiy textures of cities. The countryside 
is disavowed.... In certain views of walled-in cities, the surrounding rural 
space is depicted as a sort of no man’s land fit for armies and desolation, 
not for civilized living (vivere civilmente). Infected by the arrogance of 
the domineering city, the artistic imagination was also affected by the 
immediacy of a subjugated countryside, and so it produced fantasticated 
pictures of the established relationships of power.60
While serving in the Florentine Chancery, Machiavelli travelled extensively 
within Italy, visiting potentially rebellious cities and recruiting soldiers for the militia, 
and he became sensitive to the potential weaknesses of these centre-periphery systems. 
It was generally recognised that the inability of the communes to unify and discipline the 
feudal aristocracies in their contadi precipitated the crises of the fourteenth century. 
Machiavelli felt that the territorial arrangements of Venice and Florence displayed similar 
weaknesses. As regards Venice, Machiavelli shared the view that the weakness of the 
Venetian state lay in the estranged nature of the relations between the city, which one 
historians describes as “a strange centre placed at the borders of its state, a seafaring and 
mercantile city, foreign to the world of common law” and the Terrafirma, “a multiform 
and polycentric periphery, organized around big urban poles and dotted with feudal 
lordships and ‘little princes’.”61 Machiavelli noted that Venice’s expansion, which had
59Martin Wamke, Political Landscape: The Art History o f Nature, (London, Reaktion Books Ltd,
1994), p. 40. Wamke also finds this imagery in the castle landscape of Stephan Lochner’s Last Judgement 
which assigns ‘the city to heaven and the castle -  the emblem of country power -  to hell.’
60Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 166.
61 S. Zamperetti, Ipiccoli principi: Signorie locali, feudi e comunitasoggette nello Stato regionale 
veneto dall ’ espansione territoriale aiprimi decenni del ’600 (Treviso, 1991), quoted in Guarani, ‘Centre 
and Periphery’ p, S86.
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taken ‘possession of a large part of Italy, for the most part not with war but with money
and craft’, threatened not only many Italian princes but also foreign kings.62 Indeed, he
attributed Venice’s defeat at the battle of Agnadello (14 May 1509) by the combined
Spanish, French and German forces of the League of Cambrai brought together by Pope
Julius II, to the fact that
they attained such a reputation for power that not merely to the Italian 
princes but to the kings beyond the Alps they gave cause for dread. Hence 
when these foreign rulers made a league against them, in one day the 
Venetians were deprived of the territory which in the course of many 
years they had gained with boundless expense.63
As far as Machiavelli was concerned, Venice’s great weakness was its fixed constitution.
While this constitution allowed the city-state to maintain its liberty and freedom because
only the gentiluomini, who knew how to conduct affairs of state, had access to
administrative posts, it was not flexible enough to allow for expansionist policies.
Because the plebe were un-armed the Venetians were forced to rely on mercenaries,
whose unreliability was the cause of the defeat at Agnadello.64
Closer to home, Machiavelli was also preoccupied with Florence’s own struggles
to control its subject territories. Machiavelli had become familiar with the threats to
Florence’s dominio during his travels as Secretary to rebellious cities like Pisa. In The
Prince, Pisa, which Florence had bought from Gabriele Maria Visconti in 1405 and lost
in 1494 as a consequence of Charles VIII’s invasion, is cited as an example of the
difficulties a prince will face when trying to holding onto recently acquired city-states
with long established traditions of liberty.65 Earlier in the Discorso dell ’ordinare lo stato
di Firenze alle armi 1506, Machiavelli had contrasted the restlessness in the Florentine
distretto, populated by potentially rebellious cities, to the peaceful contado of Florence’s
62Niccol6 Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade ofTitusLivius in Machiavelli, Chief Works 
and Others, Volume I, 1:6, p. 210.
63Niccol6 Machiavelli, The History of Florence in Machiavelli, Chief Works and Others, Volume 
III, 1:29, p. 1069.
64After the Venetians’ defeat at the battle of Agnadello Machiavelli was in Verona, one of 
Venice’s subject cities, and wrote to the Dieci explaining that Venice’s defeat was compounded by the use 
of mercenary forces and the ambivalent loyalties of the aristocracy in the subject cities. See, for details, 
Elena Fasano Guarani, ‘Machiavelli and the Crisis of the Italian Republics’ in Gisela Bock, Quentin 
Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), pp. 17-40, at p. 23.
65Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 24.
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immediate vicinity.66 Machiavelli feared that without sufficient armi and giustizia to 
defend and punish its subjects, Florence was incapable of governing its dominio properly. 
Florence’s very survival was threatened by ‘the fragility of its territorial system, badly 
guarded, exposed to external pressures, undermined internally by the presence of cities 
“che desiderano piu la vostra morte che la loro vita”.’67 Machiavelli advised Florence’s 
rulers that if they wanted to consolidate the state’s territory they would not only have to 
reinforce Florence’s military force and institutions of justice, but also take a firm control 
over internal matters by rewarding faithful subjects and punishing rebel cities. However, 
the centre-periphery system remained the dominant structure of power in Renaissance 
states, even in the territories of the princes, throughout the sixteenth century. Guarani’s 
own research on the Medici rule of Florence in the sixteenth century reveals a centre- 
periphery ordering of power which extended outwards from Florence to the Tuscan 
territories. Tuscany was a pluralistic society in which cities, towns and rural communities 
maintained their own councils and government bodies and were responsible for tax 
collection and allocation, the maintenance of public order, and, till Cosimo I, defence.68
Machiavelli is often quite explicit that states are institutions grounded in violence. 
As he says ‘[t]he principal foundations of all states, the new as well as the old and the 
mixed, are good laws and good armies’ and it is not possible to have good laws without 
the existence of competent armies.69 The subject of armies was very important to 
Machiavelli, who had been responsible for recruiting a militia force for Florence, and 
discussions on how to raise, maintain and deploy armed forces appear in all his major 
works.70 In The Prince he devotes chapters xii-xiv to a critique of the widespread, and he 
felt entirely regrettable, practice among Italy’s rulers of employing foreign mercenaries 
or auxiliaries. Machiavelli had much contempt for mercenaries whom he considered as 
‘disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal... [and]... cowardly’. Indeed, he laid 
the responsibility for the ‘present ruin of Italy’ entirely at the feet of Italian rulers who
66See, for details, Guarani, ‘Crisis of the Italian Republics’, p. 23.
67Guarani, ‘Crisis of the Italian Republics’, p. 23.
68Guarani, ‘Centre and Periphery’, pp. S81-2.
69Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 47.
70See especially Niccolb Machiavelli, The Art of War, ed. N. Wood, (New York NY, Da Capo,
1965).
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have relied upon ‘mercenaries for a stretch of many years.’71 Auxiliaries are even more 
dangerous because their primarily loyalty is always to their own commander, who could 
easily turn his soldiers against their employers. Machiavelli advises both princes and the 
ruling elites of city-states to substitute for mercenaries, militia forces made up of local 
men whose allegiances would be more predictable. Machiavelli warned that unless the 
Prince could call upon armies made up of his own subjects or citizens, then his 
principality would remain insecure and dependent on fortuna, ‘not having strength that 
in adversity loyally defends her.’72 In rejecting foreign mercenaries and recommending 
locally-based militias Machiavelli anticipates the inside/outside distribution of territorial 
violence. The militias have two roles: internally they ensure pacification by quashing any 
rebellious factions that challenge the state authorities, externally they defend the state 
against the marauding armies of the oltramontani. If the militia is conducted properly, ‘it 
naturally suppresses all disturbances -  rather than fomenting them -  among its 
constituents’ as well as being able ‘to protect them against the fear of foreign enemies.’73
Michel Foucault has pointed out that state violence in Early Modem Europe was 
both spectacular and disciplinary.74 In The Prince Machiavelli provides examples of 
princes using both forms of violence to secure the territories of their states. In the tract 
‘On the Method of Dealing With the Rebellious Peoples of the Valdichiana’, Machiavelli 
warns the Florentine leaders that the Duke of Valentino Cesare Borgia, who was seeking 
to establish his authority in Romagna and to build a powerful territorial state in central 
Italy, was trying to incite rebellion among the discontented peoples of the Florentine 
state.75 In The Prince, however, Valentino is praised for his attempts to hold onto his new 
principality in the most difficult of circumstances. Valentino’s hold over Romagna was 
considered to be weak because he had relied on other men’s forces -  his armies were 
heavily reinforced by mercenaries belonging to the Orsini and by soldiers on loan from 
the French king Louis XII -  but had also relied on fortuna -  he had been able to rely on 
the support of the pope Alexander VI who was Roderigo Borgia his father. Valentino
71Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 47.
72Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 54.
73Machiavelli, Art of War, p. 40
74Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1979).
75See the extracts in Machiavelli, Chief Works and Others, Vol. 1, p. 161-2.
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recognised that three factors potentially threatened his position: the dubious loyalties of
the Orsini mercenaries, Louis’ disapproval of his plans for further expansion into
Tuscany, and the anarchy within Romagna whose peoples were disunified and sick of
being ruled by weak lords who had exploited them. Cesare began to strengthen his
position by eradicating the leaders of the Orsini and Colonna families and by breaking
his alliance with the French.76 In order to pacify Romagna, Cesare put in charge ‘Messer
Remirro de Oreo, a man cruel and ready’ who ‘in a short time tendered the province
peaceful and united.’ In order to avoid incurring resentment at the violent means used to
restore order, Cesare wanted to show that
any cruelty which had gone on did not originate with himself but with the 
harsh nature of his agent. So getting an opportunity for it, one morning at 
Cesena he had Messer Remirro laid in two pieces in the public square 
with a block of wood and a bloody sword near him. The ferocity of this 
spectacle left those people at the same time gratified and awestruck.77
The Remirro case is an example of the use of spectacular violence in the
consolidation of the territory of a Renaissance state. The spaces of Renaissance polities
were also constituted through disciplinary violence. Pierangelo Schiera sees the modem
state as ‘a point of unity’ in which the institutional and legitimate organization of power
is combined with the discipline that determines the collective behaviour its subjects.78 For
Schiera these three elements come together in the seventeenth century, but they all
developed, albeit separately, in Italian humanism.79 The institutional dimension arose out
of negotiations between the signoria, the papal and imperial vicariati, and the principate,
which replaced ancient civic legitimacy with a state based legitimacy. City-states derive
Between 1502 and 1503 Machiavelli was sent on official missions to Valentino’s courts at 
Imola and Cesana, and then to the Papal court in Rome. From these courts he sent detailed dispatches to 
the Ten of Liberty reporting on the status of the ongoing alliance negotiations between Florence and 
Borgia. In these legations Machiavelli describes Cesare’s rise and fall. See the extracts from Legation 11, 
‘An Official Mission to Duke Valentino in Romagna’ in Machiavelli, Chief Works, pp. 121-42; and 
Legation 13, ‘An Official Mission to the Court of Rome’ in Machiavelli, Chief Works pp. 142-60. In the 
Roman legation Machiavelli reports on the death of Pope Alexander in 1503 and the succession of Julius 
II; these events reappear in The Prince as the blow offortuna which ultimately cost Cesare his princedom. 
On Cesare’s elimination of the Vitelli and Orsini factions in January 1503, see Machiavelli, ‘A Description 
of the Method Used by Duke Valentino in Killing Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermoi, and Others’ 
in Machiavelli, Chief Works, pp. 163-9.
77Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 31.
78Pierangelo Schiera, ‘Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for 
the Birth ofthe Modem State’, The Journal of Modern History, 67: Supplement (December 1995), pp. SI 1- 
33, at p. S30.
79Schiera, ‘Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions’, p. S32.
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their legitimacy, as Marsiglio noted, from their status as a community that protects 
individuals so that “the men belonging to it may live and live well.”80 Discipline arose 
from the codes of the guilds, corporations, universities and Church, which ensured the 
co-ordination of the citizens’ behaviour with the needs of the communal civic order. 
Machiavelli, despite his contempt for the institutions of the Roman church, recognised 
that religion had a vital role in reinforcing social cohesion and identity. It is the duty of 
‘the rulers of a republic or of a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they 
hold. If they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and 
consequently good and united.’81 Religion can also assist in securing the discipline of 
armies. Machiavelli praises rulers who ‘with very great ceremonies... had their soldiers 
swear to observe military discipline, in order that if they acted against it, they would have 
to fear not merely the laws and men but God; and they used every device to give them 
strong religious feeling.’82
It would perhaps be rash to conclude that the political conditions of his time 
would have allowed Machiavelli to entertain with too much hope the Weberian ideal that 
one central authority should have sole control over the means of violence within a state’s 
territory. Nevertheless, he recognises that violence is an important element in the 
acquisition and consolidation of a state’s territory. For Machiavelli a prince cannot have 
effective control over his dominio unless he has effective armies at his command. 
Machiavelli’s desire for a local militia and his accounts of the use of spectacular and 
disciplinary violence in the subjugation of new lands, do display an awareness that state 
territoriality is founded and legitimised through violence.
The Prince and Identity
Along with sovereignty and violence, the third component of the Realist-Weberian 
territorial state is a national identity inscribed into the state’s territory. In The Prince 
Machiavelli touches upon themes of identity in chapter iii on ‘Mixed Princedoms’ and 
in the famous last chapter xxiv, ‘An Exhortation to Grasp Italy and Set her Free from the
80Marsiglio of Padua, quoted in Schiera, ‘Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions’, p. SI 9.
8Machiavelli, Discourses, 1:12, in Chief Works, p. 227.
82Machiavelli, Art of War, 6, in Chief Works, p. 69.
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Barbarians’ ,83 In chapter iii Machiavelli discusses the problems faced by a prince who has 
recently acquired mixed principalities. If the new territory has the same customs, mores 
and language as those established in his antico stato, and if the inhabitants of the new 
territory are already accustomed to princely rule, then assimilating the territory in tutto 
un corpo will be relatively easy. The prince does not need to alter existing laws and taxes, 
but if he ensures that the previous ruling family is wiped out ‘in a very short time they 
unite with his old princedom in a single body.’84 However, if the inhabitants of the newly 
acquired territory possess different language, laws and customs he will require good 
fortune and have to cultivate virtu to retain it. He may have to either move his residency 
to the new lands or establish colonies in it. Further, he must forge alliances with the lesser 
princes of the region, while making sure not to increase the power of any potential rivals. 
In the next chapter Machiavelli argues that it is particularly hard for the new prince to 
hold onto territories in which his predecessor shared power with several feudal lords 
because there will be several foci of hereditary allegiance opposed to his rule. However, 
the most difficult territories to retain are republican cities with strong traditions of liberty 
and in which civil life is conducted according to their own laws. As it is not possible to 
eradicate memories of liberty and freedom, the only sure ways to hold onto these states 
is either to destroy them, or to go and live there, while retaining as many old laws as is 
possible.85
In these chapters we get the sense that the Renaissance individual’s political 
identity is mainly derived from local spaces. A man’s political identity is determined 
primarily by his residence in the lands of a particular prince or in a certain city’s dominio. 
The notion that one’s identity is derived from some sense of Italia seems, at best, to be 
a secondary consideration. This comes across in Machiavelli’s statement that ‘the 
territories a conqueror annexes and joins to his own well-established state are either in
83Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 12-20 & 92-6.
^Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 14.
85The problem of holding onto cities with traditions of liberty -  a particular problem for Florence 
-  is also noted by Guicciardini: ‘it has been more difficult for the Florentines to acquire their small 
dominion than for the Venetians to acquire their large one. This is because the Florentines live in a province 
that used to be full of free republics, which it is extremely difficult to extinguish. So it requires the greatest
effort to conquer them and, once conquered, it is no less difficult to keep them The cities the Venetians
have had to capture have been accustomed to subjection and lack any determination to defend themselves 
or rebel.’ Francesco Guicciardini, Maxims or Ricordi reprinted in Guicciardini, Dialogue on the 
Government of Florence, trans. Alison Brown, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 171.
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the same country, with the same language, or they are not.’86 It is interesting that he 
identifies language as the most important factor in determining whether the residents of 
newly acquired lands are in the same provincia (which can be translated as nationality) 
and thus of the same identity to those in the prince’s antico stato}1 Through this 
emphasis on provincia and language Machiavelli wants to impress upon his reader that 
the new prince will find it hard to hold onto a territory that has different mores and 
customs than those in his original principality. In terms of Connolly’s analysis of 
Rousseau’s concept of territoriality, we can say that the tracts of land which the new 
prince acquires are not empty spaces, but are already territorialised because the 
inhabitants already possess mores, languages and customs; they already have an identity 
inscribed into the land that the new prince must overcode.
In Renaissance Italy loyalties were mostly captured by regimes and city-states and 
not by thepatria, Italia. Florentines felt, for example, that the Palazzo della Signoria and 
the Duomo symbolised their city’s unique status; ‘Brunelleschi’s cupola high in the 
heavens is the cosmos centered in Florence and covering an empire of the peoples of 
Tuscany.’88 They proclaimed Florence’s political, artistic and scientific hegemony over 
the rest of Italy. Machiavelli’s own pride in Florence was sightly tempered by a fear that 
her cultural achievements were threatened by the political weakness that came from a 
multitude of minor allegiances to individual families rather than to the city as a whole. 
Such locally-based identity formations contrasted to those being developed in the 
Northern states, where political symbolism and the institutions of hereditary succession 
and primogeniture were fixing loyalties on the person, the body, of the monarch. The 
parochial loyalties to cities and princes could not compete with the mass loyalties enj oyed 
by the Northern monarchs. Indeed, some commentators have argued that Machiavelli,
QfL
Machiavelli, The Prince, [B], p. 8. In Italian the phrase is ‘Dico pertanto che questi Stati, quali, 
acquistandosi si aggiungono a uno stato antico di quello che acquista, o e’ sono della medesima provincia 
e della medesima lingua, o non sono.’ Machiavelli, II Principe, p. 12. Price translates provincia as country; 
it ‘denotes any area that is larger than a “city” or “city-state” (citto).’ fii (a) p. 80. Price claims that in The 
Prince Machiavelli gives lo stato two different meanings. It is a ‘political community existing within certain 
territorial boundaries as well as the government of such a community... (I have usually translated the first 
sense as “state”, but sometimes I have used “territory” and “region”.) See, Appendix B: ‘Notes on the 
Vocabulary of The Prince.’ p. 102.
87J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 163.
88de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, p. 146.
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who famously declared to Vettori ‘I love my country more than my soul’, was prepared 
to sacrifice these parochial loyalties for an Italic spirit that would reunite the entire 
geographical area beneath the Alps with its proud heritage in the Roman Empire.89
The final chapter of The Prince easily lends itself to an interpretation that 
Machiavelli saw the future in terms of a large territorial state clothed in a single Italian 
identity. Machiavelli urges his reader, probably either Guiliano or Lorenzo de Medici, to 
take up the challenge to liberate Italy from foreign occupation. The ‘barbarous cruelty and 
arrogance’ of the foreigners has reduced the Italians to a situation where they are ‘without 
order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, devastated, subject to every sort of ruination.’ 
However, the Italians have retained their spirit and are ‘ready and willing to follow a 
banner.’90 The Medici are well positioned to provide this leadership, for not only are they 
blessed by fortuna, but now, with the benefits of Machiavelli’s advice, they can learn 
from the examples of great leaders like Moses, Cyrus and Theseus. Machiavelli advises 
the Medici to reform Italy’s laws and institutions and to provide them with wise 
leadership. In ‘Italy there is no lack of matter on which to impose any form; there is great 
power in the limbs, if only it were not wanting in the heads.’91 The most important reform 
must be to ensure that Italy has own armies.92 Should the Medici accept this task in the 
spirit of justice, they will be revered and loved by all Italians.
Since Ranke, Machiavellian scholars have debated whether chapter xxiv is the 
logical tel os of The Prince or merely a rhetorical addendum designed to curry favour with 
Guiliano and then Lorenzo de Medici.93 Whatever the outcome of these debates, one can
89See, for example, de Grazia, pp. 145-56. Others claim that Machiavelli did not despair of the 
future of the city-states. Though Florence’s situation was serious, it was not hopeless if it could achieve a 
strong and virtuous government like Rome had had at the time of the Empire. See Gilbert, Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini, pp. 182-4.
90Machiavelli, The Prince quotes p. 93.
91Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 94.
92Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 95.
93Sidney Anglo believes that The Prince “is a deliberately structured work; and the apex of that 
structure is the call to the Medici to unite Italy -  or rather North Italy -  and lead it from the dominion of 
the barbarians.”, quoted in David Laven, ‘Machiavelli, italianita and the French invasion of 1494’ in David 
Abulafia, The French Descent into Renaissance Italy: Antecedents and Effects (Variorum, Aldershot,
1995), pp. 355-69, at p. 366. Others however believe that the emotional and rhetorical appeal for national 
salvation is out of tune with the preceding rational and detached analysis of the means to acquire and hold 
onto power. In the nineteenth century Ranke and Villari, influenced by contemporary nationalist discourse, 
read The Prince as a statement of Italian patriotism. Villari, writing after wars of Italian unification, 
suggested that the purpose of The Prince “is a question of achieving the unity of his Italian motherland and 
delivering it from foreign rule.” quoted in Laven, ‘Machiavelli, italianita\ p. 365. Later Meinecke
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nevertheless analyse the chapter’s discourse in order to determine whether or not it 
expressed aspirations for an Italian territorial based national identity. Machiavelli was 
certainly not alone in voicing aspirations for a revival of an Italian spirit. In the fifteenth 
century
the Italian view about the position of Italy in Europe was clear and 
simple: there was Italy; and there was the indistinct mass of all other 
nations of Europe which the Italians regarded as culturally inferior. The 
Italians of the Renaissance liked to repeat the classical adage that God -  
or Nature -  had placed the Alps as a protecting wall around Italy. People 
living beyond the Alps were foreigners and it was unnatural for 
oltramontani to interfere in Italian affairs.94
In concluding The Prince with a verse from Petrarch’s Italia Mia, Machiavelli refers his
reader to a long tradition of praise for the Italian spirit. In the fourteenth century
Petrarch’s ideas were picked up by the poets Fazio Degli Uberti and Francesco di
Vanozzo. In the fifteenth century, when foreign influence was less invasive and Italian
politics relatively autonomous, humanists tended to reserve their praise for individual
cities or states, while acknowledging the larger unity within which the individual state
flourished. Florence’s chancellor Coluccio Salutati praised the city because ‘in defending
her own freedom she had “saved liberty in Italy.’”95 The humanists’ accentuation of
Italy’s rich intellectual history increased the feeling of a distinctiveness from the rest of
Europe located somewhere over the Alps.
The discourse of Italian identity was articulated in opposition to that of the
barbarian other. By the time Machiavelli wrote The Prince the theme of the ‘barbarian’
interpreted the chapter as a piece of humanist rhetoric tacked on as an afterthought. Contemporary scholars 
adopt three different positions. Chabod argues that the whole of The Prince was written in small period of 
1513 and was a work of unified conception that lead logically to its conclusion. Sergio Bertelli and Felix 
Gilbert suggest that the last chapter was written at the same time as the final dedication of the work to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici between September 1315 and September 1516, and reflected the plan of Pope Leo X 
to create a new state for a nepote in north-central Italy capable of resisting the French. Finally, Hans Baron 
argues that it was written between January and March 1515 and reflected the brief hope that a coalition 
organised by Leo in February 1515 could resist the French designs on Milan and Lombardy. The coalition 
not only included military commitments from the Swiss, the Spanish and the Emperor, but also gathered 
together nearly all the northwestern Italian states. This period of hope was, however, short-lived for the 
coalition weakened throughout the summer and plans were scuppered by the French victory at Marigiano 
in September 1515. See Hans Baron, ‘The Principe and the Puzzle of the Date of Chapter 26’, Journal of 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 21:1 (Spring 1991), pp. 83-102.
94Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, p. 255.
95See Felix Gilbert, ‘The Concept of Nationalism in Machiavelli’s Prince’, Studies in the 
Renaissance, 1 (1954), pp. 38-48; Salutati is quoted on p. 41.
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was a standard of rhetoric and discourse. In his Ricordi, Guicciardini expressed a desire 
to see “Italia liberata da tutti e’ barbari.”96 By the fourteenth century ‘barbarian’ had 
acquired several meanings: someone who wasn’t a Christian and who therefore lacked 
civilization, a writer of bad Latin, and the ancient sense of one outside of the cultural 
world of Rome.97 From the fourteenth century humanists developed the later meaning to 
distinguish Italy, the home of the Roman church, from the rabies barbarica north of the 
Alps. Salutati’s official correspondence of 1376 ‘identified Florence with Italy, Italy with 
Latinitas and barbarism with the French and English mercenaries.’98 The discourse of 
Italy’s superiority due to its Roman ancestry, continued throughout the fifteenth century, 
as in Flavio Biondo’s histories of medieval Europe. This historical narrative, which 
constantly harked back to the golden days of the Roman Empire, is a powerful subtext 
in Machiavelli’s depiction of the disunity of Italy in The History o f Florence. In this text 
Machiavelli uses the term barbarian to describe and to draw analogies between the 
northern tribes (Cimbri, Visigoths, Vandels, Burgundians, Alans and Franks) who had 
ravaged the Roman Empire between 377-439 and the northern invaders of more recent 
times. The wars between 1434-1494 meant ‘a new road was opened to the barbarians, and 
Italy put herself back into slavery to them.’99
While the discourse of national territorial identity flourished at the level of 
cultural and political aspiration, it rarely functioned as more than a tool of realpolitik in 
the calculations of Italy’s regional princes. Appeals to national interest were usually made 
by princes seeking alliances with other princes when they felt threatened by the alliance 
of other states with a foreign power. For example, Florentine and Papal negotiators used 
the discourse of national identity to appeal to Venice to drop her stance of neutrality after 
Charles VIII’s invasion. The Venetians were informed that “‘a good Italian,” would have 
regard for the “universal danger” and “universal needs of Italy”.’100 The national interest 
was easily appealed to ‘as it was by Naples, by Venice, by Ludovico Moro, by Julius II
96Guicciardini, quoted in fii. 3, p. 168, Machiavelli, II Principe.
97Denys Hay, ‘Italy and Barbarian Europe’ in E.F. Jacobs (ed.), Italian Renaissance Studies 
(London, Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 48-68.
98Hays, ‘Italy and Barbarian Europe’, pp. 57-8.
"Machiavelli, History of Florence in Machiavelli, Chief Works Vol III, at pp. 1034 & 1233.
100Quoted in Gilbert, ‘The Concept of Nationalism’, p. 43.
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-  when their own interest was threatened. ’101 But the national interest almost always came 
second to the interest of the city or principality. The Venetian Doge replied to the Papal 
legate that they would not risk a war with Milan and France and the possibility of ruining 
the state. The discourse of the barbarian which contrasted the cultural richness of Italy 
to backwardness of the uncivilised peoples who threatened them was also more evident 
at the level of rhetoric than as an influence on the practical policies of Italy’s rulers, many 
of whom were prepared to call upon the services of the barbarians if they could assist in 
struggles against local rivals. Most Italian princes and governments were largely 
indifferent to the idea of Italia. The events of 1494 when the Duke of Milan, Ludovico 
Sforza ‘il Moro’, hoping to gain some Venetian territory, encouraged Charles VIII’s 
invasion on the pretext of the Angevin claim to the Kingdom of Naples, illustrated the 
weakness of the claim to Italian identity in the face of the interests of the regional princes. 
However, Machiavelli was disgusted that Ludovico’s personal ambition should have put 
Italy’s interests under threat. His deviousness was the source of ‘the growth of those evil 
seeds that not long after, since no living man could destroy them, devastated -  and are 
still devastating -  Italy.’102
Conclusion
In our discussion of Realism we saw that the idea of the territorial state serves as the 
ground for the resolution of a set of claims about sovereignty, violence and identity in 
modernity. In this chapter I have argued, in support of my thesis that the modem idea of 
the territorial state emerged in the spatial discourses of Renaissance humanism, that 
Italian Renaissance political and historical, text and practice reveals a similar, if perhaps
101Gilbert, ‘The Concept of Nationalism’, p. 44.
102Machiavelli, History of Florence, 6:36, p. 1435. Machiavelli viewed the invasion of Italy as 
a vindication of his argument that Italy had become weakened because her slothful princes had given up 
the pursuit of military virtii in favour of luxury and the arts. They were forced to rely on condottieri whose 
ineffectiveness was demonstrated by the French victory over the forces of the Holy League at the battle of 
Fomovo, July 1495. Laven argues that in chapter xxiv Machiavelli implies that the 1494 invasion and the 
subsequent barbarian yoke are to be welcomed on the basis that ‘Italy had become so corrupt that the old 
system needed to be proved totally rotten so that it might be swept away, and virtii restored.’ Laven, 
‘Machiavelli, italianitcC, p. 364.
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unformed, set of claims about sovereignty, violence and identity and the space occupied 
by lo stato. While it is admitted that the Renaissance articulation of territorial 
sovereignty, violence and identity, in the work of thinkers like Machiavelli, was not as 
visible as it would become in Classical political discourse, there is enough evidence to 
suggest that foundations of the idea of the territorial state were partially established in 
Renaissance political theory and practice. One of the claims I made in the opening 
chapters of the thesis is that the idea of the territorial state can be analysed not just as an 
objective concept in a tradition of political theory, but also as the product and producer 
of discourse associated with the birth and development of the modem culture of abstract 
space. In the next chapter I shall examine how Renaissance cosmological discourse, 
which set about dismantling the hierarchies of various medieval spatial hierarchies, 
established the foundations of the modem territorial order based in vertically structured 
and differentiated sovereign-territorial spaces.
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Dismantling the Hierarchical Cosmos
The previous chapter exposed the foundations of the Realist idea of the modem territorial
state in the political discourses of Renaissance Italy. Machiavelli largely anticipated the
dynamics that would conjoin the idea of the territorial state to modem conceptions of
political identity, sovereignty and violence. An important condition for the modem
discourse of territoriality to flourish is a widespread acceptance that authority is layered
horizontally; that it can be distributed equally among separate units, rather than being
derived from a universal, vertical, hierarchical structure. In the Christian medieval world
the spatial metaphor of hierarchy structured all belief about the order of things. In both
political and cosmological discourses, which were often barely distinguishable,
hierarchies abounded, distinguishing temporal from celestial, mundane from divine,
becoming from being and the City of God from the humana civilitas. In the Renaissance,
however, the hegemony of this order was undermined by several critiques mounted in
various fields of spatial knowledge. Together these challenges re-imagined the spatial
order as being horizontal and homogeneous. This chapter argues that this re-imaging of
space was an important discursive foundation of the modem idea of the territorial state.
Michael Shapiro observes that the implicit ‘separation of the world into kinds of
space is perhaps the most significant kind of practice for establishing the systems of
intelligibility within which understandings of global politics are forged. ’1 Shapiro claims
that Cardinal Richelieu and his foreign emissary Father James, the two protagonists of
Aldous Huxley’s novel Grey Eminence, embody respectively a modem and a medieval
spatial imagination. Father James’ medieval mentality presents the world to him as a
vertical set of spaces, organised into a mundane present and a transcendental eternity.
Richelieu, by contrast, has a modem, horizontal, geopolitical mentality. Huxley’s story
can, therefore, be read as
a chronical (sic) of the waning of the medieval and the waxing of the 
modem spatialization of the world, an effect so powerful that, ever since, 
people pursuing statecraft have been able to subjugate and direct 
ecclesiastical authority on behalf of policy that unfolds within a
Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Textualising Global Politics’ in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro 
(eds), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington MA, 
Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 11-22, at p. 12.
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horizontal, desacralized world. Indeed, much of the subsequent history of 
world politics involves the demise of the authorities connected to a 
vertical world and the ascension of those connected to a horizontal, 
geopolitical one.2
Shapiro correctly observes that the modem spatio-political order is structured horizontally
and consists of equivalent spaces (of course, within each space authority is structured
vertically; perhaps we could best define the modem political spatial regime as the
horizontal ordering of differentiated spaces of vertical authority). This is the landscape
within which the foundations of the idea of the modem sovereign territorial state could
be laid down. However, Shapiro also lends another voice to the Classical dating of the
origins of modem territoriality. Richelieu was the statesman par excellence of the
seventeenth century. I however, want to rejoin the general argument of the thesis that
visibility is not necessarily the moment of foundation. I shall argue that the Medieval
Christian cosmos began to crumble in the face of critiques mounted by various
Renaissance thinkers in the Cinquecento. Rob Walker traces the origins of the European
state system to the Italian High Renaissance, claiming it was attendant on a transition
‘from the hierarchically ordered universe of medieval Christendom to the system of
independent sovereign states that accelerated after the late fifteenth century. ’3 For Walker
this process began in fifteenth century Renaissance Italy:
The modem conception of international relations may be said to have 
begun with the closure of political space in Italy, becoming increasingly 
elaborated throughout Europe after the French invasion of Italy in 1494, 
and attaining its classical legal expression with the Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648 and the Peace of Utrecht of 1713.4
Our claim may initially derive some support from the narrative which identifies 
a novel conception of time in the political discourse of the Renaissance; after all, 
representations of space and time are, as Kern has shown, woven together in a complex 
cultural tapestry.5 J.G.A. Pocock claims that one of Machiavelli’s (many) original 
contributions to political theory was to point out that political communities exist in a
2Shapiro, ‘Textualising Global Politics’, pp. 12-13.
3R.B.J. Walker, ‘Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics’, (World Order 
Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 8, Princeton University, 1980), p. 17.
4R.B.J. Walker, ‘Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics’, p. 18.
5Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press, 1983).
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world dominated by time. In medieval Europe, time was either figured as the cyclical
time of constitutional change, as in Polybius’ cycles, or as eschatological Christian time
in which secular or temporal events were absorbed into the eternal order determined by
divine intention. These temporal frameworks had underpinned medieval conceptions of
political society. Dante, as we shall see, viewed the Holy Roman Empire as an
embodiment of the hierarchy and structure of the eternal order of the cosmos: ‘political
society was envisaged as the existence among men of the hierarchical order existing in
heaven and in nature; its legitimation and its organising categories were alike timeless.’6
For Machiavelli, however, time is a succession of various series of events, physical,
conscious, chemical, legal or military.7 This new understanding of time as a series of
events allowed the humanists Colluccio Salutati and Leonardo Bruni to portray the
Florentine Republic as a secular ideal in itself, distinct from the eternal order. This
freedom, however, came at a price. Once Florence was conceived of as a ‘particular
being’ existing in time rather than in eternity, it became transitory and doomed to
impermanence. This is Pocock’s famous ‘Machiavellian moment’, the ‘moment in
conceptualised time in which the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal
fmitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable in a stream of irrational
events that were destructive of systems of secular stability.’8 The Christian doxy that
asserted that political life played out in the temporal realm is subordinate to and merely
a preparation for the universal kingdom of God was, suggests Walker, undermined by
Machiavelli’s placement of politics in
the world of fleeting impressions, of flux, becoming, and illusions. 
Political reality is ... rescued from its subordination to eternity and 
transcendence. It becomes redefined in terms of time: time as the context 
of political life; temporal images as the source of new vocabularies of 
political thought within a discourse dominated by universals; and maxims 
about how to cope with time, change and illusions as the distillation of 
political knowledge. Even where he appeals to the possibility of fixing 
political life within a spatial form -  lo stato -  it is a spatial form with its
6J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 53.
7Robert Orr, ‘The Time Motif in Machiavelli’ in Martin Fleisher (ed.), Machiavelli and the 
Nature o f Political Thought (New York NY, Atheneum, 1972), pp 185-208, esp. pp. 188-9.
8Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. viii
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own temporal contingency.9
If, for Machiavelli, political life is played out in time then Fortuna takes centre- 
stage. The founders and rulers of political communities were permanently exposed to the 
unpredictable, and often capricious, intervention of this goddess, the realm of ‘pure, 
uncontrolled and unlegitimated contingency.’10 Against such a foe, political leaders must 
cultivate a judicious combination of virtu, instinct and force. Of these, virtii -  the ability 
to anticipate, prepare for and act rationally in the face of contingent events -  is most 
valued. In the principality virtu depended upon the talents and character of the prince, 
while in the Republics it was acquired by the active participation of the citizens in the res 
publica.11 It is possible that Machiavelli’s insistence on the contingency and 
transmutability of politics reflected a widespread feeling among Italians that, ever since 
the 1494 invasion by Charles VIII, Italy’s political fortunes had been determined by 
external historical forces driven by power struggles over the Alps. Under these 
circumstances, concludes Felix Gilbert, ‘it was natural for Machiavelli to draw the 
conclusion that the dimension in which politics worked was history and that every 
political action had to be fitted into the context of historical change.’12
Our interest, however, is less with the temporal than with the spatial setting of 
politics. We are interested in the intellectual processes which began to undermine the 
foundations of the hierarchies of the Christian Medieval order and so established the 
conditions of possibility for the representation of the modem territorial order. The first 
section of this chapter sets the scene by offering a portrait of the medieval cosmos drawn 
upon a canvas framed by Dante Alighieri's two works The Divine Comedy and On
9R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 109. See also R.B.J. Walker, ‘The Prince and “The Pauper”: 
Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of International Relations’ in Der Derian and Shapiro 
(eds), International/Intertextual Relations, pp. 25-48, esp. pp. 35-8.
10Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 156. Both Machiavelli and Guicciardini had aspirations for 
political society that were caught between ‘thought aimed at the constitution and stabilization of civic 
bodies in intimate tension with thought aimed at the rapid and unpredictable change.’ p. 117.
nPocock notes that ‘by the institutionalization of civic virtue, the republic or polis maintains its 
own stability in time and develops the human raw material composing it toward that political life which is 
the end of man. By the exercise of a partly nonmoral virtu, the innovator imposes form on fortuna ... upon 
the sequence of happenings in time disordered by his own act.’ Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 184.
19Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence 
(New York NY, W.W. Norton and Co, 1965), p. 199.
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Monarchy. The second section examines the impact that the re-imagination of man and 
cosmos by the Neo Platonist philosophers Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola had on the hierarchical spatial ontology of the medieval cosmos. In the final 
section I discuss the combined impact of Copernicus’ heliocentric re-ordering of the 
universe and Machiavelli’s terrestialization of political life on the Christian hierarchical 
cosmos and the structures of political authority emanating from it. Renaissance thinkers 
often sought to articulate novel ideas while being confined within traditional categories 
of thought. Nevertheless, the hierarchical order did not remain unchallenged until the 
seventeenth century and the ‘waning of the medieval and the waxing of the modem’ 
spatial order of the world began sometime before Cardinal Richelieu.
Dante’s Universe
Dante’s political cosmology was structured by a hierarchical and vertical order of 
political space, with its apex in God (Fig.l).
God
Civitas Dei
Emperor Pope
Empire Crown 
Humana Civitas
1. Spatial Hierarchies o f Medieval Political Cosmos (Dram  by JL)
In contrast the graphic representation of the modem international state system, comprised 
of differentiated sovereign-territorial states has a horizontal rather than vertical structure 
(Fig. 2). This representation of the modem political cosmos, in which authority is ordered 
horizontally, would not have been recognisable to Dante. Dante’s whole world-view was 
structured by spatial hierarchy. The spaces of the political cosmos were intertwined with 
the spaces of the material cosmos and both were determined by the same spatial 
imaginary, which, to borrow Foucault’s phrase, was underpinned by spatial episteme of
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hierarchy. In this section I want to explore the intimate relationship between political and 
cosmological space in the Christian medieval world as conveyed in Dante’s Divine 
Comedy and On Monarchy}3
Ood
Emperor Crown Pope
Holy Roman Territories State Territory Papal Territory
2. M odern Sover*4gj»-T«-Htori»l Political O rder (Drawn ky JL)
This episteme of hierarchy conditioned the medieval image of the spatial world, 
which by Dante’s time, combined premises of Aristotelian physics with Ptolemaic 
astronomy and Christian theology. Aristotle’s universe was a sphere (the perfect solid 
form), eternal and finite, but was shot through with hierarchy.14 The most fundamental 
hierarchy divides the order of objects, placing the eternal and perfect over and above the 
mutable and imperfect. In the spatial world ‘an unbridgeable gap separates the “above” 
from the “below”, the “higher” heavenly world from the “lower” sublunar world. ’15 In the 
sublunar world nature is imprecise and objects come to be and pass away. By contrast,
13Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans. John Ciardi, (New York NY, W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1970); and Dante Alighieri, Monarchy and Three Political Letters, trans. by D. Nicholl and C. 
Hardie, (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1954).
14On Aristotle’s cosmos see Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance 
Philosophy, trans. Marco Domandi, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963), pp. 174-85; Michael Hoskin (ed.), 
The Cambridge Illustrated History o f  Astronomy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 31 - 
4; and M.A. Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers (London, Allan Wingate, 1956), pp. 75-83. In 
Aristotle’s physics matter had three kinds o f  motion: heavy bodies move in a straight line down to the 
centre o f  the World; light bodies, such as fire, move straight up towards the world’s circumference; and 
the eternal heavenly bodies circulate forever in a circle around the central Earth at rest.
15Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, p. 178. Aristotelian space is also aggregate and topological. 
One all-embracing space contains all particular places. There can be nothing outside o f  the universe, not 
even space or time for they are qualities o f  matter. Space encloses bodies; it is the geometrical line between 
bodies constituted by the boundaries o f  other adjacent bodies. There are no gaps between bodies and so 
all individual places are connected to space as a whole. In this universe there is no empty space. Aristotle 
replaces Plato’s idea o f  chora or space as a massive spatial sphere o f  vast extent in which objects are 
placed but not in any specific places or regions, by place as distinct topos. For Aristotle place is analogous 
to a vessel in that it surrounds and contains the body located within it. Place is unchanging, “the inner 
surface o f  the innermost unmoved container o f  a body”. Aristotle from Physics quoted in Edward S. Casey, 
The Fate o f  Place: A Philosophical History, (Berkeley CA, University o f  California Press, 1997), p. 55.
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in the heavens the celestial bodies are made of imperishable substance or quinta essentia 
and revolve eternally through geometrically perfect cycles: ‘all is changeless, eternal, 
divine. Motion is in circles, space is filled with ether, the heavenly bodies as well as their 
spheres are of an ethereal substance.’16 Within the sublunar world things are ordered 
according to the relative baseness of the elements: at the centre the earth is surrounded 
by water, air, and then fire reaching to moon. In the heavens the spheres simply rotate 
carrying along the stars and planets which have no motion themselves. The movement 
of the planets proves the existence of Essences, eternal and immovable themselves, who 
cause these movements. Above all these is a First Mover, the Primum Movens Immobile 
who is one and eternal and upon whom the whole of heaven and all of Nature depends 
(See Fig. 3).
3. Prime Mover and Geocentric universe, 
Nuremberg Chronicle, late 15thc
The order of the seven planets was established by Ptolemy in the Almagast. This order 
was based on the relative time the planets took to rotate the Earth. Following Eudoxus 
and Aristotle, Ptolemy allocated the fixed stars to the outermost sphere and placed in the 
positions nearest to them those planets, Saturn, Jupiter and Mars, whose motions were 
most similar. The moon, whose motion was the most removed from that of the heavens, 
was placed nearest the earth. The remaining three planets, Sun, Mercury and Venus all 
shared an annual orbit around the earth. So, in accordance with astrological tradition, the 
Sun was assigned to the middle sphere, leaving Mercury and Venus below the Sun.
16Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 82.
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Ptolemy’s final order was Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn and fixed 
stars. Ptolemy also calculated that the radius of the universe was 19,865 times greater 
than that of the earth or about 75 million miles; it was ‘in the work of Ptolemy that the 
universe first became too large for the human mind truly to comprehend.’17
4. Anonymous, Medieval astronomer breaks through sphere o f stars and 
discovers the mechanism o f  the Platonic universe .Woodcut
Christian theologians adapted Aristotle’s physics and the Ptolemaic order to make 
the cosmos equivalent to the description of the heavens in Genesis. The biblical 
‘firmament’ was identified as the eighth sphere of the fixed stars. The ‘waters above the 
firmament’, which were understood to be hard and made of crystal, became the 
crystalline heaven. The heaven created on the first day was the outermost sphere, the 
motionless Empyrean, the ultimate container of the universe and the dwelling place of 
God and the elect. The ultimate source of the motions of the planets and starry skies was 
God, the Prime Mover, who acted directly on the outermost sphere and who assigned to 
each of the other spheres an immaterial spiritual intelligence or angel to move it in a 
uniform circular motion.18
In the Vita Nuova Dante affirms that ‘according to Ptolemy and Christian truth 
there are nine heavens which move.’19 Dante’s universe includes eight Ptolemaic heavens
1?Hoskin, History o f  Astronomy, p. 47. Dante meets both Aristotle and Ptolemy in the First Circle 
o f Hell or Limbo among the Virtuous Pagans whose souls inhabit the Citadel o f Human Reason, the highest 
state man can reach without God. See Canto IV o f The Inferno, Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, pp. 
19-23.
For details, see Hoskin, History o f  Astronomy, p. 78-9.
19My translation of, ‘secondo Tolommeo e secondo la Cristiana verita, nove siano li cieli che si 
muovono.’, quoted in Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, p. 291. See Orr, pp. 289-328, for details o f  
Dante’s cosmology.
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as well as the Crystalline sphere and the Empyrean. In Paradiso Dante and Beatrice
ascend the spheres.
The moon is “la prima stella,” Mercury “il secondo regno”, Venus “il 
terzo del,” the spirits met in the sun are “la quarta famiglia,” Mars is 
“questa quinta soglia,” and “piu levato” than the last heaven, Jupiter is the 
“stella sesta,” Saturn “il settimo splendore.” The starry heaven is alluded 
to as “la spera ottava.” The Primum Mobile is “il cile velocissimo,” “il 
maggior corpo.” The Empyrean, “il ciel ch’ e pura luce,” is called “P 
ultimate spera, ...20
5. Dante’s Universe, Drawn 
for Sapegno Edition
In the Divine Comedy an ontological fault line separates the sublunar world from 
the celestial heavens. In the heaven of Mercury, Beatrice discourses on the mysteries of
20Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, pp. 296-97.
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creation and redemption and affirms that while mens’ souls, the spheres and the angels 
were created directly by God and are thus immortal, the elements and their compounds 
as well as the souls of plants and animals were created through the intermediate 
instruments of the heavenly bodies.21 Dante also arranges the four elements in accordance 
with Aristotle’s hierarchy. At the centre of the universe is the Earth, ‘the bedrock of the 
elemental core’22 -  although, as we can see from the above image, the real centre of 
Dante’s universe is Hell, ‘in the spatial sense the medieval world was literally 
diabolocentric.’23 Above Earth is the sphere of water or the oceans which cover three 
quarters of the world.24 On the Mountain of Purgatory, ‘that soars highest to Heaven from 
the sea’, Dante and Virgil reach the sphere of air devoid of any cold vapours from the sea 
or earth.25 On the top of Mount Purgatory Dante enters the Garden of Eden whose 
bounteous nature is composed by ‘that free air open to heaven and earth’.26 Then, having 
exchanged Virgil for Beatrice, Dante ascends rapidly with her through the sphere of fire 
to the moon, the lowest sphere of the heavens. Beatrice informs him that the heavenly 
bodies are made up of ether, lacking either heaviness or lightness; ‘the round ether’ .27 The 
movement of the spheres is provided by the fervour and adoration of the Angels. In Canto 
xxvii of Paradiso Dante and Beatrice reach the Primum Mobile the sphere ‘that spins 
with it as it goes all of the universe.’28 As in the De Celestia Hierarchia of Dionysius the 
Areopagite there are nine orders of angels and each one is responsible for the movement 
of one sphere.29 All such movement proves the existence of a First Mover of who is 
‘loved, / desired by all creation, sole, eternal / who moves the turning Heavens, Himself
21See Dante, Paradiso, VII, 1.124-41, p. 434.
22Dante, Paradiso, XXIX, 1. 51, p. 573.
23 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 
1964), p. 102.
24See Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, pp 298-305, for a discussion of how medieval 
thinkers dealt with the fact that in many places the earth rises out of and is above the waters.
25Dante, Purgatorio, III, 1. 15, p. 196.
26Dante, Purgatorio, XXXI, 1. 145, p. 375.
27Dante, Paradiso, XXII, 1. 132, p. 531.
28Dante, Paradiso, XXVII, 1. 70, p. 567.
29Beatrice explains the angelic order to Dante in Canto XXVIII of Paradiso. The nine orders of 
the angels are grouped into three trinities: first, Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones; second, Dominations, 
Virtues and Powers; and third Principalities, Archangels and Angels.
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unmoved.’30
The principle of hierarchy that determines the order of space and place in the 
material cosmos also underpins the social and political cosmos. As Ernst Cassirer tells 
us:
In religious life we find the ecclesiastical hierarchy that reaches from the 
Pope as the summit, to the cardinals, the archbishops, the bishops down 
to the lower degrees of the clergy. In the state the highest power is 
concentrated in the Emperor, who delegates this power to his inferiors, 
the princes, the dukes, and all the other vassals. This feudal system is an 
exact image and counterpart of the general hierarchical system; it is an 
expression and a symbol of that universal cosmic order that has been 
established by God and which, therefore, is eternal and immutable.31
Dante’s political cosmos is centred on the person of the Emperor. On the third cornice
of Mount Purgatory, occupied by the souls of the Wrathful, Dante and Virgil meet Marco
Lombardo who is discoursing on the causes of the world’s corruption. According to
Marco, God created man out of an act of love and the purpose of man’s life is to reconcile
himself with God in letizia or eternal bliss. However, because man has a tendency to
pursue earthly goods rather than divine purpose, guides or curbs are required to ‘divert
the soul’s inclination to pursue “small goods” and direct it again towards true Love.’ At
the personal, intellectual and ethical levels these curbs are provided by ‘Reason and Faith,
Philosophy and Theology, Love of Poetry and Love of Woman.’32 At the social level the
main guide is law. But, to give and impose laws requires a supreme authority so, argues
Dante through Marco, the need for the Emperor who because of his position of Eminence
is high above other human beings and able to see the tower of the Civitas Dei and to
guide people to it:
Men, therefore, need restraint by law, and need 
a monarch over them who sees at least 
the towers of The True City.. .33
In Dante’s spatial imagination the hierarchies of the cosmos not only mirror but 
are of the same order as the structure of political authority which is invested in the
30Dante, Paradiso, XXIV, 1. 130-2, p. 544.
31Emst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1946), p. 132.
32Piero Boitani, ‘From Darkness to Light: Governance and Government in Purgatorio XVI’ in 
John Woodhouse (ed.), Dante and Governance (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 12-26, at p. 21.
33Dante, Purgatorio, XVI, 1. 94-6, p. 279.
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Emperor by God.
The Empire ‘tends’ towards the city of God, where the soul shall return 
in perfect joy if its use of free will has deserved it and if laws are 
implemented. Governance o f the soul and government o f the kingdom are 
inextricably tied together.... Dante knows the world, il mondo. But he is 
interested in seeing how it relates to a higher world, il cielo.34
The world-city of the Empire on Earth and the world-city in Heaven or Empyrean are, for
Dante, linked by resemblance. ‘Empire’ and ‘Empyrean’ are, points out Donna Mancusi-
Ungaro practically interchangeable; the ‘two sides of one coin -  the ideal polis for
mankind reflects and is reflected in God’s eternal empire.’35 In the celestial kingdom the
citizens enjoy the everlasting peace which is the paragon of right political order sought
by Dante on earth. Dante, however, never forgets that the world of the Empyrean is of a
higher order and is the “sovereign edifice of the world, in which all the world is
enclosed.”36
The reason why the Humana Civilitas has not been realised on earth is because 
of Papal interference in temporal affairs. Voicing an anti-Papalism that was to resurface 
with Machiavelli, Dante complains that the Papacy, which should be providing spiritual 
guidance, is itself devouring earthly riches and setting a bad example, ‘ [t]he bad state of 
the modem world is due ... to bad leadership.’37 In Canto XXX, Beatrice proclaims 
before the entire court of heaven that the plans of Emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg to 
introduce order in Italy were sabotaged by the devious policies of the ‘prefect of the holy 
court’ Clement V -  whom Dante condemns to the eighth circle of Inferno.38 Papal 
nefariousness has corrupted Italy to such a degree that it now bears little resemblance to 
the good society achieved under ancient Rome:
34Boitani, ‘From Darkness to Light’, p. 22.
35Donna Mancusi-Ungaro, Dante and the Empire (New York NY, Peter Lang, 1987). Ungaro 
points out that Dante accepts Aristotle’s belief that civilization can only be achieved in the polis, but 
enlarges the scale arguing that humana civilitas requires a world city modelled on the Roman Imperium. 
The image of the city is basic to his political philosophy, ‘[t]he earthly city and the heavenly city are as 
parallel for Dante as the themes in the Monorchia and the Commedia. Humana civilitas -  the perfect 
flourishing of human civilisation -  in the Monarchia is in fact the groundwork for the ideal community of 
souls in Paradise.’ p. 54.
36Dante in the Epistola, quoted by Orr, Dante and the Early Astronomers, fh. 3, p. 297.
37Dante, Purgatorio, XVI, 1. 103-4, p. 179.
38Dante, Paradiso, XXX, 1. 130-50, p. 581.
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Rome use to shine in two suns when her rod 
made the world good, and each showed her its way: 
one to the ordered world, and one to God.
Now one declining sun puts out the other.
The sword and crook are one, and only evil 
can follow from them when they are together39
Dante yearns for a world in which the two suns, the emperor and the pope, co­
exist as two equal lights illuminating respectively the complementary ways of the world 
and of God. In the above quoted passage Dante alludes to and reworks Pope Innocent 
Ill’s 1198 depiction of papal authority as represented by the light of the sun and imperial 
authority by that of the moon; the implication being that as the moon receives its light 
from the sun, so the Emperor receives his authority from the pope. In De Monarchia 
Dante argues that while the moon’s light comes from the sun it does not follow that its 
existence, powers or operation depend on the sun; ‘[similarly ... temporal government 
does not owe its existence to the spiritual government, nor its power (which constitutes 
its authority), nor even its operation as such.’40 If the Emperor’s authority ‘does not 
depend upon the vicar of God, then he must depend upon God himself.’41 For Dante, ‘the 
temporal Monarch receives his authority directly and without intermediary from the 
Source of all authority.’42 Dante also rejects the claim in Boniface VIII’s 1302 bull Unam 
sanctam that “both the spiritual and the material swords are in the hands of the Church.”43 
In Dante’s hierarchy the Pope is not above the Emperor, but in a different sphere entirely. 
The Emperor’s authority to rule the world comes directly through God and is not 
mediated by papal jurisdiction. For Dante, ‘government belonged only to the emperor and 
to the subordinate officials authorised by him. The emperor should rule the humana 
civilitas. The pope should point men to the polis that was Paradise.’44 Man has two goals,
39Dante, Purgatorio, XVI, 1. 106-111 p. 280.
40Dante, Monarchy, III, p. 71.
41Dante, Monarchy, III p. 91.
42Dante, Monarchy, III, p. 94.
43Quoted in Boitani, ‘From Darkness to Light’, p. 23. In the Canto, Dante replaces the sword of 
spiritual power with a crook signifying the Good Shepherd, the ancient symbol of peace and charity. In 
joining this with the sword he creates an impossible oxymoron, thereby exposing the impossibility of Papal 
aspiration for coterminous spiritual and temporal power.
^See Charles Till Davis, ‘Dante and the Empire’ in Rachel JacofF (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Dante (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 67-79, at p. 68.
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‘the first is happiness in this life, which consists in the exercise of his own powers and 
is typified by the earthly paradise; the second is the happiness of eternal life, which 
consists in the enjoyment of the divine countenance ... and is typified by the heavenly 
paradise.’45 To achieve these two different goals man requires two distinct and separate 
guides, ‘there is the Supreme Pontiff who is to lead mankind to eternal life in accordance 
with revelation; and there is the Emperor who, in accordance with philosophical teaching, 
is to lead mankind to temporal happiness.’46
I have tried to demonstrate, by means of a reading of Dante, that the entire 
universe of medieval man, material and political, was structured in terms of hierarchically 
ordered spaces. In the medieval imaginary the material and political were not regarded 
as separate realms of existence but were expressions of the same order of things: the God 
who sets the planet in motion is the same God from whom the Emperor’s political 
authority stems; things are eternal and perfect in both the material Empyrean and the 
constitution of the Civitas Dei, while in the lower world things are mutable and decay and 
the political system in corrupt and decadent. In the next two sections I want to explore 
how this intricate set of dependencies begins to unravel in the Renaissance, so paving the 
way for the modem order of political territory underpinned by the spatial principle of 
horizontal differentiation.
Individual and Cosmos in Ficino and Pico
In chapter two we considered Ashley and Walker’s argument that the Cartesian practice 
of spatialization, which in modernity marks out the spaces of territorial sovereignty from 
those of difference and anarchy, is one manifestation of the widespread principle of 
sovereign identity that dictates the inside/outside divisions of modem culture. In this 
section I want to argue that the principle of sovereign identity was anticipated in the 
Neoplatonist and Humanist re-evaluations of man’s nature and place in the cosmos in 
Renaissance philosophy. In particular I shall suggest that the Renaissance discourse on 
the ‘dignity of man’, as developed in the work of Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della
45Dante, Monarchy, III, p. 92.
46Dante, Monarchy, III, p. 93.
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Mirandola, had two consequences for the re-imagination of man’s being in space as the 
medieval hierarchical order collapsed into the modem vertical order of territoriality.47 
First, the discourse of the dignity of man released man from the hierarchies of the 
medieval universe and so removed the pivotal foundation upon which the hierarchical 
universe was constructed. Second, by asserting man’s capacity for self-fashioning, this 
discourse affirmed man’s capacity to shape and order the world around him including its 
spaces, rather than being shaped and ordered by them. Both philosophers contributed to 
the legitimation of the principle of sovereign identity. Ficino because he viewed man’s 
divinity ‘as an image of God, and of God himself through this human image’, while Pico 
asserted the dignity of man on the basis that man was not created as a fixed part of the 
universe but was free to participate in the universe when and how he wanted.48 The 
dignity of man is the first sign of the sovereign identity that underpinned the Cartesian 
practice of space that inscribes the territorial spaces of modernity.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that because Ficino and Pico could only 
build their philosophical systems using the existing categories of Christian scholasticism 
and Neoplatonism their work is best thought of as a threshold between ‘il passato antico 
e medioevale e il futuro modemo ... vale la frase di Leibniz: charge dupasse et gros de 
I ’avenir,’49 This reflected, suggests Peter Burke, a widespread prevalence of the imagery 
and poetry of the medieval cosmos in Renaissance art and culture. Most sixteenth century 
Italians shared Dante’s view of the cosmos as divided between a higher and a lower 
world; the mental universe of Renaissance Italians was ‘like that of their medieval 
ancestors, animate rather than mechanical, moralized rather than neutral and organized
47My focus on Ficino and Pico’s philosophical systems is necessarily limited to their cosmologies. 
Good general introductions to their work are Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance 
Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), esp. ch. 3; and Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and 
Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, Vol II (Notre Dame, Notre Dame Press, 
1970), esp. chs ix & x.
48Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, p. 465.
49Eusebio Colomer, ‘Individuo e Cosmo in Nicolo Cusano e Giovanni Pico’ in L ’opera e il 
pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell’ umanesimo (Firenze, Istituto Nazionale di 
Studi sul Rinascimento, MCMLXV), pp. 53-102, at p. 102. Copenhaver and Schmitt suggest that Ficino’s 
Platonic Theology is ‘as much patristic and scholastic as classical, depending not only on Plato, Plotinus 
and Proclus but also on Augustine and Aquinus’, Renaissance Philosophy, p. 149.
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in terms of correspondences rather than causes.’50 J. Hale agrees that the traditional view 
of the universe retained much heuristic value because it continued to provide an 
intelligible ‘ready-reference system for the allocation by category of every phenomenon 
to its place in the scheme of things.’51 The widespread acceptance of this mental universe 
ensured that novel theories of the universe were resisted by much of the educated elite 
and remained unknown to the mass of the population. By and large, concludes Arthur 
Lovejoy, ‘[t]he men of the fifteenth century still lived in a walled universe as well as in 
walled towns.’52
Ficino’s image of the cosmos would therefore have been recognisable to Dante.
It was a closed system of hierarchically ordered spheres in which each being has its place
and degree of perfection. God, residing at the summit, presided over a descending
hierarchy of orders: angels and souls; celestial and elementary spheres; then animal, plant
and mineral species; and finally shapeless prime matter.
Above the four elements which are moved according to substance and 
quality are the seven heavens of the planets. They are not moved by 
substance but in a certain manner by a kind of quality or, as it were, 
disposition. Since the movements of these planets is erratic, an eighth 
heaven, whose motion is more regular, is set over them. But this heaven 
has two motions, namely one from the East to West and another in the 
opposite direction. It has two qualities also, namely brilliance and 
splendour. For that reason, the crystalline sphere whose one motion is 
from the East [to the West] and has a single quality, brilliance, is 
ascendant over it. But since position is superior to motion and since what 
gives light is superior to light, therefore one ascends to the Empyrean 
which is entirely stable and shining throughout. The Empyrean is rightly 
related to the stability and light of the Trinity, and the nine other heavens
50Peter Burke, The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1986), p. 201. In Botticelli’s Primavera, for example, the space between the earth and moon is inhabited 
by nymphs, woodspirits and demons. Burke points out that although there were intimations of an emergent 
mechanical worldview in Renaissance sciences, the organic model was the norm until the seventeenth 
century. Alberti’s idea that a building is ‘like an animal’ or Donato Gianotti’s understanding that ‘[e]very 
republic is like a natural body’ were more typical than Leonardo’s view that ‘the bird is an instrument 
operating by mathematical law’. Even Machiavelli, whose notion of lo stato is not conceived of in terms 
of an organic analogy, saw political disorder as something that could be diagnosed in the manner of a 
physician. See pp. 200-3.
51John Hale, The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance (London, Harper Collins, 1993), p. 
562. The traditional cosmos was not only regular and harmonious, but ‘winningly participatory, a cosmos 
of leakings from above, of sympathetic reactions across space, of correspondences between man and 
universe which linked a war with a comet, a syphilitic infection with the conjunction of virile Mars with 
Saturn, for whom heated pleasure was an anathema.’, p. 562.
52Lovejoy, Great Chain, p. 101.
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to the nine orders of angels. Indeed, they are disposed in a manner 
consistent with Dionysius the Areopagite; three hierarchies of divine 
spirits, each of which contains three orders.53
Underpinning Ficino’s cosmological hierarchy is a Neoplatonist conception of the
structure of being as a continual hierarchy obtaining through the principle of division,
‘[t]his hierarchical order constitutes ... an ontological space that embraces all corporeal
and incorporeal elements alike and in which all things have a definite relationship of
proximity to each other.’54 Within the sphere of Being an object has a rank that
determines its ontological proximity to other things. The rank determines its relative
dignity or perfection and hence its essence. Ficino conceives of the totality of things as
an ascending, or descending, sequence of grades. At the summit is ‘divine sun’ and
‘angelic mind’, then comes rational soul, in the middle position, below it are the ‘active
quality’ that gives form to matter and, finally, at the bottom the ‘dull mass of bodies’.55
In the Heptaplus Pico’s adds a cabalistic dimension to Ficino’s Neoplatonic
hierarchy of being.56 Pico’s cosmos consists of three worlds: the elemental world of
nature, the celestial world of the planets, and the angelic world of the intelligences,
arranged in an ascending order illustrating a clear value hierarchy:
In the first world, God, the primal unity, presides over the nine orders of 
angels as if over many spheres and, without moving, moves all toward 
himself. In the middle world, that is, the celestial, the empyrean heaven 
likewise presides like the commander of an army over nine heavenly 
spheres, each of which revolves with an unceasing motion; yet in 
imitation of God, it is itself unmoving. There are also in the elemental 
world, after the prime matter which is its foundation, nine spheres of 
corruptible forms.57
53Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia (Basel 1576) 1:19, quoted in Pauline Moffit Watts, ‘Pseudo- 
Dionysius the Areopagite and Three Renaissance Neoplatonists: Cusanus, Ficino and Pico on Mind and 
Cosmos’ in James Hankins, John Monfasani and Frederick Purnell Jr (eds), Supplementum Festivum: 
Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller (Binghampton NY, Centre for Medieval and Early Renaissance 
Studies, 1987), pp. 279-98, at p. 294.
54Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. V. Conant, (New York NY, 
Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 74-5.
55See, Kristeller, Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, pp. 104-9, for details of Ficino’s hierarchy of
being.
56Pico’s philosophy was more eclectic and syncretic than Ficino’s sacralized Platonism. It was not 
only influenced by Neoplatonism but also included Aristotelian and Averroist elements as well as Hebraic 
Cabbalism.
57G. Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, trans. D. Carmichael (New York NY, 1965), p. 78, quoted 
in Watts, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’, p. 290.
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However, Pico also mentions a fourth world, that of man, which contains all things that 
are found in the other worlds.
Ficino and Pico’s representation of the hierarchy of being and the structure of the 
cosmos had epistemological consequences. Foucault describes the Renaissance episteme 
as ‘the prose of the world’ in which words and things are united in a seamless web of 
resemblances.58 Four resemblances or similitudes relates things to each other. First, 
convenientia brings ‘like things together and makes adjacent things similar, [so] the 
world is linked together like a chain.’59 Second, through aemulatio objects separated in 
space come to imitate one another -  for example, the sky resembles the face with its two 
eyes the earth and sun -  and so ‘by duplicating itself in a mirror the world abolishes the 
distance proper to it; in this way it overcomes the place allotted to each thing.’60 Through 
analogy all figures in the universe are brought together to one point, i.e. man, who, 
‘saturated with analogies’, is the ‘the great fulcrum of proportions; the center upon which 
relations are concentrated and from which they are once again reflected.’61 Finally, 
sympathy draws all things together into the homogeneous identity of the ‘ Same’ -  a drive 
always countered by antipathy which reinforces difference. The cognitive idiom of the 
Renaissance episteme was signature. God had inscribed everything with a mark or 
signature to illustrate their mutual resemblance. Thus, knowledge is acquired through a 
‘hermeneutics of resemblances’ and a ‘semiology of signatures’ which interpret the 
‘nature of things, their coexistence, the way in which they are linked together and 
communicate’ through the chain of resemblance that is ‘visible only in the network of 
signs that crosses the world from one end to the other.’62 The Renaissance episteme 
influenced Ficino and Pico. Ficino’s theory of knowledge as adaequatio assumed a 
correspondence between the knowing mind and the object of its knowledge and reflected 
a conception of the universe as a hierarchically ordered sympatheia:
As long as the intellect is only potentially prepared to know, it is not yet
united with the object potentially to be known; but when it is actually
58Foucault’s description of the Renaissance episteme is in Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: 
An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (London, Routledge, 1974), pp. 17-45.
59Foucault, Order of Things, p. 19.
60Foucault, Order of Things, p. 19.
61Foucault, Order of Things, p. 23.
62Foucault, Order of Things, p. 29.
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knowing, it is united with it.. .since the form of that object is inherent in 
the m ind.... Thus the knowing mind and the thing known becomes one, 
since the form of that thing, as such, molds the mind.63
Pico’s universe was also an emanative sympatheia: “whatever is in any of the worlds is
at the same time contained in each, and there is not one of them in which is not to be
found whatever is in each of the others.”64 The allegorical principle ‘everything is in
everything’ is the basis of all knowledge. For Pico, “[b]ound by the chains of concord,
all these worlds exchange nature as well as names with mutual liberality.”65
It may be remarked at this stage that Ficino and Pico seem to offer little by way
of a critique of the medieval hierarchical cosmos. So far so charge du passe. Nevertheless
both philosophers do, by means of a re-evaluation of man’s being in the cosmos, offer the
first signs of the principle of sovereign identity. In this sense their work is gros de
I ’avenir. In the medieval cosmos the standard order of things was established by Plotinus’
model of six hypostases: One, Mind, Soul, Sensation, Nature and Body. In the Theologia
Platonica Ficino profers a new typology consisting of five grades of substances in the
universe: God, Angel, Soul, Quality and Body. Although the upper part of Ficino’s
hierarchy reproduces that of Plotinus, by placing the soul at the centre of a symmetrical
hierarchy of ontological order, Ficino guarantees its dissolubility and immortality; if the
soul perishes the whole hierarchy dissolves. Paul Kristeller points out that in assigning
‘the privileged place in its centre to the human soul ... [Ficino gives] ... a kind of
metaphysical setting and sanction to the doctrine of the dignity of man.’66 The soul is the
absolute median which connects the extremes of the world and confirms the inner unity
of Being. It is the mean of all God’s creations; situated between and having attributes of
both higher and lower beings. Plato argued in the Symposium that love is an active force
that binds all things together. For Ficino the human soul extends its thought and love to
all things from the highest to the lowest:
63Ficino quoted in Watts, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’, p. 296.
64Pico, Heptaplus p. 77, quoted in Watts, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’, p 290-1.
65Pico, Heptaplus, pp. 78-9, quoted in R. Waddington, ‘The Sun at the Centre: Structure as 
Meaning in Pico della Mirandola’s Heptaplus’, Journal o f Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 3 (1973), 
pp. 69-86, at p. 83.
66Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford CA, Stanford 
University Press, 1964), p. 43.
136
the Soul is all things together. It possesses the images of the divine things 
on which it depends itself and the concepts and originals of the lower 
things which in a certain sense it produces itself. And since it is the centre 
of all things, it has the forces of all. Hence, it passes into all things. And 
since it is the true connection of things, it goes to the one without leaving 
the others. It goes into an individual thing and always deals with all. 
Therefore it may be rightly called the center of nature, the middle term of 
all things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and juncture of 
the universe.67
Ficino’s conception of the soul is, for Charles Trinkaus, the most radical
statement of human autonomy in the Renaissance.68 Man signified as rational soul is the
mean between eternal and temporal and between divine and nature, and is the only agent
with the primacy of movement between the corporeal and divine realms. Man has a
unique status in the universe for his soul “is not compelled by the divine, from whose
providence it is free from the start, nor is it coerced by anything natural over which it
widely rules”.69 Unlike other animate creatures which are forced to act in compliance
with the rules of nature, the human soul is able to exercise free will through the
application of intellect. Man’s actions are -  like those of God who created man in his
own likeness -  not determined by nature, but by the purpose of his own will. Man acts
freely and on nature rather than according to nature and as such is capable of ordering
rather than being ordered by time and space. Furthermore, intellect provides man with
relative autonomy from the influence of the heavens; the soul’s direct relationship to God
elevates man above the heavens.
The form of the heavens is corporeal, singular, local and temporal. The 
form by which the mind intellects is incorporeal, universal and absolute. 
Therefore this is not bom from the heavens. Moreover, since the intellect 
does not receive its own action or the principle of its action from heaven, 
it is not subject to a heavenly body, especially because our mind 
according that power by which it is joined to things which are said to be 
above the heavens, is not only not subject to the heavens but also is above
67Ficino, quoted in Kristeller, Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p. 120. Kristeller provides a much 
more in-depth discussion of the soul, love and the principle of affinity in Ficino’s work than can be entered 
into here.
68Charles Trinkaus, ‘Marsilio Ficino and the Idea of Human Autonomy’ in G. Garfagnini (ed.), 
Marsilio Ficino e ilritorno diPlatone: Studie documenti (Firenze, Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1986), pp. 197- 
210.
69Ficino, Disputatio contra indicium astrologorum, quoted in Trinkaus, ‘Human Autonomy’, p.
201.
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them.70
Man’s autonomy gives him the exclusive use of the industrial, civil and liberal arts, and 
science:
For, as though a participant of providence on the model of divine 
governance the soul rules itself, the home, the city, the arts, and the 
animals. ... the power of man, therefore, is very similar to that of the 
divine nature, seeing that man by himself, that is through his own decision 
and art, rules himself without being in the least limited by his physical 
nature, and imitates individual works of the higher nature.71
Pico takes another step towards dismantling the hierarchies of the spatial order
of things and establishing the principle of sovereign identity in his Oration on the Dignity
o f Man?2 Pico agrees with the humanist view that man is the most wonderful and
fortunate of creatures, but does not think that the reasons put forward -  man is an
intermediary between creatures, the intimate of the gods, the king of lower beings, or the
being with the most developed senses, intellect or use of reason -  explain why man is so
worthy of admiration and occupies an enviable rank in the universal chain of being. The
dignity of man is a consequence of the desire of the ‘supreme Architect’, once he had
created the world, for a being to appreciate and contemplate his creation:73
He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature, and 
assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: 
“Neither a fixed abode not a form that is thine alone nor any function 
peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according 
to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and 
possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt 
desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the 
bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in 
accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, 
shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the 
world’s centre that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever 
is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither 
mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honour, as 
though the maker and moulder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in
?0Ficino, Theologica Platonica II, p. 24, quoted in Trinkaus, ‘Human Autonomy’, p. 204.
71Ficino, Theologica Platonica II, pp. 209 & 224, quoted in Trinkaus, ‘Human Autonomy’, pp.
206 & 7.
72Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,‘Oration on the Dignity of Man’ in Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar 
Kristeller and J.H. Randall Jr (eds), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man: Selections in Translation 
(Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 223-54.
73Pico, ‘Oration’, p. 224.
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whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate 
into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, 
out of thy soul’s judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are 
divine.”74
There can be few more emphatic declarations of the principle of sovereign identity than
Pico’s Oration. Man is not only his own maker, capable of fashioning himself as he
desires, but he also occupies a place at the centre of the world, from where he can observe
it all. Of particular note is the fact that Pico’s declaration of the dignity of man is a
statement of the principle of sovereign identity expressed in the vocabularies of
modernity’s ocularcentric discourse. Pico’s man endorses the principle of sovereign
identity that for Walker, to quote him again, seeks to ‘fix a point of identity -  a
universality in space and time against which all differences in space and time can be
measured, judged and put in their place.’75 For Pico man is not simply the microcosm of
the universe, a mixtum compositum of the world, but he also remains different from the
world and so has a privileged position in relation to the natural and spiritual worlds:
‘unlike any other creature, he owes his moral character to himself. He is what he makes
of himself...’76 Man has all the elements of the universe at his service: elements and
beasts below and angels and celestial souls above:
It is a truly divine possession of all these natures at the same time flowing 
into one, so that it pleases us to exclaim with Hermes, “A great miracle,
O Asclepius, is man.” The human condition can especially be glorified for 
this reason, through which it happens that no created substance disdains 
to serve him. To him the earth and the elements, to him the animals are 
ready for service, for him the heavens fight, for him the angelic minds 
procure safety and goodness.77
Because man is not enclosed within the limits of a determinate being, he is raised above
74Pico, ‘Oration’, pp. 224-5.
7SR. B. J. Walker, ‘Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of 
Contemporary Political Practice’ in R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), Contending 
Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community (Boulder CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990), pp. 159- 
85, at p. 175.
7 Ernst Cassirer, ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas’ 
in Paul Oskar Kristeller and Philip P. Wiener (eds), Renaissance Essays From the Journal of the History 
of Ideas, (New York NY, Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 11-60, at p. 34. Foucault points out that in the 
Renaissance episteme the dominant spatial metaphor was that of microcosm and macrocosm, which 
simultaneously differentiates between and unites the spaces of different realities; so that ‘[njature, like the 
interplay of signs and resemblances, is closed in upon itself in conformity with the duplicated form of the 
cosmos.’ Foucault, Order of Things, p. 31.
77Pico, Heptaplus, quoted in Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, p. 519.
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even those beings that stand higher than him in the hierarchical order. The angels and
heavenly intelligences have their nature and perfection impressed upon them at creation,
while the lives of the natural animate beings are determined by instinct. Man is the only
being that can achieve perfection through his own actions and intellect. Man’s distinctive
privilege is thus the ‘almost unlimited power ofself-transformation at his disposal. Man
is that being to whom no particular form has been prescribed and assigned. He possesses
the power of entering into any form whatever.’78
In this section we have identified in the work Ficino and Pico signs of the
intellectual deconstruction of the medieval hierarchical cosmos. Both philosophers assert
the dignity of man and so remove him from his fixed and low position in the hierarchy
of being. Man becomes the fulcrum of the universe and is able to move up and down its
hierarchies as he wishes. Man is no longer under the influence of the heavens and is able
to manipulate and control nature, especially space and time, for his own ends, rather than
being shaped and constrained by them. They re-imagine of man as the prototype of an
identical sovereign presence which would provide the epistemic figure for the
demarcation of territorial space through Cartesian practice. Kristeller concludes that
Ficino and Pico played a ‘modest part’ in the disintegration of the hierarchies of the
medieval cosmos. Ficino offers a dynamic conception of the universe which ‘transcends
the limits of the traditional notion of hierarchy’ .79 Pico goes even further. He elevates the
chameleon-like status of man to the highest order and overturns the hierarchical premise
of Aristotelian metaphysics that the highest value is in the immutable and eternal. He also
questions the Christian world-view which sets the goal of all human activity in eternity
and which regards the temporal aspirations of man as mere vanity. With Pico
man is no longer a definite element in the hierarchical series, not even its 
privileged centre: he is entirely detached from the hierarchy and can move 
upward and downward according to his free will. Thus the hierarchy is no 
longer all inclusive, while man, because of his possession of freedom, 
seems to be set entirely apart from the order of objective reality.80
Here is the principle of sovereign identity that proclaims man’s distance from an
78Cassirer, ‘Giovanni Pico’, p. 45.
7QPaul Oskar Kristeller, ‘Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe’ in 
Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts (Princeton'NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964),pp. 102-10, 
at p. 109
80Kristeller, ‘Ficino and Pomponazzi’, pp. 109-10.
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objective reality which he is predisposed to order.
The End of Hierarchy for Space and Politics
In the discussion of Dante’s universe it was pointed out that the material and political
cosmos were interwoven, both being determined by the epistemic figure of hierarchy. In
this section I want to follow up Ernst Cassirer’s claim in The Myth o f the State that
between 1400 and 1600 in both political and astronomical discourse ‘one breach after
another is made in the hierarchical system’, which, although not levelled overnight,
gradually began to fade away.81 Copernicus’ astronomical system replaced the
Aristotelian distinction between higher and lower worlds with an assumption that all
movement, whether of the earth or the celestial bodies, obeys the same universal rules.
In Copernicus’ system, according to Giordano Bruno, ‘the world is an infinite whole,
pervaded and animated by the same infinite divine spirit. There are no privileged points
in the universe, no “above” or “below”.’82 Parallel breaches occurred in the political
sphere as the feudal order began to crumble and embryonic states created by individuals,
appeared. Cassirer suggests that Machiavelli’s Prince captures a new centre of gravity in
the political world that had little concern for the established structures of the Papal and
Imperial order. The erasure of hierarchies in Renaissance cosmology and Renaissance
political discourse is identical.
In both cases the difference between the “lower” and the “higher” world 
vanishes. The same principles and natural laws hold for the “world 
below” and the “world above”. Things are on the same level both in the 
physical and in the political order.83
Elsewhere, Cassirer notes that Pico’s discourse of the dignity of man applied the 
principles underlying the new conceptions of space developed by Cardinal Nicholas of 
Cusa to history. As Cusa relativized the centre of the universe and collapsed the division 
between higher and lower orders of being, so Pico claimed that any point in time could 
be taken as a centre. The dignity or freedom of man arises when the fixed temporal
81Emst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1946), p. 132.
82Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 133.
83Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 136.
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distinctions between past, present and future are dissolved or unified in a single vision; 
it is revealed in such a ‘seeing together’.84 Although he was not an Italian, ‘the 
disintegration of the old idea of hierarchy, took place most definitely in Nicholas of 
Cusa,’ and we cannot really understand the transition in the Renaissance from a 
hierarchical universe to a horizontal universe of equivalent spaces without some 
consideration of his cosmology.85
The point of Cusa’s famous work, De docta ignorantia of 1440 was not to 
develop a new cosmology -  which arose as a by-product -  but to demonstrate that 
because it is impossible to know the physical and quantitative world -  docta ignorantia 
meaning that which ‘consists in knowing that we do not know’ -  we may as well give up 
trying to conceive of the world and concentrate on God.86 Cusa applied the ‘principle of 
plenitude’ to the size of the universe and to the possibility of life in other places. If God’s 
creative power was infinite then its ‘manifestation should therefore be infinite’ and 
everywhere there was matter there could be life. His arguments challenged Christian 
cosmology on two counts: first, the possibility that the universe contained other inhabited 
worlds challenged the importance of human and terrestrial life; second, the physical 
universe was no longer imagined as being heliocentric with a conceivable shape but 
acentric and composed of a large number of unevenly distributed, isolated systems. De 
docta ignorantia challenged the Aristotelian system in three ways. First, Cusa relativised 
the fixed and absolute nature of place and movement. He argued that in order to know 
the objective measure of the universe, fixed and immutable points from which to take 
measurements must be established. Such points are not, as Aristotle claims, prescribed 
by the objective nature of thing and absolute, but hypothetical and ideal, posited by the 
free mind.87 Second, Cusa rejected the hierarchical structure of the universe and the 
earth’s lowly position within it. Since all things change and motion is inherent in all finite 
things, so the idea of a natural centre looses all meaning. Since only a being in state of 
absolute rest, or God, can constitute a natural centre, only God, who remains equally
84Cassirer, ‘Giovanni Pico’, pp. 37-8.
85Kristeller, ‘Ficino and Pomponazzi’, p. 109.
86For details of Cusa’s cosmology see Lovejoy, Great Chain, pp. 108-16; and Alexandre Koyr6, 
From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (New York NY, Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 5-23.
R7See Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, pp. 176-7.
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close to all points in the universe, can constitute it. Finally, the idea of the ‘closed world’ 
collapses: because since time and space exist only in terms of this moving universe, 
nothing can limit it from the outside and the cosmos must be a least privatively infinite. 
Cusanus’ universe is one of indefinite if not infinite extension (infinity was still 
considered to be an exclusive attribute of God). It is a ‘sphere of which the center is 
everywhere, and the circumference nowhere’. Cusa surmised that the world could have 
no circumference
for if it had a centre and a circumference there would be some space and 
some thing beyond the world, suppositions which are wholly lacking in 
truth. Since, therefore, it is impossible that the world should be enclosed 
within a corporeal centre and a corporeal boundary, it is not within our 
power to understand the world, whose centre and circumference are God.
And though this world cannot be infinite, nevertheless it cannot be 
conceived as finite, since there are no limits within which it could be 
confined. The earth, therefore, which cannot be the centre, cannot be 
wholly without motion.... And just as the world has no centre, so neither 
the sphere of the fixed stars nor any other is its circumference.’88
However, for Cassirer, the real revolution in the conceptualisation of the cosmos
comes not with Cusa but with Copernicus. Copernicus’ description of the heliocentric
universe in De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium was published in 1543.89 Book One
was a treatise on the cosmos designed to demonstrate from the proposition that earth
moves around the sun that the planets would form a coherent integrated system. In Book
Two, Copernicus justified this claim by proving that adequate planetary tables could be
calculated from geometrical models with the sun at their center. For some historians of
science the case for the Copemican revolution is overstated. Bertrand Russell argues that
‘the atmosphere of Copernicus’s work is not modem; it might rather be described as
Pythagorean.’90 Lovejoy agrees with Russell that Copernicus’ thought remained
constrained within traditional categories. Although Copernicus challenged details of the
historical orthodoxy of Christian theology, his system did not imply the deconstruction
o o
Cusanus quoted in Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, pp. 112-3.
89The first ten chapters of Book One of Nicholas Copernicus, De revolutionibus orbium 
coelestium are reprinted in Michael J. Crowe, Theories of the World from Antiquity to the Copemican 
Revolution (New York NY, Dover Publications Inc., 1990), pp. 102-34. For discussions of Copernicus’ 
system see Crowe, pp. 85-102; Hoskin, History of Astronomy, pp. 90-7; and Koyr6, Closed World, pp. 28- 
33.
90Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London, Unwin Paperbacks, 1979), p. 513.
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of the medieval cosmos: ‘[f]or Copernicus the solar system and the universe remained
identical; his world, though not geocentric, was still centred, still spherical in shape, still
securely walled in by the outermost sphere’.91
Certainly traditional premises influenced Copernicus’ thought.92 Indeed it was
from these traditional premises that Copernicus was able to undermine Ptolemy’s
geocentric system. First, Copernicus accepted the established view of the earth as a
sphere having the rotational motion appropriate to its form. Hence the apparent rising and
setting of sun, moon, stars and planets could, he suggested, be accounted for by the
earth’s daily rotation. Second, Copernicus accepted the Aristotelian premise that the
movement of the eternal heavenly bodies in a symmetrical and harmonious universe must
be circular and uniform. From this he surmised that because their movement, as viewed
from the earth, was non-uniform and irregular the earth could not be the center of the
universe. Because ‘the same planets are observed nearer to the earth and farther away
[this] necessarily proves that the center of the earth is not the centre of their circles.’93 In
more detail Copernicus theorised that
[i]f, then, the earth too moves in other ways, for example, about a center, 
its additional motions must likewise be reflected in many bodies outside 
it. Among these motions we find the yearly revolution. For if this is 
transformed from a solar to a terrestrial movement, with the sun 
acknowledged to be at rest, the risings and settings which bring the 
zodiacal signs and fixed stars into view morning and evening will appear 
the same way. The stations of the planets, moreover, as well as their 
retrogradations and forward motion will be recognised as being, not 
movements of the planets, but a motion of the earth, which the planets 
borrow for their own appearances. Lastly it will be realised that the sun 
occupies the middle of the universe. All these facts are disclosed to us by 
the principle governing the order in which the planets follow one another, 
and by the harmony of the entire universe, if only we look at the matter, 
as the saying goes with both eyes.94
91Lovejoy, Great Chain, pp. 103-4.
92Copemicus assumed that the structure of the universe was based on the symmetry of its parts. 
He placed the sun, the symbol of good in the Platonic tradition, in the middle of the universe. He assumed 
that the universe must be a sphere because ‘of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect.’ Furthermore, the 
‘earth too is evidently enclosed between poles and is therefore spherical’ and ‘is perfectly round, as the 
philosophers taught.’ Copernicus, De revolutionibus, at pp. 114 & 116.
93Copemicus, De revolutionibus, p. 119.
94Copemicus, De revolutionibus, p. 127-8.
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Once he had established that the earth is a planet revolving around the sun, Copernicus
was able to order the rest of the planets. Venus and Mercury, which were only seen at
dawn and dusk, were positioned within the earth’s orbit. All the others, which could be
seen all night, were placed outside the earth’s orbit. With the sun at centre of the system
their relative positions could be established according to the durations of their orbits.
Copernicus introduced a new planetary order: ‘the sphere of the fixed stars, which is
immovable, then Saturn (with a circuit of thirty years) followed by Jupiter (twelve), Mars
(two), the Earth (an annual orbit), Venus (nine months) and Mercury (eighty days).95 The
sovereign centre of this universe is the sun.
At rest, however, in the middle of everything is the sun. For in this most 
beautiful temple, who would place this lamp in another or better position 
than that from which it can illuminate the whole at one and the same 
time? For, the sun is not inappropriately called by some people the lantern 
of the universe, its mind by others, and its ruler by still others. The 
Thrice-Great Hermes labels it a “visible god”; and Sophocles’ Electra,
“that which gazes upon all things”. Thus indeed, as if seated on a kingly 
throne, the sun governs the family of planets revolving around it.96
In terms of the themes that we have been pursing in this chapter, Copernicus’ re­
imagination of the cosmos had several consequences for discourses on space and politics. 
First, Copernicus gave a further boost to the principle of sovereign identity. Russell reads 
Copernicus’ ‘dethronement of the world from its geometrical pre-eminence’ as 
withdrawing from man the cosmic significance he had in Christian theology. ’97 However, 
the central position occupied by man in the medieval cosmos is a low and degraded one. 
Therefore by removing man from the centre of things, Copernicus does not make him less 
significant, but, on the contrary, raises him from his lowly estate. Copernicus rejected 
Aristotle’s premise that the central position is degraded and denied the ‘whole antithesis 
between the sublunary world of becoming and the immortal immutable heavens.’98 
Second, Copernicus’ representation of a heliocentric universe further undermined the 
validity of the spatial hierarchies of the medieval cosmos. Koyr£ thinks that Copemican 
astrology had an ‘overwhelming scientific and philosophical importance’ because
95Copemicus, De revolutionibus, p. 132.
96Copemicus, De revolutionibus, p. 133.
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Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 513.
98Lovejoy, Great Chain, p. 104.
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by removing the earth from the centre of the world and placing it among 
the planets, [it] undermined the very foundations of the traditional cosmic 
world-order with its hierarchical structure and qualitative opposition of 
the celestial realm of immutable being to the terrestrial or sublunar region 
of change and decay."
Third, the Copemican re-imagination of astronomical space had consequences for all
branches of knowledge based in with spatial hierarchies. Goethe claimed that after
Copernicus all the hierarchies of the medieval order lost their heuristic and practical
value:
Humanity has perhaps never faced a greater challenge; for by 
[Copernicus’] admission [that humanity is not the center of the universe], 
how much else did not collapse in dust and smoke: a second paradise, a 
world of innocence, poetry and piety, the witness of the senses, the 
conviction of a religious and poetic faith...100
The hierarchical structure of the medieval political cosmos also collapsed in the dust and
smoke of the Renaissance. In Renaissance Europe spatial hierarchies collapsed
simultaneously in various fields of discourse and practice. The old spatial order was
ending and a new modem one based in a horizontal ordering of homogeneous spaces was
coming to replace it.
Cassirer claims that Machiavelli’s Prince opened the way for modem political
philosophy because of its implicit rejection of the whole scholastic tradition and, in
particular Machiavelli’s destmction of the ‘the cornerstone of this tradition -  the
hierarchic system.’101 For medieval philosophers, quoting from St Paul, all power is of
God and the state is of divine origin. This belief was so ingrained that even during the
Renaissance advocates of temporal power rarely challenged the theocratic principle.
Machiavelli does not attack it head on but simply ignores it thereby illustrating its
irrelevance for the new political order that he sought to describe. From his political
experience Machiavelli was well aware that real power is not divine. The power wielded
by the new princes had precious little to do with God. As a political realist Machiavelli
ignored the medieval political system; he viewed the divine origin of kings as a product
99Koyr6, Closed World, p. 29.
100Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Theory of Three Colours, quoted in Crowe, Theories of the 
World, p. 194.
101Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 135.
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of imagination not of political thought. Machiavelli ignored the scholastic debates about
the relations between temporal and heavenly authority and simply set about describing
the facts of political life as he saw them, facts which, when brought to life, were enough
to ‘destroy the hierarchic and theocratic system.’102
There are, of course, moments when the hierarchical images and figures of the
medieval cosmos appear in Machiavelli’s work -  we should not expect him to have
completely divested his thought of what was still a very influential episteme. Machiavelli
occasionally suggests that the heavenly bodies can influence natural and human affairs
in the sublunar world. The influence that celestial design has on natural phenomena in
the lower world is revealed in signs. In the Discourses Machiavelli asserts that ‘both
ancient and modem instances indicate that nothing important ever happens in a city or
a region that has not been foretold either by diviners or by revelations or by prodigies or
by other celestial signs.’103 Elsewhere Machiavelli considers the possibility that the air
may contain ‘intelligences’ or, ‘spirits’ which ‘warn men with such signs, so they can
prepare for resistance.’104 Nature also -  in contrast to Pico’s view- can influence political
outcomes. In the Florentine Histories Machiavelli refers to the cycles of political order
that are conditioned by the nature of things in the sublunar world:
In their normal changes, countries generally go from order to disorder and 
then from disorder move back to order, because, since nature does not 
allow things of the world (mondane cose) to remain fixed, when they 
come to their utmost perfection and have no further possibility of rising, 
they must go down.105
In this passage Machiavelli seems to be saying, claims A.J. Parel who argues that
Machiavelli was not a modem thinker, that the patterns of the rise and fall of
civilisations, states and religions are not the exclusive outcome of human volition, for
‘history is dependent on “heaven, the planets and the elements” for its “motion, order and
102Cassirer, The Myth of the State, p. 136.
103Niccol6 Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius in Machiavelli, The Chief 
Works and Others: Volume One, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 175- 
529, 1:56, p. 311.
104A11 quotes from Machiavelli, Discourses, 1:56, pp. 311-2.
105Machiavelli quoted in A.J. Parel, ‘The Question of Machiavelli’s Modernity’, The Review of 
Politics, 53:2 (1991), pp. 320-39, at p. 323.
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power”.’106
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that in general Machiavelli’s political
philosophy is not underpinned by the episteme of spatial hierarchy. His discussion of
religion and religious authority is not couched in the same language of hierarchy we can
detect in Dante’s writings. Machiavelli was a harsh critic of Christianity, both as a belief
system and as an institution of political governance. In The Discourses the Christian
religion is represented as a flawed belief-system precisely because it directs men’s
attention to the futile contemplation of other-worldly truths. Because Christianity does
not value the honour of the world it does not stir men to action or to fight for freedom.
Machiavelli has far more admiration for those ancient religions which not only valued
honour in this world and actively encouraged men to seek it, but incited them into action
through spectacle and sacrifice. Christianity values humility and contempt for worldly
things and so fails to stir men for action in the service of freedom as the ancient religions
did. If religion is to have any use, argued Machiavelli, it must be to instill virtu in
political actors. Religions that inspire contemplation of ‘another’ world - 1 do not think
that Machiavelli would have regarded it as a ‘higher’ world -  are of no use in the conduct
of effective political life.
Ancient religion ... attributed blessedness only to men abounding in 
worldly glory, such as the generals of armies and the princes of states. Our 
religion has glorified humble and contemplative men rather than active 
ones.107
Machiavelli was even more critical of the Roman Church as an institution. He felt that 
the reason why ‘this land has lost all piety and religion’ was directly due to the bad 
example set by the conduct of the papacy and church.108 The Church was also responsible 
for keeping Italy divided because it was not strong enough to unite all Italy, nor so weak 
that when threatened it was unable to call on men to defend its interests. Machiavelli’s 
disdain for Rome is to the fore in his distinctly sarcastic observation in The Prince that 
‘since they [Ecclesiastical Princedoms] are protected by superior causes, to which the
106A. J. Parel, ‘Machiavelli’s Modernity’, p. 321. Parel feels that Machiavelli’s inability to escape 
the confines of a pre-modem cosmology combined with a pre-modem anthropology, means that ‘[i]f 
modernity requires the acceptance of a post-seventeenth-century concept of physical nature and human 
nature, then Machiavelli cannot be considered a modem.’ p. 339.
107Machiavelli, Discourses, 2:2, p. 331.
108Machiavelli, Discourses, 1:12, p. 226.
148
human mind does not reach, I omit speaking about them because since they are set on 
high and maintained by God, to discuss them would be the act of a man presumptuous 
and rash.’109
Yet it is Machiavelli’s relativization of religion that really undermines the spatial
structure of the Christian hierarchy. In The Discourses Machiavelli praises Romulus’
successor Numa Poppilius for his ability to maintain a well-ordered state by turning to
religion. Roman history demonstrates how ‘helpful religion was in controlling the armies,
in inspiring the people, in keeping men good, in making the wicked ashamed.’110
Machiavelli no longer seeks to relate religion to a transcendental order nor is he
concerned with spiritual salvation. He evaluates religion purely in instrumentalist terms
as a cultural glue in the service of politics:
It is the duty, then, of the rulers of a republic or a kingdom to preserve the 
foundations of the religion they hold. If they do this, it will be an easy 
thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and 
united. Also whatever comes up in favour of religion, even though they 
think it false, they are to accept and magnify.111
By such criteria Machiavelli evaluates Christianity negatively because it renders men
weak and effeminate and hinders the development of political virtu. Stephen KcKnight
characterises the Renaissance as a period in which two drives dominate: secularization,
which produces independence from God and the sacred, and sacralization, which
‘transforms the secular realm to the point where it is indistinguishable from the sacred.
Man becomes God, and society becomes an earthly paradise.’112 Machiavelli’s
contribution was to sacralize the secular world of the state.
With Machiavelli we stand at the gateway of the modem world. The 
desired end is attained; the state has won its full autonomy .... The sharp 
knife of Machiavelli’s thought has cut off all the threads by which in 
former generations the state was fastened to the organic whole of human 
existence. The political world has lost its connection not only with 
religion or metaphysics but also with all the other forms of man’s ethical 
and cultural life. It stands alone -  in an empty space.113
109Machiavelli, The Prince in Machiavelli, Chief Works, p. 44.
110Machiavelli, Discourses 1:11, p. 224.
11'Machiavelli, Discourses 1:12, p. 227.
119 Stephen A. McKnight, Sacralizing the Secular: The Renaissance Origins o f Modernity (Baton 
Rouge LA, Louisiana State University, 1989), p. 25.
113Cassirer, Myth of the State, p. 140.
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Conclusion
Dante and Machiavelli present us with two very different images of the spatial order of 
things. In Dante’s universe the material and political worlds combine in a rigid, 
vertically-ordered, hierarchy in which the spaces of divine and mundane, heaven and 
earth are qualitatively different. In Machiavelli’s world not only is the relationship 
between the structure of the political cosmos and the hierarchies of being more tenuous, 
so weakening the overall structure, but temporal politics acquires its own authority and 
values in a space that is inferior to no other. Machiavelli’s contention that principalities 
could be legitimately acquired by power and human volition rather than through the 
sanctified authority of divine providence amounted to a total rejection of the hierarchical 
and theocratic system of authority. A crucial step in the process which led to the 
dismantling of the hierarchies of the medieval cosmos was taken by Renaissance 
philosophers who in proclaiming the dignity of man, extricated man from the rigid 
hierarchies of the medieval universe and breathed the first signs of life into the principle 
of sovereign identity that was to underpin the Cartesian allocation of political authority 
to separate and equivalent spaces of sovereign territory. Although Renaissance thinkers, 
even those as irreverent as Machiavelli, were not able to completely dispense with the 
images and language of spatial hierarchy, by articulating different possibilities of being 
and politics they set in motion a process that would eventually leave the broken structures 
of the hierarchical cosmos littered over the entire landscape of the modem culture of 
space and its horizontally-ordered world of sovereign-territoriality.
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R epresenting  T errito ria lity  in the Regim e o f Perspective
t   ~ ~  ^ * -
1. Piero della Francesca, Portraits of Battista Sforza, Duchess o f  Vrbino and Federico da Montefeltro, Duke o f  Urbino, 
Florence, Uffizi Gallery
The last chapter showed that important steps in the intellectual development of the idea 
of the territorial state were taken in the Italian Renaissance discourses of cosmology. The 
gradual dismantling of the hierarchies of the vertically-structured spatial order of the 
Christian medieval cosmos established the groundwork for the re-imagination of a 
political spatial order based in the horizontally-ordered, homogeneous spaces of 
sovereign territoriality. In this chapter the discussion moves to the pictorial representation 
of the idea of the territorial state in Renaissance Italy. In particular it considers the impact 
that the invention or re-discovery of perspective in painting -  which made it possible to 
represent three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional canvas -  had on the 
representation and production of the idea of the territorial state.
This chapter takes its cue from John Ruggie’s proposition that perspective and the 
modem European states-system share the same underlying ordering principle of 
differentiation. For Ruggie the principle of differentiation defines the modem ‘social
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episteme ’, or the mental equipment used ‘ in imagining and symbolizing forms of political
community’ in modernity.1 The transition from the juxtaposed, overlapping political
spaces of the medieval world to the differentiated, bounded state-spaces of the modem
world required the imagination and symbolisation of this change at the level of social
epistemology. Differentiation characterised not only new political doctrines like cujus
regio ejus religio and Rex in regno suo est Imperator regni sui, but also the mechanistic
and atomistic political metaphysics which portrayed individual societies as autonomous
bodies-in-motion. These political discourses of differentiation mirrored equivalent
transformations in social epistemology: the replacement of Latin by vernacular
vocabularies, the standardisation of the I-form of speech, and new notions of individual
subjectivity.2 However, the most significant component of the modem social epitome was
the invention of single-point perspective in visual art. According to Ruggie single-point
perspective prioritised the sovereignty of ‘a single point of view, the point of view of a
single subjectivity, from which all other subjectivities were differentiated’ in relation to
the vanishing point.3 As in art, so in politics:
political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed 
viewpoint. The concept of sovereignty... was... the doctrinal counterpart 
of the application of single-point perspectival forms to the spatial 
organisation of politics.4
Unfortunately Ruggie does not develop this initial observation and we are left 
wondering how exactly ‘single-point perspectival forms’ were applied to the ‘spatial 
organisation of politics’. How could perspective -  a code of pictorial representation -  
have influenced the articulation of the political spatial discourse of territoriality? What 
is required is an approach which allows us to analyse the aesthetics of politics or, if you 
will, the politics of aesthetics. One school of thought which has made some advance in 
this area is New Cultural History. One of its most prominent thinkers is Stephen
'John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organization, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp 139-74,atp. 158. The concept of the social 
episteme is rather unclear. Ruggie claims that it manages to combine the view of German social theorists 
that society consists of ‘webs of meaning and signification’ with the French notion of '‘mentalites 
collectives'.
2Ruggie, ‘Territoriality’, p. 158.
3Ruggie, ‘Territoriality’, p. 159.
4Ruggie, ‘Territoriality’, p. 159.
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Greenblatt who argues that the political and social conventions, the norms and practices
of any society, are not only reflected in but partially produced by a society’s cultural and
aesthetic discourses: through its poetic, literary and artistic texts. Greenblatt urges us to
regard the work of art not as
a pure flame that lies at the source of our speculations. Rather the work 
of art is itself the product of a set of manipulations, some of them our own 
... any others undertaken in the construction of the original work. That is, 
the work of art is the product of a negotiation between a creator or class 
of creators, equipped with a complex, communally shared repertoire of 
conventions, and the institutions and practices of society.5
I shall argue that during the Italian Renaissance the ‘institution’ of territorial sovereignty
was partially produced through works of art commissioned by new territorial princes. The
representation of territoriality in the these works of art was produced by means of a
‘negotiation’ with the ‘convention’ of perspective.
The details of perspective may be unfamiliar to students of political theory, so in
the first section of the chapter I shall provide, in the context of Renaissance Italy, a brief
overview of the origins, the principles and the development of perspective theory. This
discussion will focus on perspective as theorised by Alberti and applied in painting by
Piero della Francesca. In the second section, entitled ‘Painting the Prince’, I shall
examine how perspective facilitated the artistic representation of sovereign-territoriality.
I shall base my discussion on Piero della Francesca’s portrait of Battista Sforza and
Federico da Montefeltro (Fig. 1). Perspective, however, is more than simply an ‘innocent’
technique of artistic representation. Cultural and geographical theory has shown that
perspective also produces space: it is, in Foucault’s terms, a network of power and
knowledge that has facilitated human mastery of space in modernity. In the third section
I consider perspective as a power-knowledge dispositif, whose defining signatures, the
sovereignty of the eye and the production of rationalised space, were established during
the Italian Renaissance. The final section shows how the power/knowledge matrix of
perspective produced territorial spaces in Renaissance cartography. This chapter, then,
continues to develop my critique of the Classical Westphalia thesis that the idea of the
sovereign territorial state was a product of the political discourse and practice of the
5Stephen J. Greenblatt, ‘Towards a Poetics of Culture’ in Greenblatt, Learning to Curse: Essays 
in Early Modern Culture (New York NY, Routledge, 1990), pp. 146-60, p. 158.
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seventeenth century. It argues that the invention of perspective in fifteenth century Italy 
was a key moment in the representation and production of the modem idea of the 
territorial state.
Perspective in Renaissance Theory and Practice
At its most basic, perspective is a representational technique allowing artists to depict 
three-dimensional space, and the positions of objects within it, on a two-dimensional 
canvas. According to Erwin Panofsky, perspective transforms a picture into a window 
and creates the illusion that ‘we are looking through this window into a space’.6 
Perspective is
the capacity to represent a number of objects together with a part of the 
space around them in such a way that the conception of the material 
picture support is completely supplanted by the conception of a 
transparent plane, through which we believe we are looking into an 
imaginary space. This space comprises the entirety of the objects in 
apparent recession into depth, and is not bounded by the edges of the 
picture, but rather only cut off.7
The main task of this section is to present a simple introduction to the basic themes of
Renaissance perspective with reference to Piero della Francesca’s work. However,
because Piero’s application and understanding of perspective was both advanced and
idiosyncratic, it is best to begin with Leon Battista Alberti’s On Painting of 1435, which
is widely regarded as the foundational text of Quattrocento perspective theory.8
In histories of the Renaissance ‘invention’ or ‘re-discovery’ of perspective,
Alberti’s text, ‘the “Magna Carta” of the Renaissance’, is often presented as one of three
foundational events.9 The first event was Filippo Brunelleschi’s ‘peepshow’ experiments
carried out Florence’s Piazza de Duomo and Piazza dei Signori in 1425, which
demonstrated the principles of perspective. The second event was the rigorous
6Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, trans. Christopher S. Wood, (New York NY, 
Zone Books, 1991), at p. 27.
n
Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, fn. 5, p. 77.
8Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. Cecil Greyson, (London, Penguin Books, 1991). The 
clearest and most accessible introduction to Alberti’s work, and indeed to the whole subject of perspective, 
is Alison Cole, Perspective (London, Dorling Kindersley Limited, 1992).
9Henri Focillon, Piero della Francesca (Parma, Pratiche Editrice, 1992), p. 76. My translation.
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application of Brunelleschi’s principles by Masaccio in his Trinity fresco in Florence’s
Santa Maria Novella in 1427.10 The publication of Alberti’s On Painting was the third
foundational moment because it codified perspective in terms of an underlying geometry.
It gave ‘painting, as a discipline, a rootedness in the underlying order of things no less
strong than that of other arts which claimed liberal status.’11
At the heart of Alberti’s philosophy lay the familiar humanist motif -  which we
have already encountered in the work of Neo-Platonist philosophers -  that man is ‘the
measure of all things’. Alberti reminds us that
[t]he Stoics taught that man was by nature constituted the observer and 
manager of things. Chrysippus thought that everything on earth was bom 
only to serve man. ... Protagoras ... seems to some interpreters to have 
said essentially the same thing, when he declared that man is the mean 
and measure of all things.12
Man had a duty to ‘study of the natural order of things in God’s creation’ and the
painter’s task was to reveal the concinnatus or harmony of nature as inscribed in the
perfect proportional correspondence of the properties of number, shape and location.13
Since perspective was capable of representing things in proportion, it enabled the artist
to represent the classically defined ideal of beauty as a harmony of parts.14
On Painting is divided into three books. In Book One, which is concerned with
‘first principles’, Alberti describes the geometrical concepts of point, line and surface in
terms of their material existence. The material world is manifested through rays of light
which issue from the surface of a material object and converge on the eye in the
configuration of a cone or pyramid.15 The visual pyramid comprises three types of light
rays. Extrinsic rays ‘hold on like teeth to the whole of the outline, form an enclosure
around the entire surface like a cage’ and form a visual pyramid:
The base of the pyramid is the surface seen, and the sides are the visual 
rays we said are called extrinsic. The vertex of the pyramid resides within
10See Cole, Perspective, pp. 14-5, for a discussion of Masaccio’s Trinity.
1 Martin Kemp, Behind the Picture: Art and Evidence in the Italian Renaissance (New Haven 
NH, Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 95-6.
12Alberti, quoted in Kemp, Behind the Picture, p. 90.
13Martin Kemp, ‘Introduction’ to Alberti, On Painting, p. 2.
14See Giulio Carlo Argan, ‘The Architecture of Brunelleschi and the Origins of Perspective 
Theory in the Fifteenth Century’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 9 (1946), pp. 96-121.
15Alberti, On Painting, p. 37.
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the eye, where the angles of the quantities meet together.16
2. Alberti’s Visual Pyramid
Median rays designate surface features such as light and colour. Finally, there is the 
centric (perpendicular or axial) ray, ‘the leader and prince of rays’, that passes along our 
visual axis and whose position determines what appears on the surface (Fig. 2). Alberti’s 
visual pyramid was not an original concept, but it was derived from medieval optics.17 
However, his subsequent claim that a painting may be defined as the intersection of the 
visual pyramid by a plane perpendicular to the centric ray was novel. So was the 
implication that because the painting forms a proportional triangle within the broader 
triangle, objects recorded on it retain their relative proportions (Fig. 3).
picture plane E
object
projected object
eye
C D B
I
3. Alberti’s Picture Plane in Perspective
In Book Two, Alberti described the rules of costruzione legittima, the way to achieve a 
correct representation of vertical and horizontal dimensions into and across the space of 
the picture, which today is known as ‘vanishing point’ construction.18 In costruzione 
legittima man is ‘the scale and measure of all things’ from which the sizes and distances
16Alberti, On Painting, pp. 42-3.
17Kemp, Behind the Picture, points out that this notion o f  the visual pyramid is ‘drawn from 
medieval optical science, the perspectiva  on which a number o f  Islamic and Christian authors had written, 
including John Pecham, whose treatise had become the standard textbook.’ p. 93.
18For graphic representations o f  costruzione legittima see Cole, Perspective, p. 13; and Kemp, 
Behind the Picture, p. 92.
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of objects can be represented in proportion.19 Having mastered the rules of costruzione
legittima the artist is then in a position to create a painting in three stages:
We divide painting into three parts, and this division we learn from 
Nature herself. As painting aims to represent things seen, let us note how 
in fact things are seen. In the first place, when we look at a thing, we see 
it as an object which occupies a space. The painter will draw around this 
space, and he will call this process of setting down the outline, 
appropriately, circumscription. Then, as we look, we discern how the 
several surfaces of the object seen are fitted together; the artist, when 
drawing these combinations of surfaces in their correct relationship, will 
properly call this composition. Finally, in looking we observe more 
clearly the colours of surfaces; the representation in painting of this 
aspect, since it receives all its variation from light, will aptly here be 
termed the reception of light.20
Following these rules, the artist is able to represent appropriate subjects or istoria -
selected from Scriptures, histories or myths -  with ‘a systematic and communicative
naturalism within a framework of order and restrained delectation.’21 In the final section
of the book, Alberti discusses the requirements for artistic virtu. The artist must be
learned in the liberal arts and he must study nature to divine all of its principles,
especially that of beauty, so that he can choose appropriate istoria for representation.22
4. Piero della Francesca, The Flagellation, Urbino, Galleria Nazionale
19Alberti, On Painting, p. 53.
20Alberti, On Painting, pp. 64-5.
21Kemp, Behind the Picture, p. 96.
22See, for a discussion o f  Alberti’s notion o f  the virtuous painter, Kemp, Behind the Picture, pp.
96-7.
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A good example of the impact that Alberti’s perspective system had on the representation
of space in Renaissance painting can, argues Henri Focillon, be seen in the work of Piero
della Francesca who interpreted ‘space in a totally Albertian manner in many of his
paintings.23 Particularly revealing is the Flagellation o f Christ (Fig. 4).
The severe simplicity of the composition, with the lines of the floor and 
ceiling converging onto an imaginary point, indicates the presence of a 
scheme which underpins the painting and which divides the image into 
sections. The figures, similar to pawns in a game of chess, are placed with 
implacable and rigorous precision in their halves. The portico is drawn 
according to the rules of the visual pyramid. However, in Piero’s painting 
one sees less fidelity to the rules of optics than a lyrical instinct, the 
happiness at mastering space for the first time.24
The influence of Alberti’s rules on measuring volume and space can be seen, argues
Alessandro Angelini, in the way Piero uses the architecture of the elegant classical temple
to order the space of the Flagellation.
Just as Masaccio’s concept of space would be inconceivable to us without 
Brunelleschi’s architecture, if it were not for Alberti’s work we would not 
be able to understand Piero’s scientific methods of arranging his figures 
within his compositions. The onlooker must stand directly in the centre 
of the painting, for the composition is strictly Unitarian, and this unity is 
achieved by the rigorous use of a single vanishing point. ... The Urbino 
Flagellation is the ultimate example of Quattrocento linear perspective.25
Alberti’s instructions regarding circumscription, composition, and the reception
of light can be detected throughout Piero’s work. Piero applies Alberti’s rules on
circumscription by painting a luminous border around his figures so as to differentiate
foreground figures from the background, while ensuring that they remain within the depth
of the painting’s space. As regards composition, Piero follows Alberti’s recommendation
that, whatever istoria is to be represented, the space of the painting should not be
crowded out by highly animated figures, but should include empty space and distance
between figures, allowing them space in which to move about with dignity and calm. For
Focillon, The Flagellation achieves an effect in which the protagonists’ ‘movements are
so removed from the flow of time, that they appear to be inscribed in eternity.’26 Finally,
Focillon, Piero, p. 80. My translation.
24Focillon, Piero, p. 80. My translation.
Alessandro Angelini, Piero della Francesca, (Florence, Scala, 1985), p. 17.
96Focillon, Piero della Francesca, p. 84. My translation.
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Alberti instructs the artist to forego pure colour -  especially the traditional gold 
backdrops which absorbed the depth of figures, denying them their plastic verisimilitude 
-  and to add black and white so as to show the hues and shades appropriate to the 
different effects of light in night and day.
It is important to acknowledge that neither Piero nor Alberti conceived of 
perspective just as a set of rules for precise pictorial representation. They understood 
perspective as a symbolic system that was capable of reproducing the essential harmony 
of the universe as created by God. As is evident in his own treatise on perspective, De 
prospectiva pingendi, Piero shared the Neoplatonic belief that perfect geometry underlies 
God’s creation. Piero was committed to the correct geometrical representation of objects 
and figures.27 Piero’s commitment to the construction and representation of space 
according to the perfect proportion made possible by perspective can also be seen in the 
numerical harmony of the angular stones in The Flagellation. In this painting the 
architectural proportions and dimensions have symbolic overtones and, in combination 
with the light, they reflect the divine order of things. Perhaps invoking the Christian 
symbolism of the number eight -  which, coming after the seven of the days of creation, 
signified rebirth or Christ’s resurrection -  Piero relates the eight figures to their 
architectural surroundings by repeating the number eight throughout the composition.28
Piero’s space, notes Marco Bussagli, is itself symbolic: the geometrical system 
and perspective are ‘symbolic elements for the representation of the dimensions of the 
Absolute, which are themselves mirrored in perceivable reality.,29 Because they incarnate 
absolute values, the objects and figures represented must fit in with this structure. Piero’s
97On De prospectiva pingendi see Kemp, Behind the Picture, pp. 97-101; and Marco Bussagli, 
Piero della Francesca, (Firenze, Giunti, 1992), pp. 5-13. Kemp describes De prospectiva as a ‘sort of 
geometrical “cook-book” for the dedicated beginner’ because it reads as a technical manual, full of 
geometrical diagrams and mathematical logic, outlining precise techniques for achieving an accurate 
geometrical rendering in perspective of specific objects, p. 100. James Elkins argues that Piero hoped to 
free the rules of perspective from their basis in the medieval science of optics and to reconfigure them in 
terms of geometry. James Elkins, ‘Piero della Francesca and the Renaissance Proof of Linear Perspective’ 
The Art Bulletin, LXIX:2 (June 1987), pp. 220-30.
Cole, Perspective, p. 18. The squares of the terra cotta pavement are eight wide and deep, there 
are eight-pointed stars behind and front of Jesus Christ, and an octagonal arrangement of patterned floor 
tiles around the stars. The piazza, in which the foreground figures are standing, is eight units deep into the 
shade of the middle distance, and then another eight units deep into light-flooded areas in front of the far 
wall.
9QBussagli, Piero della Francesca, p. 15. My translation.
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5. Piero della Francesca, Resurrection, Sansepolcro, Museo Civico
Piero’s symbolic use of perspective is powerfully demonstrated in The Resurrection o f  
Christ (Fig. 5) with its two axial points of view. The higher one directs the viewer’s gaze 
to Christ and imbues his figure with a sense of atemporal otherworldliness; in contrast, 
the lower point of view, which draws the eyes to the sleeping guards at the level of the 
tomb, emphasises that these are men whose physical being limits their experience to the 
mundane world.30
Painting The Prince
One way in which perspective contributed to the legitimation of the idea of sovereign 
territoriality was in providing artists with the technical means to portray their patrons in 
landscapes that were clearly intended to represent their territories. In this section, I shall 
discuss Piero’s diptych of Federico da Montefeltro, the Duke o f  Urbino, and his wife 
Battista Sforza (Figs 1 and 6) as an early pictorial representation of sovereign 
territoriality.31
30Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, p. 22.
31 The most inclusive discussion o f the Urbino Portraits is Eugenio Battisti, Piero della 
Francesca (Milano, Instituto Editoriale Italiano, 1971), pp. 355-71. See also Angelini, Piero della 
Francesca, pp. 60-7; and Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, pp. 43-7. Originally the two portraits were
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6. Piero della Francesca, Allegorical Triumphs o f  Federico da Montelfeltro and Battista Sforza, Florence, Uffizi 
Gallery
The inner panels of the diptych are profiles of Federico and Battista. Battista’s 
portrait, on the left, has two notable features: first, her face is very white, like a funeral 
mask -  she had recently died giving birth to their son Guidubalbo; second, Battista’s 
elaborate hairstyle and exquisite jewellery are rendered in considerable detail, showing 
Piero’s mastery o f ‘miniaturistic’ portraiture.32 Federico’s portrait, in the right panel, is 
also very detailed, showing moles and blemishes on his olive skin. Because Federico
separated by a hinge which allowed it to be opened and shut like a book. When it was closed the two 
allegorical triumphal processions made up the cover. The form o f the painting, with the portraits in profile 
on one side and the triumphal emblem on the reverse, may have been influenced by the tradition o f the 
double-sided medallion portraiture associated with Pisanello. Today the panels are in the Uffizi, opposite 
Paolo Uccello’s, Battle o f  San Romano (c. 1450s). Uccello was also a master o f  perspective who 
experimented both with the geometric representation o f  figures and objects, and with the mathematics o f  
three-dimensional space. Uccello painted three versions o f  the Battle o f  San Romano, celebrating 
Florence’s victory over Sienna in 1432, which once hung together in the Medici Palace. See, Cole, 
Perspective, pp. 16-7, for details.
32It is not known precisely when the portraits were painted. Battista’s portraits were probably 
commissioned by Federico, after her death in July 1472, as a commemoration. The portraits o f  Federico 
have been dated variously. Bussagli claims they were painted before 1467, while for Battisti the fact that 
in his allegorical triumph there appears to be a reference to his crowning in Rome means they must be 
dated after the summer o f  1474. Focillon dates both portraits much earlier, to Piero’s residency in Urbino 
in 1456. Focillon, Piero della Francesca. Bussagli notes that the correct identification o f  the personalities 
was first made in 1834, when previous hypotheses -  that it was either a portrait o f  Francesco Petrarca and 
Laura, or o f  Sigismondo Pandolfo Mataltesta and his consort Isotta degli Atti -  were finally abandoned.
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presents us with his left profile, his blind right eye -  a wound gained in battle, like his 
broken nose -  is hidden. Behind both Federico and Battista, receding into the far distance 
until the horizon where it merges with the sky, is an extensive countryside landscape of 
cone-shaped hills, fields and a lake. On the reverse panels, Battista and Federico are 
represented in triumphal procession. Federico sits on a gilded chair placed on a carriage 
pulled by two white cavalry horses driven by Eros. Dressed in a full suit of armour and 
holding a sceptre, Federico is being crowned by the angle of la Vittoria. Towards the 
front of the carriage sit the four Virtues: Prudenza, Temperanza, Fortezza and Giustizia. 
Battista’s carriage, also driven by Eros, is drawn by two unicorns -  the symbols of 
chastity and purity. She appears in a pious reading pose, and is accompanied by Fede and 
Carita at the front, and Speranza and Modestia at the back of the carriage. Once again 
the backgrounds of both pictures are landscapes of the Urbino territories: behind Federico 
is Lake Trasimeno and behind Battista is the fertile countryside of Valdichiana.
The Latin inscription underneath Federico’s triumph reinforces the message these 
paintings were intended to convey: “His eminence is carried is great triumph for his 
famed eternal virtue proclaims him worthy of bearing the sceptre as the equal of the most 
distinguished condottieri.”33 Federico did not want to be seen simply as ‘the leader of a 
band of mercenaries’ -  he had followed in the family’s traditional ‘profession of arms’ 
-  but strove to ‘comport himself like prince’ possessing great virtu.34 Thus in the 
portraits, apart from the fact that Federico is wearing armour in his triumph, the standard 
iconography of the warrior-prince is largely absent. Federico’s military virtu is presented 
alongside and complementary to the virtu of good governance and cultural patronage.35 
His biographer Pierantonio Paltroni recorded that Federico aspired to the status of the 
virtuous, wise and benevolent prince, able to combine military skill with good
My translation of Bussagli’s translation from Latin into Italian: “Colui che la fama imperitura 
delle virtu proclama degno di reggare lo scettro, pari ai piu insigni condottieri, l’illustre b portato in 
grandioso trionfo ”, Bussagli, Piero della Francesca, p. 45.
34Hubert Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. John Goodman, (Cambridge MA, The MIT 
Press, 1994) p. 188.The Montefeltro had been mercenaries since the Middle Ages. The rewards of this 
profession had given them the resources to control their terre castellate in the mountainous frontier region 
between the Papal domains and the Emperor’s territories.
According to his biographer Vespasiano da Bisticci, Federico’s military virtit was partially 
derived from his mastery of Latin which allowed him to absorb the lessons of the ancients. See Vespasiano 
da Bisticci, Vite in Eugenio Garin, II Rinascimento Italiano (Bologna, Capelli, 1980), pp. 236-8.
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governance and a learned disposition:
It appeared that the life of this excellent prince is to be compared and 
equated with the life of any of the more worthy and notable ancients in 
any of the great generations. For the things he did so outstandingly in 
handling arms he merits the greatest fame and eternal memory, as he does 
for his singular sapienza (wisdom) in ruling and governing .... and for 
being learned in scienza (knowledge), eloquence, liberality, benevolence, 
and clemency, and for the splendid court and for magnificent and splendid 
buildings.36
All three of these princely virtues (military prowess, wise and just governance, and 
learning) were symbolised in Federico’s palace at Urbino.37 Baldassar Castiglione 
portrayed Federico’s palace, built by the architect Laurana, as the ‘most beautiful to be 
found anywhere in Italy’ ,38 To Castiglione it seemed more like a city than a palace. It was 
not only furnished and decorated with the usual luxurious trappings of wealth and 
prestige, but with objects -  antique statues, pictures, musical instrument and rare Latin 
Greek and Jewish texts -  which identified it as a court of high culture and learning.39 The 
palace also symbolised Federico’s magnificent and benevolent rule. The public spaces 
of the palace, particularly the cortile and garden where Federico received his subjects, 
were designed to provide ease of access for his subjects, who, if we are to believe da 
Bisticci, were treated by Federico with such kindness and humility that they considered 
themselves to be the favoured children of a kindly parent.40 Castiglione also regarded the 
people of Urbino as especially fortunate, not only because they inhabited a fertile and
36Pierantonio Paltroni, Commentari della vita etgesti dell ’illustrissimo Federico Ducad' Urbino, 
quoted in C. W. Westfall, Chivalric Declaration: The Palazzo Ducale in Urbino as a Political Statement’ 
in Henry A. Millon and Linda Nochlin (eds), Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics (Cambridge 
MA, MIT Press, 1978), pp. 20-45. Baldassar Castiglione regarded Federico’s military talents to be equal 
to those of the great generals of antiquity, nevertheless he placed them at the end of a litany of Federico’s 
virtues after prudence, humanity, justice, generosity and an indomitable spirit. See Castiglione’s portrayal 
of Federico in Bk. I, II, of Baldassar Castiglione, II Libro del Cortegiano, (Milano, Garzanti Editore, 
1981). The quote is my translation o f ‘della sua prudenzia, della umanita, della giustizia, della liberalita, 
dell'animo invitto e della disciplina militare.’ p. 23. II Cortegiano was set in the court of Federico’s heir 
as Duke of Urbino, Guidubalbo. All subsequent Castiglione quotes are from pp. 17-9.
37Westfall, ‘Chivalric Declaration’.
38My translation of ‘il piu bello che in tutta Italia si ritrovi’. Castiglione, Libro del Cortegiano,
p. 18.
39da Bisticci notes that these objects were not just for show, but reflected the fact that Federico 
was himself a man of high culture: well read in history, conversant with philosophy, knowledgeable of 
architecture, and appreciative of music, sculpture and painting. Vite, pp. 236-7.
40See, Westfall, ‘Chivalric Declaration’, pp. 28-31.
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abundant land, but also because they were ruled by ottimi Signori. Federico took a 
personal interested in the preservation and development of his land: he not only provided 
his subjects with housing and secure conditions within which to make a good living, but 
often went personally on foot to their workshops and farms to enquire into their well­
being and to offer any assistance he could.41
Although we might have expected Machiavelli to admire Federico ’ s princely virtu 
-  Federico’s ambition and ruthlessness seemed to mirror those of Machiavelli’s 
exemplary prince Cesare Borgia -  he despised the fact that Federico had achieved his 
princely status as a mercenary. In The History o f Florence Machiavelli casts Federico as 
a typically untrustworthy and unreliable condottieri. He saw Federico as a fickle 
character, whose opportunist changes of allegiance between Florence and her enemies 
were to be despised. Machiavelli records that during the negotiations of 1473 and 1474 
when Florence, Milan and Venice were allied against the Papacy and Naples, 
Frederick, the ruler of Urbino, then considered the ablest general in Italy,
had for a long time carried on wars for the Florentine people. The Pope 
[Sixtus IV] and the King [Ferdinand of Naples], therefore, in order that 
the hostile league might be without this leader, determined to get hold of 
Frederick, so the Pope advised him to visit the King of Naples and 
Ferdinand invited him. Frederick consented, to the wonder and 
displeasure of the Florentines ... and Frederick returned from Naples and 
Rome with high honour and as general of Sixtus and Ferdinand’s league.42
Federico’s shift to the Church broke with the Montefeltro’s traditional allegiance to the
Emperor -  who had bestowed their titles of nobility upon them. Hubert Damisch suggests
that it was this move that prompted Federico to revoke ‘the Ghibelline mode of tyranny’
and while ‘motivated by power politics as much as by reason’ to endorse the idea that his
authority should be founded on virtu and prudence.43
In Renaissance Italy the relative prosperity and happiness of the subjects living
41da Bisticci, Vite, p. 238.
42Niccol6 Machiavelli, The History of Florence in Machiavelli, Chief Works and Others Volume 
III, trans. Allan Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), p. 1376. This was not the first shift 
of allegiance recorded by Machiavelli. From 1447-8 Federico acted as a general for Florence against King 
Alfonso of Naples; in 1452 he commanded 12,000 of Alfonso’s troops against Florence; later, between
1467 and 1474, Federico was again in the pay of Florence, assisting in a war against Venice and helping 
to put down disturbances in the City of Volterra; after his move to the papal camp Federico participated 
in campaigns against Florence, such as the attack in 1478 on the Chianti city of Radda.
43Damisch, Origin of Perspective, p. 187.
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in a government’s territories were interpreted as the visible signs of an administration’s
good or bad governance. Good and bad government therefore lent themselves to pictorial
representation in the new genre of landscape. In the Renaissance the painted landscape
whatever its particular form, exists to serve mankind. Its fields and groves 
are carefully groomed and only rarely give way to wild ravines, 
spectacular vistas, or deserted places. This domesticated world gives 
sustenance to the physical needs and spiritual yearnings of the men who 
inhabit it. In the broadest sense the landscape is humanized.44
The attention given to landscape satisfied a desire for greater realism in the narrative
function of painting or, in Alberti’s terms, for painting to convey istoria. Richard Turner
claims that this new historical sensitivity can be seen in Duccio’s Entry into Jerusalem.
Duccio replaced the traditional symbolic narrative history of the implacable unfolding of
God’s will, with a sense of the lived experience and emotional reactions of participants
to a specific historical event. For the ‘real’ experiences of human subjects to be
communicated convincingly, the scenographic spaces in which the istoria were set had
to be represented as realistically as possible, especially when the landscape itself was
intended to convey a clear political message.
Perhaps the paradigmatic use of landscape in Renaissance political discourse are
Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s frescoes of Good and Bad Government made in 1338-9 that adorn
the walls of the Sala della Pace in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. In a fresco depicting the
effects of Good Government on the country (Fig. 7), Lorenzetti offers a
real manifestation of an abstract idea. Therefore human activity in relation 
to the land is the essential quality of the landscape. Elegant city folk ride 
out to enjoy the salubrious effects of the country, while peasants walk to 
town to dispose of their animals and crops. We glimpse varied activities; 
reaping in the fields, tilling of the soil, hunting in the country. In the 
distance the painter shows us properly cultivated hillsides, where the rules 
of sound agricultural practice have been observed. In microcosm this 
detail focuses the essential meaning of the fresco, the presentation of a 
well-governed land where both human needs and pleasures are satisfied.45
The landscape we see behind Federico and Battista is clearly intended to convey to the
viewer the beneficial effects that Federico’s own good governance is having on life and
44A. Richard Turner, The Vision of Landscape in Renaissance Italy (Princeton NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1966), p. 3.
45Tumer, Vision of Landscape, p. 12.
7. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Allegory o f  Good Government in the Country, Palazzo Pubblico, Siena
activity in his territory. Eugenio Battisti sees this as a landscape that has clearly 
been‘modified by man’; there are buildings constructed according to advanced building 
techniques, little farmsteads, and a network of roads.46 This is a countryside that has been 
made more productive by modem farming practices: irrigation schemes, artificially 
created pastures, farms enclosed within rectangular hedgerows, and ploughing and tillage 
systems. If we recall Connolly’s discussion of Tocqueville’s work in chapter two, we may 
remember that Tocqueville recognised the legitimacy the American ‘civi-territorial 
complex’ only because its had possessed its land by agri-culture and the exploitation of 
natural wealth.47 The agri-cultural possession of the land, signifying not only occupation 
but also ownership, is an important element in the modem idea of the territorial state and 
is conspicuous in the Urbino Portraits. While we cannot be sure if Federico and his 
advisors introduced these agricultural innovations, or whether they indicate processes 
already underway, nevertheless, ‘the general system of agriculture has ... characteristics 
of modernity.’48 Battisti feels that by including the landscape Piero imparts ‘to the 
sovereigns a rare form of royalty, as if suspended between the contemplation of the 
beauty of natural things and the assiduous intervention in social reality.’49
At a compositional, rather than symbolic, level the declaration of Federico’s
46See, for this discussion, Battisti, Piero della Francesca, pp. 357-8.
47See pp. 59-60.
48Battisti, Piero, p. 358. My translation.
49Battisti, Piero, p. 358. My translation.
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territorial sovereignty is enhanced by the capacity of Renaissance landscape painting to
unite figures with the space that surrounds them. Kenneth Clarke points out that
landscape’s ability to convey increased realism and naturalism complemented a rupture
with Christian symbolism and didactic imagery in medieval art.50 In the Renaissance,
according to Clarke, a ‘landscape of symbols’ -  in which material objects were presented
as symbols of spiritual truth and arranged in a unified flat surface in a decorative yet
harmonious pattern -  was replaced by a ‘landscape of fact’ in which istoria could be
presented in a realistic setting embodying a new nexus of unity or enclosed space.’51
In the Urbino Portraits this capacity of landscape painting to unite human figures
within a unified space reinforces the message that Federico’s political authority is
territorial. Federico and Battista are not only the sovereign surveyors of a landscape from
their high vantage-point, but have become inscribed into their territorial dominion. The
wealth and authority revealed in the minutia of the portrait detail in their faces and
clothes are mirrored in the details of the fertile and productive land. The geometric lines
of their profiles replicate and unite with the horizontal and receding lines which carve out
the extended territory behind them.52 Damisch suggests that this portrait frames the
relationship between Federico and Battista and their territory in terms of both a
legitimating past and future aspirations:
as the subjects’ profiles are inscribed against landscape backgrounds with 
horizons blocked by a line of hills or mountains, and which, while a bit 
rough behind the duchess, opens behind the duke onto a large, navigable
50Scholars disagree as to when the first landscapes were painted. Gombrich regards Marc Antonio 
Michiel’s description of Giorgione’s tempesta (1521) as ‘a small landscape (paesetto), on canvas, with a 
thunderstorm, a gipsy and a soldier’ to be the first expression of landscape, while for Clark the ‘landscape 
of fact’ first appears in the 1420s. See E.H. Gombrich, ‘The Renaissance Theoiy of Art and the Rise of 
Landscape’ in Gombrich, Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London, Phaidon Press, 
1966), pp. 107-21; and Kenneth Clark, Landscape into Art (London, John Murray, 1949).
51Clark, Landscape into Art, p. 14. For Clark the landscape of fact was combined with a new 
sensitivity to light which was used to unify the details of the landscape.
52One notable compositional feature of the painting is Piero’s successful unification of two distant 
perspective planes -  the foreground figures and the landscape background -  without resorting to the 
traditional ploy of placing an architectural balustrade between the figures and the landscape. Piero 
achieved ‘a remarkable synthesis ... between the accurate description according to the rules of linear 
perspective, as elaborated by Italian art, and “miniaturistic” painting obtained thanks to the techniques of 
oil paints, developed to such an extraordinary degree by Netherlandish artists. The greatness ofPiero’s art, 
rather than in his radical break away from traditional patterns, lies in this unique ability to harmonize 
elements from such different cultures and transform them into a universal language.’ Angelini, Piero, p. 
66.
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body of water. The same opposition -  which thus accrues a programmatic 
meaning -  is to be found on the backs of the two panels, which bear 
representations of the triumph of Federico and Battista; almost as if these 
were the two complementary wings of a single political agenda, one of 
them affirming the dynasty’s geographic roots, the other signalling the 
opening to the exterior reflected in the duke’s enterprises.53
The viewer is presented with an image of Federico and Battista that confirms their status
as territorial sovereigns: ‘the portraits, with the imposing hieratic profiles, dominate the
painting just as the power of the rulers portrayed dominates over the expanse of their
territories.’54 This portrait is a visual representation of the modem idea of the territorial
state wherein sovereign and territory become melded together.
Perspective impacted on Renaissance political discourse not only as a facilitator
of the pictorial representation of territorial sovereignty. James Elkins notes that in
Western thought perspective has often been referred to as ‘a metaphor for something ...
a sign signifying a mental state, a culture, or an expressive language. ’55 This metaphorical
use of perspective has, suggests Elkins, been most prevalent since the Enlightenment
when it became affiliated to two ideas. The first, common to philosophical perspectivism
from Leibnitz to Nietzsche, is the subjectivist and historically relativist idea of the ‘point
of view’. The second is the claim that space logically precedes and make possible the
existence and apprehension of objects. However the metaphorical function of perspective
was already being deployed in the Renaissance by political writers, most notably by
Machiavelli in his dedicatory letter to Lorenzo de Medici in The Prince. Machiavelli was
worried that Lorenzo might be offended that a mere citizen should presume to offer him
advice on the conduct of his affairs, and he attempted to justify his advice by drawing a
parallel between political observation and the artistic representation of space:
No one, I hope, will think that a man of low and humble station is 
overconfident when he dares to discuss and direct the conduct of princes, 
because, just as those who draw maps of countries put themselves low 
down on the plain to observe the nature of mountains and of places high 
above, and to observe that of low places put themselves high up on
53Damisch, Origin of Perspective, p. 188.
54Angelini, Piero, p. 62.
55James Elkins, The Poetics o f Perspective (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1994),pp. 16-7. 
Elkins contrasts the metaphorical usage of perspective with ‘meaningless’ perspective, where it is 
discussed as a rigorous branch of mathematics -  as an offshoot of Euclidean and Cartesian geometry and 
‘it “means” only equations, points, lines, angles, and various geometric operations.’ p. 6.
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mountain tops, so likewise, in order to discern clearly the people’s nature, 
the observer must be a prince, and to discern clearly that of princes, he 
must be one of the populace.56
Here Machiavelli is invoking Leonardo da Vinci’s declaration in his Treatise on 
Painting that
[t]he painter is lord of all types of peoples and of all things. If he wants 
valleys, if he wants from high mountain tops to unfold a great plain 
extending down to the sea’s horizon, he is lord to do so; and likewise if 
from low plains he wishes to see high mountains.57
Machiavelli was familiar with Leonardo’s cartography and aerial perspective. They are
known to have come into contact on several occasions. In 1502 Machiavelli was the
ambassador of the Florentine republic to the court of Cesare Borgia when Leonardo
presented his ariel projection of the city of Imola to Cesare, and in May 1504
Machiavelli, acting as Segretario della Cancelleria della Republica, commissioned
Leonardo on behalf of the Signori to paint the, never realised, Battle o f Anghairi fresco
for the Sala del Consiglio Grande in the Palazzo della Signoria. 5 8  Carlo Ginsburg has
argued that Machiavelli appropriated the perspective metaphor because he admired
Leonardo’s attempt to use perspective to achieve an analytical distance from the reality
he sought to describe.59 Leonardo’s analytical distance mirrored Machiavelli’s desire to
56Niccold Machiavelli, The Prince in Machiavelli, Chief Works and Others Volume I, trans. Allan 
Gilbert, (Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1989), p. 10-1.
57Leonardo, quoted in Roger D. Masters, Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science of Power (Notre 
Dame IA, University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 52. Leonardo’s writings on perspective are less 
systematic than those of Alberti and Piero. See Leonardo da Vinci, On Painting, ed. Martin Kemp, (New 
Haven NH, Yale University Press, 1989). All subsequent quotes from this work. Because it was verifiable 
through demonstration, Leonardo considered perspective to be connected to the ‘glories of mathematics 
and physics’ and to be ‘preferred to all the human discourse of disciplines.’ p. 49. Like Alberti, Leonardo 
based his theory of perspective in the laws of optics. Perspective is focussed on the eye, the noblest of the 
senses, which ‘sees in no other way than by a pyramid’ and in which the ‘shapes, the colours, all the 
images of the parts of the universe are reduced to a point, and this point is such a marvellous thing! ’p. 50. 
It was important for all painters to grasp the basic principles of perspective because it is the system which 
controls the representation of diminution: of the size of bodies at various distances, of the colours of these 
bodies, and of the shapes and boundaries of these bodies at various distances. Like Alberti, the basic 
principle of perspective for Leonardo was the idea that a painting is an intersection of the visual pyramid, 
a plane on which ‘[t]he image of the original object will be smaller to the extent that the pyramid is 
intersected nearer the eye.’ p. 53.
58The contract for the Battle o f Anghairi, 1504, as ‘ [d]rawn up in the palace of the said Magnifici 
Signori in the presence of Niccolo, son of Bernardo Machiavelli, Chancellor of the said Signori...’, is 
reprinted in Leonardo da Vinci, On Painting, pp. 270-1.
59Carlo Ginsburg, ‘Distanza e prospettiva: Due metafore’ in Ginzburg, Occhiacci di legno: Nove 
riflessioni sulla distanza (Milano, Feltrinelli Editore, 1998), pp. 171-93.
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describe ‘la verita effectual delle cosa’ rather than construct utopian models of ideal 
republics. Machiavelli, according to Ginsburg, alluded to the perspective metaphor 
because it strengthened his thesis that political reality is constituted in the relationship 
between the prince and the people: neither the prince nor the people are able to see the 
whole, for both have restricted points of view due to their subjective positions.60 
Machiavelli’s cognitive metaphor of perspective is, however, based in a conflictual 
ontology for ‘ [t]he contrast between different representations of political life is bom from 
things, from their intrinsically conflictual nature.’61 Nevertheless political regimes can 
be successfully based on such tensions: ‘ [t]he fact that the Plebs and Senate of the Roman 
republic were disunited set free that republic and made it powerful.’62
Space in the Gaze of Modernity
So far we have discussed the impact of perspective upon Renaissance ideas of 
territoriality in terms of two registers: its function as a representational technique that, 
though the medium of landscape painting, gave artists the means to present images of 
sovereign authority extending over distinct territories; and as a metaphorical tool that 
enabled theorists like Machiavelli to justify their advice to princes. These two registers 
could, in Foucault’s terms, be described as the archaeological manifestations of 
perspective as a structural vocabulary. In this section I want to examine perspective from 
another Foucauldian point of view, as a dispositif or a matrix of discourse and practice 
which produced the abstract and rational space within which the idea of the modem 
territorial state could be inscribed.
Recent work on perspective and space in cultural geography has drawn upon 
Lefebvre’s concept of ‘representations of space’ and Foucault’s work on 
power/knowledge networks. Derek Gregory argues that modernity has been partially 
constituted in
60Machiavelli felt that his particular insight was special because, first, he was one of few citizens 
who had had a subjective experience of political life; second, his extensive historical studies of politics 
had taught him how to observe politics with an objective and dispassionate eye.
61Ginzburg, ‘Distanza’, p. 182.
62Machiavelli, Discourses 1:4, quoted in Ginzburg, ‘Distanza’, p. 182. My translation.
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a complex cultural geography of perspective that radiates into far wider 
constellations of power and knowledge: perspective was not only a visual 
ideology ... but also what Foucault would have called a technology of 
power. The same geometrical techniques were used by surveyors to map 
private estates, by cartographers to map political boundaries, and by 
engineers to calculate the trajectories of cannon.63
Similarly, Stuart Cosgrove talks about ‘landscape’ as ‘a composition and structuring of
the world so that it may be appropriated by a detached, individual spectator to whom an
illusion of order and control is offered through the composition of space according to the
certainties of geometry.’64 Landscape combined Renaissance humanist concepts and
constructs of space, specifically the articulation of linear perspective, with the
vocabularies of Euclidean geometry. Its history is one of ‘the physical appropriation of
space as property, or territory’65 It was extended ideologically through painting and
garden design and practically through surveying which located and measured individual
estates, cartographic maps which apportioned global space through coordinates, and
engineers’ plans for fortresses and canon trajectories to conquer or defend national
territory. Landscape ultimately achieved ‘the control and domination over space as an
absolute, objective entity, its transformation into the property of individual or state.’66
Like Foucault and Lefebvre, these geographers stress the importance of vision in
the production of modem space. For Gregory the spaces of modernity, perspectival space,
‘marks the erasure o f the living body itself: this is a space dominated by the eye and the
gaze'.61 In this context a latent double symbolism derived from two biblical motifs
becomes evident in the Urbino Portraits', ‘the “gaze from the window”, which denotes
the almost sacred majesty of the two personalities; and dominion from on high’.68 For
many cultural historians, ‘the gaze’ is one of the dominant forms of discursive power in
Western modernity. As we saw in our discussion of Lefebvre’s work, the ‘ocularcentric’
nature of modernity is well recognized. Martin Jay argues that one unified visual model
63Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 391.
^Denis Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea’, Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers: New Series, 10 (1985), pp. 45-62, p. 55.
65Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, Perspective’, p. 55
66Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, Perspective’, p. 46.
fflGregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 392.
68Battisti, Piero, p. 358. My translation.
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or ‘scopic regime’, that of ‘Cartesian perspectivalism’, has dominated the visual
imagination of modem culture.69 This regime, which combined the ‘Renaissance notion
of perspective in the visual arts and Cartesian ideas of subjective rationality in
philosophy’, has produced a distinctive notion of space as ‘geometrically isotropic,
rectilinear, abstract and uniform’.70 This space arose out of the idea -  itself an outcome
of the belief that perspective symbolized a harmony between the mathematical
regularities of optics and God’s will -  that the composition, the order of objects within
a space, rather than the objects themselves, had positive connotations.
As a technology of power, perspective or landscape has a number of
distinguishing features. The most important is ‘the sovereignty of the eye’ that reinforces
a distinction between man as sovereign subject and space as an object to be known and
controlled by him. The single perceiving eye -  ‘static, unblinking and fixated rather than
dynamic’ -  is privileged in perspective composition.71 This ‘logic of the Gaze’ -  as
distinct from ‘the Glance’ -  privileges ‘a visual take that was eternalized, reduced to one
“point of view,” and disembodied’.72
In the founding perception, the gaze of the painter arrests the flux of 
phenomena, contemplates the visual field from a vantage-point outside 
the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment of disclosed presence; 
while in the moment of viewing, the viewing subject unites his gaze with
69Martin Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes of Modernity’ in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality (Seattle 
WA, Bay Press, 1988), pp. 3-23. Jay does not see the modem visual order as ‘a harmoniously integrated 
complex of visual theories and practice’ but as a ‘contested terrain’ characterised by ‘a differentiation of 
visual subcultures.’ p. 4. ‘Cartesian-Perspectivalism’ has been privileged as the scopic regime in modernity 
because it seemed to best express ‘the “natural” experience of sight valorized by a scientific world-view.’ 
(p. 5) However, two other scopic regimes have also informed the modem visual order: 1) an ‘art of 
describing’, as in seventeenth century Dutch painting based in cartographic principles; and 2) a ‘madness 
of vision’, as in Baroque art, which flaunted the opacity of the sublime subject and underscored the 
rhetorical conventionality of sight.
70Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes’, at pp. 4 & 6. There are two implications that follow from the imposition 
of this scopic regime. First, the visual order was ‘de-eroticised’ as the abstract coldness of the perspectival 
gaze eliminated any emotional contact between the artist/viewer and die image depicted, ‘ [t]he moment 
of erotic projection in vision -  what St. Augustine had anxiously condemned as “ocular desire” -  was lost 
as the bodies of the painter and viewer were forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincamated, absolute 
eye.’ Second, the visual order was ‘de-narrativized or de-textualized’ as the image became more 
autonomous from its extrinsic purpose -  religious or other; painters became more interested in the abstract, 
qualitatively conceptualized space than in the subjects painted in it. Jay ‘Scopic Regimes’, p. 8.
71 Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes’, p. 7.
72Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes’, p. 7.
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the Founding Perception, in a perfect recreation of that first epiphany.73 
If we retrace our steps for a moment and return to Alberti’s On Painting, we can see how 
the sovereignty of the eye is privileged in perspective discourse. First, the form and 
position of the objects depicted in space are, for Alberti, no longer determined by 
absolute principles but produced by the relative position of the sovereign eye. Second, 
Alberti’s rays of vision originate in the eye, confirming its sovereignty at centre of the 
visual world. Third, linear perspective reinforces a realist representation of space in the 
external world; the external world is directed towards the individual located outside of 
that space. The eye has ‘absolute mastery over space. ... Visually space is rendered the 
property of the individual detached observer, from whose divine location it is a 
dependent, appropriated object.’74
Ruggie’s observation -  outlined at the start of this chapter -  that territorial 
differentiation mirrors the social episteme of perspective, is an example of the way that5 
the sovereignty of the eye is privileged in perspective discourse. As Ruggie says, 
‘political space came to be defined as it appeared from a single fixed viewpoint.’75 
Ruggie also reproduces a concept of the sovereign subject, identical to the humanist ideal, 
that is outside of and able to order the space it inhabits. Ruggie, in effect, offers us 
Alberti’s ‘Man’, who occupies ‘a central position as observer of a pictorial world of 
which he himself is the measure.’76 Giulio Argan points out that this conception of 
subjectivity is inseparable from the notion that perspective is a conception of the world, 
the artistic representation of the Platonic ideal of man knowing himself in Nature. Once 
man is no longer a particular inscribed within a universal transcendent Nature, 
perspective is the vehicle by which the newly constituted Ego, endowed with senses and 
reason, is able to apprehend Nature. Further, because the laws of form and nature are
7^Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 
1983), p. 94.
74See, for these three points and the quote, Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, Perspective’, pp. 48-9.
75Ruggie, ‘Territoriality’, p. 159.
76John White, The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space (London, Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 121. 
For White ‘ [t]he new role of the spectator in relation to the picture, which played such an important part 
in the discovery of Brunelleschi’s two panels, is underlined throughout Alberti’s treatise, and reflects the 
growing humanism of the period. This humanist approach is carried into the pictorial world itself when 
Alberti points out that all the appearances of things are purely relative, and that it is the human figure which 
alone provides the measure of whatever else the artist cares to represent.’ p. 122.
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equivalent, through perspective the sovereign-artist comprehends ‘nature as a reality 
conceived by man and distinct from him as the object from the subject’.77
The eye-as-sovereign thesis also implies that space is, to paraphrase Argan, ‘a 
reality conceived by man and distinct from him as the object from the subject’. The space 
produced by the sovereign eye of the ideal humanist subject through perspective is known 
and ordered rationally in the same way that territory is demarcated and disciplined by 
sovereign political authority. The rational nature of perspectival space is emphasised by 
Panofsky in Perspective as Symbolic Form. Panofsky argues that perspective transformed 
psycho-physiological space into rational, systematic and modem mathematical space. 
Panofsky even goes so far as to claim that perspective constitutes the modem 
Weltanschauung which ‘demands and realizes a systematic space’. In modernity 
perception is ‘governed by a conception of space expressed by strict linear perspective’ 
which, in turn, is ‘comprehensible’ only for a ’specifically modem, sense of space, o r ... 
sense of the world’.78 It is worth noting that Panofsky maintains that modem rational 
systematic space is a prerequisite for rather than a product o f  perspective. Indeed he 
argues that modem systematic space first appeared in the art of the early Renaissance -  
as in Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s Annunciation (1344) which Panofsky reads as the first use 
of a coordinate system -  ‘well before it had been postulated by abstract mathematical 
thought.’79 This system was later formalised in terms of mathematical theory by 
Quattrocento costruzione legittima. Panofsky’s argument that systematic rational space 
provided the conditions for linear perspective is reinforced by Edgerton’s view that ‘a 
“systematic” space,” infinite, homogeneous, and isotropic’, precipitated the re-discovery 
of linear perspective in the Quattrocento.’80
77 Argan, ‘Architecture of Brunelleschi’, p. 96.
78Panofsky, Perspective, at pp. 42 & 34.
79Panofsky, Perspective, p. 58.
80Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, The Renaissance Rediscovery o f Linear Perspective (New York NY, 
Basic Books Inc, 1975), p. 161. For Edgerton linear perspective is based on the assumption that ‘visual 
space is ordered a priori by an abstract uniform system of linear coordinates’ which allows painters to 
conceive of a subject in the realm of spatial homogeneity. Edgerton Rediscovery, p. 7. Panofsky and 
Edgerton’s thesis that perspective is a product of rational systematic space has not gone unchallenged. 
Elkins argues that Panofsky engages in a chronological sleight-of-hand by attributing to the Renaissance 
a Kantian conception of space -  in which the a posteriori world of objects is disconnected from the a 
priori intuition of pure space that makes the appearance of objects possible. For Elkins perspective did not 
arise out of a general sense of rationalized space. While some painters did have ‘an inchoate idea of 
rationalized space’ we cannot ‘attribute an interest in the rationalization of all space to painters who looked
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The hegemony of the perspective visual order and its production of abstract
rational space was reinforced by the simultaneous rise of a modem scientific
Weltanschauung and bourgeois mentality. Cartesian-Perspectivalism was ‘in league with
a scientific world view that no longer hermeneutically read the world as a divine text, but
rather saw it as situated in a mathematically regular spatio-temporal order filled with
natural objects that could only be observed from without by the dispassionate eye of the
neutral observer.’81 During the Renaissance the eye’s ability to observe and record the
world was acknowledged by Leonardo da Vinci:
Now do you not see that the eye embraces the beauty of the whole world?
It is the lord of astronomy and the maker of cosmography; it counsels and 
corrects all the arts of mankind; it leads men to different parts of the 
world; it is the prince of mathematics, and the sciences founded on it are 
absolutely certain. It has measured the distances and sizes of the stars; it 
has found the elements and their locations; it divines the future from the 
course of the stars; it has given birth to architecture, and to perspective, 
and to the divine art of painting.82
Leonardo’s proclamation of the ‘triumph of the Eye/I’ over word and tradition is, argues
Turner, evidence that the seeds of modem scientific rationality were being nurtured in
Renaissance knowledge.83 Perspective which abstracted space created a distance between
the experiencing subject and the experienced object -  the pictorial surface acted as an
invisible plane separating the space occupied by the viewing subject from the Active
space on the other side -  and so can be seen as
one of the first steps in the modem scientific outlook, in the sense that an 
object is no longer as it was in the Middle Ages, something loaded with 
symbolic qualities in which experienced subject and external object tend 
to fuse, but an entity to be held at arm’s length and subjected to
at specific objects with geometrical eyes.’ Elkins, Poetics, pp. 28-9.
81Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes’, p. 9.
Leonardo, quoted in A. Richard Turner, Inventing Leonardo: The Anatomy of A Legend 
(London, Papermac, 1995), p. 157.
Turner, Inventing Leonardo, pp. 155-7. Perspective and sight were valued because, unlike 
words which required interpretation through other words, they permitted the immediate perception and 
objective representation of the world’s phenomena, especially the three-dimensional structures of objects. 
Leonardo regarded himself as an ‘omo sanza lettera’ who acknowledged that words are human inventions 
requiring interpretation through more words and as such susceptible to errors of tradition. For Leonardo 
the phenomena of the world, the truths of the present can be directly grasped by the eye: “Painting presents 
the works of nature to our understanding with more truth and accuracy that do words or letters; but letters 
represent words with more truth than does painting.” Leonardo, quoted in Turner, Inventing Leonardo, p. 
169.
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dispassionate optical scrutiny.84
The hegemony of the perspectivalist scopic regime of modernity, invented or, at 
least, re-discovered during the Italian Renaissance, underpins a whole technology of 
power. This regime organised the appropriation and ordering of various social, political 
and cultural spaces. Its impact on the legitimation of the idea of the territorial state came 
principally through its reinforcement of territorial borders in cartographic discourse. 
Cartographic representations of space facilitated not only the production of the political 
spaces of differentiated territorial sovereignty but also the spatial imagination of modem 
European International Society.
Mapping Territory
8. Ptolemy, World Map, British Library, London
The beginnings of Renaissance cartography can be traced to the publication in Florence 
in 1406 of Jacopo d’Angelo’s Latin translation of Ptolemy’s Geographia (Fig. 8). The 
influence of the Geographia was widespread, reaching beyond the obvious constituency
84Tumer, Inventing Leonardo, p. 169. Leonardo was not a scientist in the modem sense o f  
someone developing a theory based on empirical perception. He was a naturalist who observed natural 
visual phenomenon and ordered them, according to the requirements o f  the Renaissance episteme, through 
correspondence and analogies: ‘the human body is like a machine; swimming and flying are similar 
activities; the cardiovascular system is like a tree, the heart and its attendant vessels like a developing seed; 
the support o f  the skull by the neck like the rigging o f  a ship ... etc. ’ Turner, Inventing Leonardo p. 171.
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of the spatial disciplines to many branches of Renaissance knowledge.85 Edgerton
suggests that it was appealing to the Renaissance mind because, like perspective, it was
based in the classical discourse of optics or perspectiva. Ptolemy’s instruction to
mapmakers to view the part of the world to be mapped as if it were connected at its centre
to the centre of the viewer’s eye by an abstract visual axis or perpendicular line, followed
on from the optical theorem that only the aspect of an object on an axis with the eye’s
centre could be clearly observed. The Geographia, argues Edgerton, reinforced rather
than overturned the traditional belief of Euclidean-based perspectiva that the perfect
harmonies and symmetries of geometry revealed the plan of the universe as designed by
God.86 Although scholars have, so far, not been able to establish precise associations
between cartography and the emergence of perspective in the fifteenth century, there is
a strong link between cartography and the production of the idea of the territorial state
in the Renaissance power/knowledge regime of perspective. David Woodward argues that
a community of scholarship and practice ... grew up later in the fifteenth 
century around the idea of measured space. There was a common interest 
in geometrically proportioned representations of nature among artists and 
engineers of the fifteenth century that is the hallmark of the “universal 
man” of the Renaissance. Surveying and mapping the Earth were at the 
very heart of this activity.87
One of the advantages of Ptolemy’s world map was that once places were mapped 
according to their longitude and latitude the cartographer was able to preserve the correct 
proportion of small areas to the whole earth. Ptolemy unified the ‘chorographic’ mapping 
of smaller areas by using pictorial elements with the ‘geographic’ maps of the world that 
showed features by lines and dots. For Renaissance scholars much of the value of 
Ptolemy’s Geographia was in showing how to combine chorography and geography in 
one geometrical space. Renaissance cartographers drew upon Ptolemy’s mapping
Of
Leonardo, deploying the familiar microcosm-macrocosm trope, cites the Geographia while 
discussing human anatomy: ‘Therefore, by my plan you will become acquainted with every part of the 
human body ... There will be revealed to you in fifteen entire figures the cosmography of this minor 
mondo, in the same order as was used by Ptolemy before me in his Cosmographia. ’ Leonardo, quoted in 
Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr, ‘From Mental Matrix to Mappamundi to Christian Empire: The Heritage of 
Ptolemaic Cartography in the Renaissance’ in David Woodward (ed.), Art and Cartography: Six Historical 
Essays (Chicago IL, University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 10-50, quote at p. 12.
86See Edgerton, ‘From Mental Matrix’, pp. 12-15.
o7
David Woodward, ‘Maps and the Rationalization of Geographic Space’ in Jay A. Levenson 
(ed.), Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration [National Gallery of Art, Washington](New Haven NH, 
Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 83-7, at p. 84.
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techniques -  plotting co-ordinates on intersecting perpendicular axes based in the 
geometrical space of Euclidean plane geometry -  in their attempts to combine the local 
surveys of the new lands revealed through the ‘voyages of discovery’ and the spaces of 
the known world in a synthetic whole. The distinction between geographic and 
chorographic mapping does however allow us to explore two different conduits through 
which the perspectival power/knowledge matrix contributed to the Renaissance 
development of the idea of the territorial state.
Mapping the Boundaries o f  International Society
The Geographia's publication precipitated a radical revision of the European world view. 
In particular it condemned the traditional symbolic imagery of the medieval mappa- 
mundi to obsolescence (Fig. 9). The medieval mappa-mundi was structured according to
9. Beatus, Mappa Mundi, British Library, London
the classic T-0 design. The O defined the outer limits of the landmass which was divided 
into one upper (orientated to the east) semi-circle occupied by Asia, and two lower 
quarter circles, Europe bottom left and Africa bottom right. The T was formed by the 
rivers which separated the three continents: the Tanais and Nile rivers formed the T’s 
crossbar and the Mediterranean was the downstroke. These maps symbolised the
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Christian cross with Jerusalem -  rather than Rome -  located at the geographical and 
symbolic centre. (It is worth noting that for the medieval European mind, as is clearly 
indicated by the size its landmass in the T-0 map, Asia was a strong presence: 
commercial and diplomatic relations with Asian rulers contributed significantly to the 
European world-view.) The T-0 maps depicted the orbis terrarum -  the territory of the 
foreshortened three-continental land mass (Europe, Asia, and Africa) -  as being limited 
and confined by an all-encircling Ocean sea, commonly regarded as being inaccessible.88
However, by the latter decades of the fifteenth century many educated Europeans 
had, at least intellectually, escaped from the confines of the medieval orbis terrarum. 
This new vision is most starkly presented in Paolo dal Pozzo ’ s famous letter to Toscanelli 
of 1474 which suggested to Columbus the theory of the ‘westward route’ from Portugal 
and Spain to the spice islands of the Indies. The ‘Toscanelli letter’ advanced two novel 
premises: first, that the ocean could be used as an intercontinental waterway; and second, 
that the navigable Ocean sea included the Southern Hemisphere.89 Thomas Goldstein has 
argued that although the Toscanelli letter was the most important single statement of the 
western route, it should be seen as the outcome of the process of the Florentine 
‘intellectual conquest of the earth’ that began in the first decades of the fifteenth century. 
The imposition of heavy tolls by the Turks and Venetians on trade through Cairo and the 
Red Sea meant that the Florentines had to find a new way to the spice islands. Florentine 
scholars hypothesised from their readings of the word-views in the Geographia and the 
manuscripts of Strabo -  introduced to the Florentines by Gemistos Plethon at the Council 
of Florence 1439-40 -  that they could be reached by a navigable sea. First, the ‘eastern’ 
(northern) territorial sweep of the T-0 map was reframed. Ptolemy’s oikoumene extended 
west-east from Gibralter to India and north-south from the Central Asian steppes to 
Ethiopia and put the Far East into sharper focus -  his anticipation of several Southeast 
Asian islands were confirmed by Marco Polo. Second, Ptolemy’s Africa extended beyond 
the equator, implying that the Southern Hemisphere was not just the traditional “torrid
g o
See, on mappae-mundi, Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World 
(London, Reaktion Books Ltd, 1997), pp. 26-33; and Woodward, ‘Maps and Rationalization’, p. 83.
89See, on the “Toscanelli Letter’, Thomas Goldstein, ‘Geography in Fifteenth-Century Florence’ 
in John Parker (ed.), Merchants and Scholars (Minneapolis MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1965), 
pp. 11-32.
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zone” but could be both inhabitable and navigable. Third, from Strabo came the startling 
idea, at least for fifteenth century geographers, ‘that the Asiatic land mass as a whole, 
south as well as east, was washed by the Ocean Sea. (“But the Southern and Eastern sides 
[of ‘India’] which are much greater than the other two, extend out into the Atlantic sea,” 
he had said.)’90 This meant that in theory Southeast Asia, including the Spice Islands, was 
accessible from the east by sailing west -  no one of course, had anticipated the barrier 
that the American continent would prove to be to these aspirations.
In terms of the representation and production of rationally ordered space in the 
discourse of perspective, the longitude and latitude grid system of the Geographia 
signalled the end of the Christian symbolism of the T-0 map. Ptolemy’s known world 
was presented in terms of geometrical co-ordinates; his organising system ‘depended on 
imagining the globe not as amorphous topography but as a homogeneous surface ruled 
by a uniform geometric grid.’91 The Geographia suggested that the world could be 
mapped according to a rational system in which a single geometric framework related 
local discoveries to the whole world. Fifteenth century world-maps produced the ‘first 
coherent, and rationally cumulative pictures of the world since antiquity.’92 Possibly the 
first true map of the world, an oval projection graduated with 360 degrees longitude and 
180 latitude onto which every point on earth could be plotted, was produced by the
90Goldstein, ‘Geography in Fifteenth-Century Florence’, p. 24.
91Edgerton, ‘From Mental Matrix’, p. 13.
92 Joan Kelly Gadol, Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance (Chicago IL, 
1969), p. 201, quoted in Woodward, ‘Maps and Rationalization’, p. 85. Some historians warn against over­
stressing the novelty of Renaissance cartography. Edgerton notes that the ‘new Renaissance grid 
consciousness’ had its antecedents in the grid organisation of space in several ancient civilisations: 
Alexander the Great made ‘the grid the trademark of Greek civilisation’; the Romans imposed a modular 
grid plan on all towns in the Empire and their centurion surveyors divided up conquered land into hundred 
square units for distribution to colonists; finally, the Chinese built grid cities and had a view of world 
based on rectangles centered on the Middle Kingdom. See Edgerton, ‘Mental Matrix’, pp. 15-26. Second, 
Whitfield suggests that Renaissance cartography was not revolutionary because it did not redefine the 
sources of knowledge. Even in 1600 the standard Cosmographia Universalis still bore the traces of a 
scholastic narratives of the past and was not constructed exclusively on the basis of reason or empiricism. 
While the form and social context of maps had been partially secularised, ‘emancipation from traditional 
sources, literary and legendary, would have been seen as impoverishing the map’. Even Mercator’s world 
map of 1569 constructed by mathematical principles drew on non-scientific geographical sources. 
Mercator’s representation of the Arctic for example is ‘pure medievalism’ based on the legend of the four 
rivers recounted by the fourteenth century English monk, Nicholas of Lynn; the Antarctic also is 
hypothetical based on the traditional authority of Ptolemy and Marco Polo. Renaissance map-makers were 
still cosmologers rather than scientifically-based geographers. See Peter Whitfield, The Image o f the 
World: Twenty Centuries of World Maps (London, The British Library, 1994), esp. p. 38.
180
workshop of Francesco Rosselli in Florence in 1508 (Fig. 10).
10. Rosselli, World Map, Florence
The spaces of the fifteenth century were no longer organised, as in the medieval
hierarchy, into central and peripheral positions, but all had equal status in the geometrical
net of lines of longitude and latitude. This was an important source of the abstract rational
space which Lefebvre identified as the dominant modem ‘representation of space’. This
space was more easily colonised and appropriated by monarchs and merchants.
Within this spatially determined grid fifteenth century geographers were 
able to plot a proliferation of locations across terrestrial space which was 
no longer circumscribed by the principles of Christian belief. Ptolemy’s 
impact on the world of geography was to revolutionize a certain 
perception of space itself, which was no longer charged with religious 
significance but was instead a continuous, open terrestrial space across 
which the monarchs and merchants who invested in copies of his 
Geographia could envisage themselves conquering and trading regardless 
of religious prescription.93
Such an abstract image of the whole earth revealed a finite world ‘over which systematic
dominance was possible, and provided a powerful framework for political expansion and
control.’94
93Brotton, Trading Territories, p. 32.
94Woodward, ‘Maps and Rationalization’, p. 87.
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Cartography played a major role in demarcating the new spaces of International 
Society that were discovered in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries. The first 
major cartographic inscription of the spaces of an extra-European International Society 
was the demarcation line established by the Treaty of Tordesillas in June 1494. This 
treaty was agreed upon after Columbus’ return in 1493 with the news of his discovery of 
islands in the Bahamas group and his exploration of the northern coasts of Cuba and 
Hispaniola. Columbus not only believed that he had discovered a part of Asia, but also 
claimed the discovered territories in the name of his sponsors, the crown of Castile. This 
upset the Portugese king Joao II who argued that Columbus’ discoveries infringed the 
terms of the Treaty of Alca?ovas of 1479 agreed between Portugal and Castile which had 
stipulated that any territories discovered ‘beyond’ Guinea were to be Portugese. Castile 
countered by suggesting that this undetermined ‘beyond’ did not extend so far as to 
include the lands discovered by Columbus. Eventually an agreement was reached 
between the two crowns, negotiated and brokered by Pope Alexander VI. The Spanish 
retained their claim to Columbus’ discoveries while the Portuguese were guaranteed 
exclusive rights to all navigational routes throughout Africa, the eastern Atlantic and all 
territories to the East.95 This agreement was literally inscribed into the space of the world- 
map when
Pope Alexander V I ... sat down before his mappamundi and arbitrarily, 
in the blank space to the left of the oikoumene, drew in a new meridian 
that he proclaimed to be “one hundred leagues west of the Azores”. All 
the vast terra incognita to the west of this purely abstract “demarcation 
line” he awarded to the Spanish. Everything East must go to Portugal.96
The final text of the Treaty of Tordesillas stipulated that
... a boundary or straight line be determined and drawn north and south, 
from pole to pole, on the said ocean sea, from the Arctic to the Antarctic 
pole. This boundary or line shall be drawn straight, at a distance of three 
hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands.97
Martin Wight has suggested that the most significant cartographic delineation of
the space of international society came not at Tordesillas but at the Peace of Cateau-
Cambresis in 1559 when a boundary-line was drawn on the world-map between the
95See, for details, Brotton, Trading Territories, pp. 71-2.
96Edgerton, ‘From Mental Matrix’, p. 46.
97Cited in Brotton, Trading Territories, p. 72.
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spaces of the civilized (European-Christian) world and the spaces allocated to uncivilized
cultures. Early-Modern conceptions of international society, such as that in the legal work
of Hugo Grotius, were ‘dual or concentric’. Grotius distinguished between ‘an outer
circle that embraces all mankind, under natural law, and an inner circle, the corpus
christianorum, bound by the law of Christ.’98 Yet almost a century before Grotius this
concentric or dual conception of international society was represented on world-maps.
Wight contends that at Cateau-Cambresis the modem states-system’s ‘dual nature, two
concentric circles, European and universal’ achieved formal diplomatic recognition. The
European signatories agreed verbally that beyond a line on a meridian of the Azores and
the Tropic of Cancer -  to the west and the south -  acts of hostility would not violate the
treaty. This overlaid the papal line of demarcation drawn up at Treaty of Tordesillas,
which the French argued was not part of the law of Christendom as it had not been
legitimated by a papal bull.
Thus the papal ‘line of demarcation’, which in theory or legend was an 
arbitral award to preserve peace, gave way to the ‘amity line’, which 
divided the zone of peace from the zone of w ar... “No peace beyond the 
Line” became almost a mle of international law, giving freedom to 
plunder, attack and settle without upsetting the peace of Europe.99
From the late fifteenth century new cartographic techniques of geographical
representation were deployed in the demarcation of the spaces and boundaries of the
territories of international society. International society was imagined in terms of
geographic space that was ‘abstract, geometric and homogeneous’ and no longer ordered
according to Christian symbolism.100 One implication of the arrangement whereby the the
‘outside’ spaces of extra-European international society were designated as arenas for
violence and war was to leave the European princes free to use violence to consolidate
the ‘inside’ spaces of their territorial dominions without outside interference. Cartography
was used by these princes to define the spaces and limits of the new territorial states of
Renaissance Europe.
QO
Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977),
p. 128.
"Martin Wight, Systems of States, p. 125.
100David Woodward, ‘Maps and Rationalization’, p. 84.
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Mapping Territorial Boundaries
In the previous section it was pointed out that geographical mapping was an important 
element in the Renaissance production of the spaces of international society. In this 
section I wish to explore how chorographic or topographical mapping -  another mapping 
technique inspired by the Geographia -  was deployed in marking-out territorial 
boundaries in the Renaissance. Topographical maps are large-scale maps of small 
districts which show the shapes and patterns of the landscape -  as distinct from small- 
scale maps showing features of a whole province or nation. Like the geographical maps, 
the Renaissance topographical maps were drawn to scale: ‘a landscape portrayed by 
selected features [was] shown in a standardized form and set in the framework of a 
uniform scale.’101 Italian cartographers were at the forefront of the development of 
topographical mapping and they established its essential characteristics and methods by 
1500. P.D. A. Harvey argues that Italy was ‘by far the most map-conscious part of Europe 
in the middle ages.’102
In Renaissance Italy two types of topographical maps were especially important 
to the representation of territoriality in the discourse of perspective: bird’s-eye views of 
towns, and district or regional maps of small areas. Between the twelfth and fifteenth 
centuries several rather basic picture maps, showing mainly the outline of walls and the 
most notable buildings, were drawn of Italian towns. Usually these maps depicted Rome 
-  like the map published in Paolino Veneto’s Magna chronologia from the 1320s and 
1330s, and the map in Flavio Biondo’s Roma instaurate 1444-6 -  but Milan and Florence 
were also mapped.103 By the end of the fifteenth century, however, the basic town plan 
no longer satisfied the desire for realism in Italian art and maps were produced which 
drew on the realist, or at least less symbolic, ground-views of towns. Ambrogio
101P.D.A. Harvey, The History of Topographical Maps: Symbols, Pictures and Surveys (London, 
Thames and Hudson, 1980), p. 11.
109Harvey, History o f Topographical Maps, p. 58. John Marino cautions that while a ‘map 
consciousness’ did distinguish Italy from the rest of medieval Europe, the meaning of this vision was an 
idealized and moralised geography: ‘an integrated cosmography of spiritual and geographical knowledge’. 
John Marino, ‘Administrative Mapping in the Italian States’ in David Buisseret (ed.), Monarchs, Ministers 
and Maps: The Emergence o f Cartography as a Tool o f Government in Early Modern Europe (Chicago 
IL, University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 5-25, at p. 5.
10^See, on these early picture-maps, Harvey, The History o f Topographical Maps, pp. 68-75.
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Lorenzetti’s view of Siena in Good Government and the image of Perugia in Benedetto 
Bonfigli’s 1454 chapel of Palazzo dei Priori are good examples of such work. The 
realism of these paintings was combined with perspective to present a birds-eye view of 
the city ‘as it really was’.
In Renaissance Italy three map makers were especially important in the 
development of bird’s-eye town plans.104 The Florentine Francesco Rosselli, whose 
world-map we have already come across, made various engraving of Pisa, Florence, 
Rome and Constantinople. Rosselli introduced into the genre a ‘detailed realism’ that can 
be seen in his 1482 view of Florence, known as the ‘Map with the Chain’ [Fig .11] 
Although this map looks at first sight like a simple landscape view looking down on the 
city from hills to the south-west, it can be read as an important image of territoriality. 
Florence lies secure within her walls guaranteeing the sovereignty of the territorial 
dominion whose good governance is evident in the wealth and prosperity of the contado 
-  note that Rosselli actually shows us the artist-surveyor drawing up the perspective plan, 
in the bottom right hand comer.105 The second Italian pioneer of birds-eye mapping was
11. Woodcut of Rosselli’s Map with the Chain, Florence
Jacopo de’ Barbari whose 1500 map of Venice is regarded as ‘a masterpiece of the vision
104The following discussion o f  Rosselli, D e’ Barbari and Leonardo is drawn mainly from Harvey, 
The History o f  Topographical M aps, respectively pp. 66-9, 75-8 & 153-6.
105The whole image is actually misleading, as no hills overlook Florence from point at which the 
map is drawn; it is drawn from an unobtainable viewpoint.
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and skill of the Italian Renaissance.’106 Barbari managed to symbolise Venice’s size, 
wealth and power by means of a complex artistic technique which combined a mosaic of 
individual sketches within a framework of an existing plan of Venice adjusted to achieve 
the uniform foreshortening, the single perspective, required by a birds-eye view.
The third innovator, perhaps not surprisingly, was Leonardo da Vinci. Two of 
Leonardo’s maps are of particular interest, not only because of their innovative 
cartography, but also because they have known associations with Machiavelli. When 
Machiavelli was serving as Florence’s Secretary of State for War during the 1503 war 
with Pisa, he commissioned Leonardo as a military architect to draw up a scheme to 
divert the course of the Amo to cut Pisa off from the sea. Leonardo’s subsequent plan for 
the embanking scheme was drawn to scale and depicted the surrounding countryside not 
as a landscape as viewed from the ground, but as a flattened projection as seen from 
above (Fig. 12).
12. Leonard da Vinci, Plan o f  Scheme to Divert the River Arno, Royal Library, Windsor
It is possible that Machiavelli commissioned Leonardo for this project after seeing 
Leonardo’s famous bird’s-eye plan of Imola -  which Machiavelli, as Florentine 
ambassador, witnessed Leonardo presenting to Cesare Borgia in 1502. In the Imola map 
all the buildings have their plans drawn in proportion, and obvious monuments are not 
exaggerated. The eight compass lines radiating out from centre of the city to the 
circumference of map’s frame shows Leonardo’s concern with distance. These plans 
anticipated many of the subsequent designs of and uses for topographical maps across
106Harvey, The History o f  Topographical Maps, p. 76.
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sixteenth century Europe. Leonardo was an innovator ‘in his concern for scale, his move 
away from pictorial representation towards outline plan, the union in himself of the 
surveyor and military engineer with the artist ... in his interest in the problems of 
cartography and his use of maps to set out and clarify all sorts of problems involving 
landscape: drainage, military strategy and tactics’.107
The other form of topographical maps based in perspective that contributed to the 
Renaissance idea of territoriality were district maps. In Italy maps were not widely 
deployed as administrative tools until the latter half of the sixteenth century. However, 
some state authorities did commission district maps as early as the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.108 Often these maps were used for military-strategic purposes. This 
was especially so in the Venetian terrafirma where the surviving maps provide ‘a graphic 
guide to the theatre of war at the time of the first Venetian conquests of the 
terrraflrma\m  In the fifteenth century the Venetians were alone in their appreciation of 
the potential that maps had for planning military campaigns and for governing and 
administering territories The war between Milan and Venice, which lasted from 1437 to 
1441, produced two maps of Lombardy on which we can see details of several items of 
military significance such as walled towns and bridges. One of these maps highlights the 
Fosse Bergamasca boundary ditch dug between Milan and Bergamo in the thirteenth 
century. Other district maps of Verona @1440), Padua 1449, Parma @ 1460 and Brescia 
1471 -2 were also executed. The main Venetian mapping project was begun in 1460 when 
the Council of Ten requested that the governors of territories, cites and castles under 
Venetian rule should commission maps and surveys and then send them to Venice. 
Several of these maps survive, including Padua 1465 by Francesco Squarcione, Brescia 
1469-70 and Verona 1479-80.110 There is also a 1496-9 military map of the Venetian 
terrafirma that emphasises territorial fortifications (Fig. 13). These maps were used to
107Harvey, History of Topographical Maps, p. 155.
108Marino points out that few maps in the state archives of Venice, Florence and Naples and in 
the published collections of Milan and Vatican are dated before the 1560s. See Marino, ‘Administrative 
Mapping in the Italian States’.
109Harvey, History o f Topographical Maps, p. 59.
110These fifteenth century maps were not particularly sophisticated. They tended to focus on the 
main city, often shown in exaggerated size; rarely illustrated much more than the fortifications of outlying 
towns; and were rarely drawn to a consistent scale.
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‘define borders, to aid in water and lagoon management, to illustrate and clarify 
ambassadorial dispatches, for defence and fortress designs, and to resolve disputes in 
court cases.’111
13. Map of Venetian Teraflrma late IS* century
In the sixteenth century the Venetian topographical and chorographical projects 
came into their own. Venetian land surveyors orperiti, like Cristoforo Sorte, mapped and 
charted 150000 hectares of land in the terrafirma between 1560 and 1600. These schemes 
were indicative of the way that the regime of perspective assisted the human mastery of 
space and territory. The new territories of the Venetian state were demarcated using 
methods which combined perspective and Euclidean geometry with naturalistic landscape 
imagery.112 Sorte considered perspective “the most essential foundation for painters and 
requiring of them the greatest familiarity, recognising that without it nothing can be 
depicted of any value.”113 Cosgrove argues that because the same Euclidean principles 
of geometry underpinned both perspective theory and the surveyors’ techniques of land 
reclamation -  conducted using compasses, cross-staff quadrants and astrolabes -  
‘technically and theoretically therefore both the reality and the illusion of Venetian
11'Marino, ‘Administrative Mapping’, p. 6.
112Denis Cosgrove, ‘The Geometiy o f  Landscape: Practical and Speculative Arts in Sixteenth- 
Century Venetian Land Territories’ in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (eds), The Iconography o f  
Landscape (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 254-76.
113Sorte, Osservazione nellapittura, 1580, quoted in Cosgrove, ‘Geometry o f  Landscape’, at p.
2 6 1 .
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landscape were grounded in Euclidean geometry.’114 Although the tradition of district 
maps was almost exclusively restricted to north Italy, some were commissioned in other 
parts of Italy. A manuscript of the Geographia printed in 1448 reproduced a map of 
Tuscany by Pietro de Massaio; and in the first decade of the sixteenth century Giovanni 
Pontano produced a map of the northern boundary of Naples for King Ferdinand based 
on a measured survey and drawn to scale.115 In any case, the pioneering district maps of 
the Italian Renaissance did help to define the territorial boundaries of Renaissance Italian 
states.
| | g j j
14. Map of the Border Commissioners tracing the 
Aussa River
This can be seen in the example from the Office of the Border Commissions (1538) [Fig. 
14] which
114Cosgrove, ‘Geometry o f  Landscape’, p. 261.
115Marino argues in ‘Administrative Mapping’ that there are two reasons why accurate maps o f  
cities, towns, provinces and principalities only emerged as administrative tools for Italian states in the last 
decades o f  the sixteenth century, despite the fact that since the early fifteenth century perspective had 
dominated Western modes o f  perception. First, it took a while for cartographers to escape the aesthetic 
requirement o f  maps commissioned by princes, rulers and clergy for didactic, spiritual or commemorative 
purposes. Second, in the fifteenth century the bureaucratic imagination was more concerned with the 
control o f  finances than with organising space. In the sixteenth century two changes increased the use o f  
mapping as form o f administrative control: i) government bureaucracies increased their control over the 
state’s domains: in Florence and Milan, organisations overseeing borders, roads, water and buildings all 
sprung up; ii) this reflected a general upturn in the economy: the ‘Italian Indian summer’ that followed the 
end o f  the Italian wars, signalled by the Peace o f  Cateau-Cambresis 1559, increased demand, credit and 
production in Northern cities, and maps were among the goods produced for these revived markets.
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depicts the land between Strasoldo, Cervignano, Aquileia, and the Aussa 
River, with clear demarcation of proprietorship between Venice and
Germany (de Tedeschi)___note the specificity of jurisdictions. Some are
named after cities like Strasoldo and Malisana, others after lords like the 
monks of Aquileia or the Savorgnani. ... Territorial information 
distinguishes such maps.116
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the representation and production of the idea of the territorial 
state in Renaissance Italy was intimately bound up with the invention or rediscovery of 
perspective in art. In the Italian Renaissance perspective facilitated the production and 
legitimation of the modem idea of the territorial state. We have seen that perspective not 
only enabled the pictorial representation of territoriality but also informed various 
discursive practices like cartography that produced territorial differentiation on the 
ground. As a technique for the artistic representation of three-dimensional space on a 
two-dimensional canvas, perspective gave artists like Piero della Francesca the means to 
represent their patron princes as sovereigns whose authority extended over and issued 
from their territories. Perspective also operated as an element of an all pervasive 
Foucauldian regime of power and knowledge, defined by the sovereignty of the eye and 
the mastery and control of rational space. As a component in this regime of power and 
knowledge perspective facilitated the demarcation of territorial spaces, from city-states 
to international society, primarily through Renaissance cartography. The invention of 
perspective in Renaissance Italy was a significant factor in the representation, production 
and legitimation of the idea of the territorial state that has dominated the political 
landscape of modernity ever since.
116Marino, ‘Administrative Mapping’, p. 7.
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The Territorial State From the Renaissance to Postmodernity
In his Istoria Fiorentina of about 1440, Giovanni Cavalcanti described a 
territorial dispute between his home city and Milan during the wars of the 
1420s, and mentions that a longitudinal line was to be established as a 
boundary between the two states. This may have been the first instance in 
history in which an imaginary mathematic line -  rather than a physical 
landmark -  was recognized as a political-territorial limit.1
The thesis has argued that the modem idea of the territorial state originated in 
Renaissance Italy. It has rejected the claim of traditional Realist history that the idea of 
the territorial state originated in the political discourse and practice of seventeenth and 
eighteenth Classical Europe on two counts. First, in terms of chronology, it has shown 
that the foundations of the idea of the territorial state were established much earlier in the 
Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Second, in terms of the 
scope of analysis it has shown that the idea of the territorial state is not a concept 
disinterestedly signifying the objective reality of the distribution of political space in 
modernity, but is the product of a set of heterogeneous discourses and practices ranging 
from cosmology and perspective to cartography and urbanization that make up the 
modem cosmopolitan culture of space.
In this concluding chapter I want to do three things. First, in a brief review I want 
to draw all the threads of the argument together by tracing its development throughout 
the chapters. Second, with reference to Renaissance representations of the Ideal City, I 
want to re-state my argument that the spatial discourses of Renaissance Italy established 
the conditions of possibility for the Classical idea of the territorial state. Third, I want to 
bring the discussion up to date by considering the arguments that the emergence of a 
postmodern spatial order signals the end of the legitimacy of the idea of the modem 
territorial state.
Resume
The first chapter established that the three dominant Realist schools of International
1 Samuel Y. Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery o f Linear Perspective (New Y ork NY, Basic 
Books Inc., 1975), pp 113-4.
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Relations all conceive of the state as a variant of the ‘national-territorial totality’. The 
Realist notion of national territorial totality is derived from Weber’s definition of the 
state as the human community that claims a monopoly of the use of physical force within 
a defined space or territory. This conception of the territorial state has been a mainstay 
of twentieth century geopolitical theory fromfin de siecle thinkers like Ratzel and Weber 
to contemporary Realism. The Realist-Weberian idea of the territorial state serves as a 
spatial pivot upon which the modem logic of inside/outside is translated to 
representations of political space in modernity. The territorial state is the site upon which 
the principle of sovereign identity marks out the modem state as the locus of rational 
ordered self-identical presence. It is from this place of identity that the outside of 
international relations marked by alterity, difference and chaos is defined. Within this 
logic, political order, legitimacy and identity is ascribed to the sovereign state encased 
within secure territorial boundaries.
The second chapter considered some of the consequences of looking at the history 
of the Realist-Weberian idea of territorial state from the perspective of discourse analysis. 
The idea of the territorial state is not an objective reality that exists independently of our 
attempts to know and represent it, but is a product of complex networks of discourse and 
practice, power and knowledge. In the same way that Foucault’s archaeology of the 
discourses of the human sciences revealed that knowledge of man is determined by 
interdiscursive networks or epistemes, so the idea of the territorial state can be analyzed 
as a concept whose spatial characteristics are determined by shared spatial vocabularies 
that are reproduced in a wide variety of knowledges of space. If we acknowledge, as 
Foucault did in the later genealogy, that discourse consists of a complex interplay of 
power and knowledge, then we can begin to analyze the idea of the territorial state as one 
strand of a matrix of modem practices and discourses on and about space. In modernity 
space is produced by representations of space, the abstract images of architects, planners 
and cartographers that have produced an abstract, visualized space. At the state level, 
modem abstract space is striated and opposed to the smooth space of the nomad. 
Rousseau’s writings on Poland and Tocqueville’s writings on America revealed that the 
process of state territorialisation, of the codification of identity in territory, is a practice 
of violence requiring the elimination of other identities and forms of existence in space.
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Starting from the premise that space, produced in discourse, has a history, the 
third chapter assessed the traditional history of the territorial state and offered an 
alternative narrative. It identified a Classical historical narrative of the idea of the modem 
state which locates it origins in the political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. This history points to the presence of the idea of the territorial state in the 
political theory of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. I argued that this historical 
narrative is not disinterested, but is itself part of an absolutist or cosmopolitan tradition 
of modernity that identifies its own origins in terms of a rupture at the start of the 
seventeenth century with the values of the Renaissance. This cosmopolitan tradition of 
modernity is characterized by a will to order and a quest for certainty. As regards space 
these aspirations were realized in the ‘Cartesian practices’, in the service of absolutist 
state authorities, that represented space as objective, rational, homogenous and amenable 
to mastery and discipline by sovereign man. I accepted that the history of the territorial 
state needs to be contextualised in terms of its relationship to the dominant spatial 
practices of modem culture, but concluded by suggesting that it is possible to write an 
alternative history of the origins of the idea of the territorial state. This history draws 
upon Lefebvre’s account of the transformations of Western space from absolute to 
abstract space. It would start from the premise that if so many of the codes and practices 
of modernity’s representation and production of space were founded in the Italian 
Renaissance it is probable that much of what in termed ‘Cartesian practice’ -  the 
differentiation of identity and difference in abstract homogeneous space -  which 
underpins the idea of the territorial state, could have its origins in the Italian Renaissance.
The next three chapters provided the substantive evidence for my claim that the 
origin of the idea of the territorial state has its foundations in Renaissance Italy. In 
chapter four I identified signs of a territorial consciousness in Machiavelli’s political 
theory of the princely state. In Machiavelli’s work there are indications that he anticipated 
the Realist-Weberian ideal of the territorial state as the legitimate locus of sovereignty, 
violence and identity. Machiavelli’s understanding of dominion, while it still retained a 
hierarchical division between the space of the city and the spaces of the contado, 
nevertheless reflected the established legal precedent that no higher power, even that of 
the Papacy or Holy Roman existed that could interfere in the affairs of a prince in his own
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territory. Second, we saw that Machiavelli recognized that in order for a prince to gain, 
and hold onto a principality he must be prepared to exercise both spectacular and 
disciplinary violence as well as secure a monopoly of legitimate violence in the form of 
a militia. Violence was needed to bind the prince’s subjective sovereignty to the objective 
territory over which he asserted his authority. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms 
Machiavelli was aware that the new prince must overcode pre-existing territorial 
affiliations of identity and loyalty. Finally, in the exhortation to free Italy from the 
barbarians, Machiavelli discloses an awareness that the future lay with those states 
capable of inscribing national identity into their territories. Further, his patriotic discourse 
revealed the workings of a inside/outside logic of identity and difference which 
differentiated and downgraded the spaces inhabited by the barbarian hordes over the Alps 
from the spaces of Italy which had given birth to Western civilization
In chapter five we turned our attention to the Renaissance deconstruction of the 
medieval-Christian spatial lexicon or episteme of hierarchy. I argued that the Renaissance 
undermined the foundation of the Christian medieval spatial order and so paved the way 
for a modem spatial order of homogeneous, rational and logical space upon which the 
differentiated but equal spaces of sovereign territoriality could be marked out 
Renaissance humanists began the process of clearing away the vocabularies of the 
Christian medieval spatial cosmos in which the spaces of political and material being 
were united in a single hierarchical structure. We saw in Dante’s work how the 
hierarchies of Aristotelian physics, Ptolemaic astrology and Christian theology were 
mirrored in and reinforced by the political order of things reaching from the Civitas Dei 
down to the degraded concerns of temporal politics. Renaissance thinkers mounted a dual 
attack on the structures of the medieval universe. First, the Neo-Platonic discourses on 
the dignity of man, promoted in the philosophies of Ficino and Pico, established the 
principle of sovereign identity. Man was removed from his low position in the traditional 
hierarchy -  a move which took away an important keystone of that structure -  and was 
lauded as a sovereign identity able to know and control nature and space rather than be 
determined by them. Second, the new cosmologies of Cusa and Copernicus together with 
Machiavelli’s erasure of religious authority from temporal politics amounted to a 
combined sacrilization of the secular. The astronomical re-imagination of cosmological
194
space as homogeneous, extended and objective destroyed spatial hierarchy in a manner 
analogous to Machiavelli’s simultaneous demotion of the Papacy and Empire to the status 
of princes among princes.
In chapter six we examined the impact of the Renaissance Italian development of 
perspective, the cornerstone of the ocularcentric culture of modernity, on the 
representation and production of the idea of the modem territorial state. We used Piero 
della Francesca’s portrait of the Duke and Duchess of Urbino to demonstrate how 
perspective facilitated the pictorial representation of territoriality. As a technique for the 
artistic representation of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional canvas, 
perspective gave artists the means to represent princes as sovereigns whose authority was 
seen to extend over and emanate from their territories. Perspective also operated as a 
technology of power and knowledge, defined by the sovereignty of the eye and the 
mastery and control of rational space. Through discursive practices like cartography, 
perspective defined and marked out in abstract space territorial boundaries from the 
confines of city-states to the perimeters of international society.
The Ideal City and the Territorialisation of Abstract Space
1. Unknown Central Italian Artist, Ideal City, Urbino, Galleria Nazionale
This thesis has proposed that the foundations of the idea of the territorial state -  which 
became visible in the political discourses of Classical Europe -  were established in 
fifteenth century Renaissance Italy. I have adapted the distinction between foundation and 
visibility from Mumford’s claim that the qualities of grandiosity, uniformity and 
regimentation that characterized the Baroque city had their foundations in the 
Renaissance vision of the forms and structure of the city as clear, open and simple.
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Nowhere is the Baroque city more anticipated in Renaissance discourse than in a famous 
group of anonymous paintings of ideal cities. The one reproduced above is known as the 
Urbino panel and was probably painted between 1470 and 1520. It seems to express all 
the spatial ideals of the Mumford’s Baroque city: this space is grandiose, uniform and 
regimented (Fig 1). In this section I want to revisit the terrain of our enquiry once more, 
this time using the Renaissance image of the ideal city as a sign, an expression, of the 
structure of the Renaissance culture of space that served as the bedrock upon which the 
architecture of the idea of the territorial state could be constructed.
In the discourse of art history the Urbino image of the ideal city is often viewed 
in the context two other images of ideal cities, known as the Baltimore (Fig. 2) and Berlin 
(Fig. 3) panels.
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2. Unknown Central Italian Artist, Architectural Perspective, Baltimore, W alters Art Gallery
All three images, unique in fifteenth century painting, present grand urban architectural 
or theatrical settings constructed with strict adherence to the principles of costruzione 
legittima. Ordinary housing is barely evident and the countryside is shown far outside the 
walls. There are no human figures in the Berlin or Urbino panels and those in the 
Baltimore panel, possibly added later, are Tost in the vastness of the spatial 
composition’2. The composition and structure of the squares and buildings comply with 
the principles and vocabularies of architectural humanism as set out in texts like Alberti’s
2Richard Krautheimer, ‘The Panels in Urbino, Baltimore and Berlin Reconsidered’ in Henry A. 
Millon and Vittorio Magnagno Lampugnani (eds), The Renaissance From Brunelleschi to Michelangelo: 
The Representation o f  Architecture (London, Thames and Hudson, 1994), pp. 233-56, at p. 238.
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De re aedificatoria? There are appropriate monuments of antiquity, the required 
ecclesiastical and secular public buildings, and the facades, porticos, loggia, windows and 
columns all conform to Alberti’s instructions. The panels show the categories of building 
required by Alberti in an ideal urban layout: a templum or principal church or cathedral, 
a basilica or law court, palaces for leaders serving both administrative and domicile 
functions, squares for commercial and political meetings; and lower class housing.4
3. Unknown Central Italian Artist, Architectural Perspective, Berlin, Staatliche Museen
The provenance and purpose of the panels continue to be the subjects of 
speculation. The author of the paintings, according to Fiske Kimball was Luciano 
Laurana, the architect of Federico de Montelfeltro’s palace at Urbino.5 The architectural 
content of the paintings indicates the influence of Bramante and Raphael on Laurana -  
all three were residents at Federico’s court at Urbino (the Citta ideale is today exhibited 
in the dressing room of Laurana’s palace of Urbino, now the National Gallery of the 
Marches). Kimball dates the Urbino perspectives to between 1470-1480. Alessandro 
Parronchi claims that the panels were set designs conceived, probably by Franciabigio 
and Ridolfo Ghirlandaio, directly for specific theatrical productions: the comedies
3Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art o f  Building in Ten Books, trans. Joseph Rykwert, (Cambridge 
MA, The MIT Press, 1988).
For an overview o f  the theme o f the ideal city in the Renaissance with particular emphasis on 
Alberti’s De Re Aedificatoria and Filarete’s Trattato d ’ Architettura, see Helen Rosenau, The Ideal City: 
Its Architectural Evolution in Europe, 3rd ed., (London, Methuen and Co, 1983), pp. 42-67.
5Fiske Kimball, ‘Luciano Laurana and the “High Renaissance’” , Art Bulletin, 10 (1927-8), pp. 
124-51. Krautheimer notes that the only other similar work, i.e. o f  grand visionary urban settings, produced 
until the second decade o f  Cinquecento were the doors o f  the ducal apartment in the palace o f  Urbino 
executed between 1474-82. It is therefore possible that all three panels were commissioned by Federico 
da Montelfeltro whose aspirations for Urbino as the perfect humanist society drew on the architectural 
vision o f  his friend Alberti. See Krautheimer, ‘Panels Reconsidered’, p. 256.
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mounted in Florence, including Machiavelli’s Mandragola, for the festivities occasioned 
by the marriage of Lorenzo di Medici and Madeleine di II Tour d’Auvergne in Sept 1518. 
The panels were subsequently transferred to Urbino by Lorenzo de Medici when he was 
made Duke of Urbino by Leo X in 1519.6 Richard Krautheimer, before he revised his 
thesis, saw the panels not as specific models for particular theatrical productions, but as 
generic models of theater architecture; they are figural representations of what Sebastiano 
Serlio, would later term, drawing on Vitruvius, the ‘tragic’ (Baltimore) and ‘comic’ 
(Urbino) scenes.7 Andre Chastel claims the panels are ‘urban views in perspective’ 
similar to the images on many marquetry panels and cassone frontals; the paintings were 
intended to valorize the space of the city in representational terms: “it’s a matter of using 
perspective to define solemn places, ennobled by forceful architectural references, 
Colissea, triumphal arches, temples ..., so as to suggest singular, crystalline spaces set 
apart in the interior of the city, ideal for processions.... One should think of them in the 
context of ritual entries, of ceremonial decorations.”8 Finally, Hubert Damisch who 
considers all the above accounts to be flawed due to their adherence to the ‘descriptive 
illusion’, which assumes that ‘representation is the primary function of both language and 
art, a pictorial proposition, like a linguistic statement, having meaning only to the extent 
it describes the “state of things” and refers to facts presented as real, or at least 
thinkable.’9 The ‘descriptive illusion’ is preoccupied with establishing the ‘referents in 
reality’ of the buildings depicted in the three panels.10 Rather, argues Damisch, we should 
see these paintings as a series which demonstrate how the paradigm of perspective works
6Alessandro Parronchi, ‘Due note, 2. Urbino-Baltimora-Berlino’, Rinascimento, 29 (Dec 1968), 
pp. 355-61.
7Richard Krautheimer, ‘The Tragic and Comic Scenes of the Renaissance. The Baltimore and 
Urbino Panels, Gazette des Beaux-Arts, 33 (1948), pp. 327-48. Krautheimer later retracted this reading 
of the panels as the scena comica and tragica of Serlio, admitting it was ‘a major blunder’, see 
Krautheimer, ‘The Panels Reconsidered’.
8Andr6 Chastel, ‘Vues urbaines’ peintes et theatre’, quoted in Hubert Damisch, The Origin of 
Perspective, trans John Goodman, (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1994), p. 225.
9Damisch, Origin o f Perspective, pp. 238-9.
10Damisch notes that three modes of representation are evident in the readings of the panels. First, 
there are representations which refer to an older model, such as the amphitheater, triumphal arch and 
octagonal temple in the Baltimore panel; second, there are representations which have a contemporary 
reference, for example in the Berlin panel there is a replica of Alberti’s Palazzo Rucellai in Florence and 
in the Urbino panel a model similar to the buildings of Antonio da Sangallo; finally, there are 
representations of a ‘utopian renaissance’ in which models from the past are combined with anticipated 
projections of the future.
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as an ‘ expressive apparatus’ that determines the proper position of obj ects on the pictorial 
plane.11
in the historical context in which we placed ourselves, perspectiva 
artificialis provided the painter with a formal apparatus like that of the 
sentence, with which it shares many features. Starting with its 
organization of point of view, vanishing point, and distance point, and the 
other corollary points designating here, there, and over there -  which is 
sufficient to make it possible to speak, again non metaphorically, of a 
geometry of the sentence that would have its analogue in the figurative 
register. What is demonstrated by the group of Urbino perspectives, and 
had previously been demonstrated by Brunelleschi’s configuration and 
would be demonstrated again by Las Meninas, is that the sentence is not 
assignable to a single system of pronouns and positional indexes in space 
and time. The formal apparatus put in place by the perspective paradigm 
is equivalent to that of the sentence, in that it assigns the subject a place 
within a previously established network that gives it meaning, while at the 
same time opening up the possibility of something like a statement in 
painting: as Wittgenstein wrote, words are but points, while propositions 
are arrows that have meaning, which is to say direction.12
Although Damisch denies that one can establish precisely the effect that
Quattrocento perspective had on Classical architecture or stage production, he notes that
the problems posed and solutions offered by Renaissance painters and architects did lead
to developments in diverse areas such as mathematics and theater design Indeed, in a
quote which captures the spirit of the research undertaken here, he suggests that
perspective ‘plays’ across centuries and discourses and so,
If there’s no question of seeking to establish relations of cause and effect, 
or of derivation, between this manifestation and that, between this 
production and that, from heterogeneous domains, and if the links that can 
be established between diverse fields of knowledge are usually of an 
analogous, if not an imaginary or even fantasmatic, character (when 
they’re not simply anecdotal), such juxtapositions nonetheless oblige us 
to jettison the compartmentalization of discourses imposed by the
I damisch sees the ‘Ideal City’ panels as ‘representations of representation’, a demonstration of 
perspective. Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Beneviste’s linguistics and Cassirer’s philosophy of 
symbolic forms, Damisch is interested in how costruzione legittima functions as a dispositif or model 
‘equivalent to a network of spatial adverbs, if not personal pronouns: in other words, to what linguistics 
call an “expressive apparatus” {dispositif d ’enonciation, sometimes translated as “sentence structure”).’ 
p. xxi. Costruzione legittima is ‘characterized by the conjunction, the bringing together at a given point 
designated the “origin,” of lines that measure the declension of figures, by establishing their relationship 
to a shared horizon line, while simultaneously determining their conjugation on a plane.’ Origin of 
Perspective, p. xxi.
IIDamisch, Origin o f Perspective, p. 446.
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academic categorization of knowledge and to pose questions about the 
irreducible, necessary multiplicity of the forms that thought can assume.13
This ‘interdiscursive approach encourages us to read the ‘ideal city’ panel as one
more product of the Renaissance culture of space that also produced the idea of the
territorial state. The same ‘conditions of possibility’ underpin the idea of the territorial
state and the spaces of the ideal city.
The principle of sovereign identity that orders the modem spaces of presence and
absence also orders the spatial structure of the panels. Damisch argues that perspective
is like a language because perspective ‘institutes and constitutes itself under the auspices
of a point, a factor analogous to the “subject” or “person” in language, always posited in
relation to a “here” or “there”.’14 In the Urbino panel the orthogonals come together at a
point, the vanishing point, within the opening of the tempio door ‘at the height of an eye
of an imagined observer standing there, half hidden by the closed panel of the door and
directing a Cyclopean gaze towards us.’15 This is the place of the sovereign subject,
occupying a space towards which our sight is inexorably drawn, and from which an ever
present panoptic gaze observes us at all times.
Lefebvre showed us that in modernity symbolic and imaginary places are
colonized by the abstract, cold and rational spaces of capitalism and the modem territorial
state. The abstract spaces of modernity, including those designed by urban planners and
architects, are produced in representations of space, sanctified by the sovereignty of the
gaze. The planned architectural space of the three ideal city panels is cold, rational and
architectonic. Stuart Cosgrove compares Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s frescoes of Good and
Bad Government (Fig. 4), painted between 1338-9, and referred to in the last chapter,
with Pietro Perugino’s Christ Giving to St Peter the Keys to the Kingdom o f Heaven in
the Sistine Chapel, painted around 1481-2 (Fig. 5), to show how the Quattrocento
transformed the Renaissance experience of urban space.
13Damisch, Origin o f Perspective, p. 228.
14Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, p. 53. This subject is not, for Damisch, humanist ‘man’
because ‘when man comes to terms with the symbolic order, his being is, from the very start, entirely 
absorbed in it, and produced by it, not as “man”, but as subject.’
15Damisch, The Origins of Perspective, p. 341.
200
4. Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Allegory o f  Good Government in the 
City, detail, Siena, Palazzo Pubblico
In the Lorenzetti fresco the city is depicted as an active bustling world of human 
life. There is a feel for how a pedestrian walking in the city might have directly 
experienced its sights sounds and smells. It is not presented as viewed from the position 
of a detached observer. This is in sharp contrast with, what Walter Benjamin has called, 
the ‘acting/gaming space for the figures' in which the istoria of Saint Peter receiving the
• . < m v n w
5. Perugino, Consignment o f  the Keys to S t  Peter, Vatican, Sistine Chapel
keys is taking place.16 This is a formalized space of a ‘monumental order ... organized 
through precise geometry’ in which the regimented geometrical order of the checkerboard
I6Benjamin, quoted in Damisch, Origin o f  Perspective, p. 235
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piazza, drawing the eye to the temple at the center, is ‘symbolic of the whole city. The 
hills and trees beyond reflect the same regimented order as the urban architecture.’17 The 
theatrical poses of the various groups of people are choreographed with an almost 
disciplinary precision. The city is an abstract formal space that defines the places of the 
individuals in it; individuals who seem to be located within rather than being of the city. 
In our ideal city panels this motif is taken to its extreme and the abstract space is almost 
entirely void of human presence -  only in the Baltimore panel do we see a few scattered 
figures whose bodies, like that of the burdened figure, leaning on a stick, in the 
foreground, are oppressed and disciplined by the totalitarian monumental space 
enclosing them.
The space represented in these ideal city paintings is what Deleuze and Guattari 
have called state space. State space is striated and coded with signs of the state’s 
presence. Lauro Martines identifies the space in the panels as ‘signorial space’: this 
imaginary space conveys all the aspirations of the urban elites to construct spaces in 
accordance with the humanist principles of magnificence with its allusions to the 
grandeur of classical antiquity.18 This space is one of striated hierarchies that 
communicates through established signs the presence of the ecclesiastical and secular 
oligarchies and the absence of the poor, the nomadic or the alien. So strong are the 
territorial logics of state based identity and nomadic difference in these images that we 
are reminded of Bauman’s description of the spaces of the cosmopolitan-absolutist state 
and its policed sites, broad avenues and monumental order without ‘vagabonds, vagrants 
or nomads.’19
Plans to develop urban space in the Renaissance favoured the urban elites at the 
expense of other groups. In the cities of vast squares, wide streets and large buildings 
‘more space was allotted to ‘the powerful and less to the powerless.’20 In Alberti’s plans 
for an ideal city important families were kept away from the poor, the noise of tradesmen
1 *7Denis Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea’, Transactions 
of the Institute o f British Geographers: New Series, 10 (1985), pp. 45-6, at p. 49.
18Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York NY, 
Alfred A Knopf, 1979), see esp. pp. 271-6.
19Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations o f Postmodernity (London, Routledge, 1992), p. xv.
90Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 274.
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and the pernicious influences of the ‘scoundrel rabble’. He envisaged a city built on a
circular plan consisting of two walled cities: one concentrically inside the other, with the
poor enclosed within the inner city.21
This wall, I believe, should not run diametrically across the city but 
should form a kind of circle. For the wealthy citizens are happier in more 
spacious surroundings and would readily accept being excluded by an 
inner wall, and would not unwillingly leave the stalls and the town-center 
workshops to the market traders; and that rabble, as Terence’s Gnatho 
calls them, of poulterers, butchers, cooks, and so on, will be less of a risk 
and less of a nuisance if they do not mix with the important citizens.22
This space is full of the cosmopolitan drive to order and control rational space.
Francoise Choay reads Alberti’s De re aedificatoria, presented to Pope Nicholas V in
1452 and first printed by Poliziano in 1485, as an ‘instaurational’ text that founded the
discourse of urbanism. It was the first text to conceive of the built domain as a totality
and the first to propose a rational method for conceptualizing and realizing buildings. De
re aedificatoria was part of an epistemological configuration constituted by
investigations into space in architecture, painting and sculpture, part of a ‘cultural
revolution ‘which resulted in the imposition of a new ideal of control over the world and
a transformation of relations between European man and his productions. ’23 For Martines
the panels show ‘vast organized spaces, or spaces more neatly boxed and absolutely
controlled. Both the visual and scripted discourses of ideal cities are part of the modem
culture of space, the site of the idea of the modem territorial state, in which man as
sovereign subject seeks to control and order a rationalized space. In the projects of the
ideal city, says Martines, ‘power and imagination united and the ensuing vision of space
was domineering, moved by a faith in men’s ability to control the spatial continuum.’24
If we were to replace the words ‘ideal city’ with ‘idea of the territorial state’ in the
following quote we would have a good summary of our argument:
21 Alberti, On the Art o f Building, V: 1 & 6. Alberti’s utopia was a product of its time, ‘adapted 
to the realities of fifteenth-century Italy and thus envisioned under different forms of government -  a 
republic; a prince ruling in accord with his subjects; or one imposing his will, a tyrannus.' Krautheimer, 
‘The Panels Reconsidered’, p. 255.
22
Alberti, De re aedificatoria, p. 118.
Fran?oise Choay, The Rule and the Method: On the Theory o f Architecture and Urbanism 
(Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1997). p. 5.
24Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 272.
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The perfected forms of the imaginary ideal city -  grand, symmetrical, 
proportioned, in fixed optical recession -  went forth from a wish for 
control over the whole enviroment and from the implicit assumption that 
this was possible. The quest for the control of space in architecture, 
painting, and bas-relief sculpture was not analogous to a policy for more 
hegemony over the entire society; it belonged, rather, to the same 
movement of consciousness. Behind the two different enterprises was the 
same drive to comprehend the environment: to convert the surroundings, 
urban and even rural to a “known” field.25
Wither the Territorial State?
I hope to have shown that the idea of the territorial state is not an ahistorial universal 
category of knowledge but a specific representation of a particular modem configuration 
of political space. The idea of the territorial state is a modem idea. Its origins can be 
traced to the dawning of modernity. The modernity of the idea of the territorial state raise 
one final question: what status can this idea have in an age when the modem appears to 
be being replaced by the postmodern.
Within International Relations there is a growing body of work that is revising 
Herz’s theme that demise of the idea of the territorial state is imminent. This time 
however the argument is that the idea of the territorial state does not sit comfortably with 
the landscape of a postmodern international order. John Ruggie feels that at the present 
moment of discontinuity in the history of the international system, when ‘postmodern 
forms of configuring political space’ are becoming increasingly prevalent, the idea of the 
territorial state is becoming a conceptual dinosaur.26 Rob Walker agrees that international 
and political theory which continues to affirm the sovereign and territorial independence 
of states is at odds with contemporary experiences of ‘temporality, speed, velocity and 
acceleration’. In a world of global flows of capital, internationalised production and 
transnational cultural experiences ‘the complexity of spatial relations is more obvious 
than the simple legalistic maps of state sovereignty. ’27 Most damming of all, John Agnew
Martines, Power and Imagination, p. 275.
7f%John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organisation, 47:1 (Winter 1993), pp. 138-74, quotes from pp. 143-4.
77R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 5 & 46.
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and Stuart Corbridge argue that the discipline of International Relations is caught in a 
‘territorial trap’. International theory clinging to territorial representations of the state 
based ‘on the methodological assumption of “timeless space” and the ontological 
presupposition that social, economic and political life can be contained within the state’s 
territorial boundaries’ is becoming increasingly irrelevant in a world of population 
movements, capital mobility, ecological interdependence, the information economy and 
military chronopolitics.28
These critiques of the idea of the territorial state in contemporary International 
Relations theory, reflect a general sense that order of the modem culture of space that 
emerged in the Renaissance may be coming to an end. We are informed that established 
modem conceptions of sovereignty, identity and violence, precisely those which we saw 
are grounded in the space of the idea of the territorial state, are dissolving into new 
postmodern configurations.
Gearoid O’ Tauthail and Tim Luke claim that the modem world order is no longer 
one based in sovereign territorial states but is characterized by new types of post­
territorial sovereignties. For O’ Tauthail the ‘new spatiality of flows’ of regimes of 
information, globalization and capital which move in ‘multiple, decentered flowmations’ 
are ‘provoking the development of un-stated space, networks, and webs that are not 
simply beyond, but overwhelm the jurisdictional power and territorial control of 
sovereign states.’29 The territorial state, claims Luke, is isolated in hyperreal currents of 
informationalization and is unable to exercise its traditional geopolitical desires to police 
its territories, populations and markets.30 The mles and norms established by state 
territories regarding their internal and external sovereignty are permeated by ‘un-stated 
sovran potentates’ constituted in the flows of ‘Islam, populism, ecology, racialism, or 
gender to the drug trade, global tourism, fast capital, computer networks or mass media’31
yo #
John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International 
Political Economy (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 78-100.
29Gear6id 6  Tuathail, ‘At the End of Geopolitics? Reflections on a Plural Problematic at the 
Century’s End’, Alternatives, 22:1 (1997), pp. 35-55, p. 45.
30Timothy W. Luke, ‘Placing Power/Siting Space: The Politics of Global and Local in the New 
World Order’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 12 (1994), pp. 613-28.
31Timothy W. Luke, ‘Govemmentality and Contragovemmentality: Rethinking Sovereignty and 
Territoriality After the Cold War’ Political Geography, 15:6/7 (1996), pp. 491-507, at p. 500.
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Centered sovereignty is being replaced by ‘unstated sovrantees -  decentered power 
centres, illegitimate law-making bodies, unruly rule setting agencies’ these ‘fissionable 
nuclei’ are able to enter traverse and leave spaces that states can no longer exercise 
control over.32
As territorial sovereignty erodes, territorially-based violence gives way to a
regime of chronopolitics centered on the war-machine. Paul Virilio argues that space is
being effaced by speed.33 Since the industrial or dromocratic revolution, mankind has
passed ‘from the age of brakes to the age of the accelerator.’34 The age of geopolitics
represented by the city-state and nation-state capable of mapping ‘out a political space
that existed in a given duration’ by parceling out geographical space and organizing
populations within territories, is over.35 In the era of speed, geography has been replaced
by chronology as new technological vectors of transport, communication and warfare
have deregulated distance:
Space is no longer in geography -  it’s in electronics. Unity is in the 
terminals. It’s in the instantaneous time of command posts, multi-national 
headquarters, control towers, etc. Politics is less in physical space than in 
the time systems administered by various technologies, from 
telecommunications to airplanes ... There is a movement from geo- to 
chronopolitics: the distribution of territory becomes the distribution of 
time. The distribution of territory is outmoded, minimal.36
As speed restricts the field of freedom, Virilio anticipates a dystopian future in which
‘nothing is left but absolute immediate control’ and in which ‘ [t]he loss of material space
leads to the government of nothing but time.’37 James Der Derian argues that speed in
combination with the technologies of simulation and surveillance has produced new
‘technostrategic practices’ which privilege image over fact and time over space,
32Luke, ‘Govemmentality’, p. 505.
33See, among many other works, Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology, trans 
Mark Polizotti, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1986); and Paul Virilio (with Sylvere Lotringer), Pure War, 
trans. Mark Polizotti, (New York NY, Semiotext(e), 1983).
34Virilio, Pure War, p. 45. Until the industrial or, as Virilio prefers to call it, dromocratic 
revolution, the potential for producing speed was limited by the capabilities of horse and ship. Society was 
‘founded on the brake, in obstacles: ramparts, laws and interdictions. The term dromology is derived from 
dromos, race.
35Virilio, Pure War, p. 60.
36Virilio, Pure War, p. 115.
37Virilio, Speed and Politics, p. 141.
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producing a ‘war of perception and representation’.38 International relations is today no 
longer a ‘realm defined by sovereign places, impermeable borders and rigid geopolitics’ 
but ‘a site of accelerating flows, contested borders, and fluid chronopolitics.’39
These transformations in the spatial qualities of sovereignty and violence are 
complemented by a de-spatialisation of identity. According to Fredric Jameson the 
Cartesian subject is disorientated by the landscape of the postmodern in which an all- 
pervasive spatial logic has effaced historical time and eliminated ‘the past as “referent”, 
leaving us with ‘nothing but texts.’40 The disorientation felt by the modem subject as it 
attempt to negotiate postmodern space is typified by the visitor to Frank Gehry’s House 
in Santa Monica who is positioned in a space of contradictory perspective in which the 
standing human subject of Renaissance perspective is denied a place. As the postmodern 
erases the traditional referents of family, city or state, the subject is faced with an 
increasing level of spatial abstraction and displacement.41 The modem subject submerged 
within the abstract spaces of global, multinational, de-centered capitalism, spaces in 
which the traditional referents of depth, distance and perspective are no longer viable, 
lacks the necessary conceptual tools and vocabularies with which to map them and its 
place within them. In the saturated spaces of postmodemity constituting a 
‘multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities’ the modem subject becomes 
fragmented and schizophrenically de-centered.42 Along with our subjectivity, the spaces 
of the postmodern threaten our notion of identity in place. Marc Auge claims that today 
‘anthropological places’ in which individuals were once able to negotiate their place in 
society in terms of historical genealogies, bounded relations and coherent identities, that 
is through the ‘concrete and symbolic construction of space’, are being substituted by 
non-places or spaces ‘which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned
38James Der Derian, ‘The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 34:3 (1990), pp. 295-310.
39James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge MA, Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992), pp. 129-30.
40See, Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, New Left 
Review, 146 (July-August 1984), pp. 53-92 at p. 66.
41For Jameson’s discussion of Gehry’s architecture and postmodern space, see Fredric Jameson, 
Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London, Verso, 1991), pp. 412-3.
42Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 413.
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with identity.’43 These non-places -  motorways, airport terminals, supermarkets, 
computer screens, automatic cash dispensers -  are the spaces of a world ‘surrendered to 
solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral.’44 In non-places the 
social contract is mediated by abstract signs and images which constitute the individual 
as a homogeneous identity -  as customer, passenger or banker, yet also ensure that the 
individual’s experience of these spaces is solitary.45
These accounts of the transition from a modem to postmodern spatial order lead 
to a number of final reflections in the context of our work on the discursive production 
and origins of the idea of the Realist-Weberian territorial state in Renaissance Italy. First, 
these narratives all endorse the inter-disciplinary research undertaken here. They insist 
that we trace the contours of the postmodern spatial order in terms of the emergent logics 
of sovereignty, violence and identity. Second, they all confirm that the spaces of politics, 
be they the modem spaces of the sovereign territorial state or the post-territorial political 
spaces of the postmodern, must be analyzed in terms of their positions in networks of 
heterogeneous discourses and practices of space, which they both produce and are 
produced by. Cartographers of the unfamiliar political spaces of postmodemity must 
begin to trace their contours by addressing the whole postmodern culture of space and the 
conditions of possibility that it establishes for the ways in which we order, represent and 
experience space. Perhaps this research into the origins of the idea of the modem 
territorial state can suggest some ways in which we can begin to identify the origins of 
the idea of the postmodern post-territorial state.
43Marc Augd, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (London, Verso 
1995) pp. 77-8. For Aug6 it is possible to ‘contrast the realities of transit (transit camps or passengers in 
transit) with those of residence or dwelling; the interchange (where nobody crosses anyone else’s path) with 
the crossroads (where people meet); the passenger (defined by his destination) with the traveller (who 
strolls along his route...’, the housing estate... where people do not live together and which is never situated 
in the centre of anything... with the monument where people share and commemorate’, pp. 107-8.
44Aug6, Non-places, p. 78.
45Aug6, Non-places, p. 103. Augd illustrates this phenomenon with reference to the experience 
of motorway travel. Motorways no longer pass through places and thus deny the driver or passenger direct 
experience of the rhythms of daily life. The individual speeding past a place is only aware of it and able 
to imagine it in terms of the signs and images referring to it on motorway notices.
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